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**A SERIES  
OF  
PAMPHLETS AND LEAFLETS  
ON  
CANADA AND THE NAVY**

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**ISSUED BY  
THE LIBERAL INFORMATION OFFICE  
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# CANADA AND THE NAVY.

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# CANADA AND THE NAVY

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A SPEECH

DELIVERED BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

**SIR WILFRID LAURIER**

P.C., G.C.M.G., M.P.

(LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION)

*In Moving Amendment to the Naval Aid Bill  
in the House of Commons on  
December 12th, 1912*

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# Canada and the Navy

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Rt. Hon. Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Mr. Speaker, as I rise to present to the House the views of His Majesty's loyal Opposition upon the measure which has been presented to it by my right hon. friend, perhaps it will not be out of place if I refer to the fact that some few months ago a document came to me, as well as to my right hon. friend, signed by some of the most important citizens of Canada belonging to both parties, strongly urging that the subject of Imperial defence should be removed from the domain of contentious politics. The motive which animated these important and respected citizens is certainly worthy of all encomium, and, so far as I am concerned, meets altogether with my approbation; but I may be permitted to observe that if the question of Imperial defence has been introduced into the domain of contentious politics, the blame is not to be imputed to any one sitting on this side of the House.

## How the Navy was Brought into Politics.

When four years ago, my hon. friend from North Toronto (Hon. Mr. Foster) introduced this subject in a concrete form, we were in control of the House, and the House will agree with me that we did not receive his motion in any carping spirit. The motion moved by my hon. friend was to this effect:

"That, in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."

We received the proposition of my hon. friend quite sympathetically, and we suggested to him that it would be advisable to enlarge it and to bring it to the broader basis of Imperial defence, in view especially of the new conditions which were then and had been for some time arising in Europe. I am bound to say that our suggestion was well received by our friends on the other side, and they in turn offered us some amendments which we were only too glad to receive. The original motion of my hon. friend thus amended, was passed by the unanimous voice of Parliament. It was in these terms:

This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relation between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial treasury for naval and



military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire and the peace of the world.

The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the Empire.

The ink was scarcely dry upon that resolution before it was assailed from the ranks of the Conservative party, assailed from motives divergent and contradictory. One section affirmed that the duty of Canada towards the Empire would not be properly discharged by the creation of a Canadian navy, but that the only manner in which this duty could be discharged was by contributions from the Canadian treasury to the Imperial treasury. The other section, on the contrary, protested against the very idea either of a contribution or of the creation of a Canadian navy. This was introducing with a vengeance into the domain of contentious politics the question of Imperial defence and it also let loose passions which we had hoped were buried, but which we found were easily brought to life again. Can it be denied that the result was affected by these feelings in the last contest?

Under such circumstances, there might perhaps be some temptation to retaliate, and to create political capital out of the difficulties of the gentlemen who now occupy the Treasury benches,—difficulties which have resulted and culminated in the resignation of one of the most important of their number. But, Sir, the subject is too great, too sacred. By such methods we will not be impelled to act, by such methods we do not desire to win. I have stated before, and I now repeat—and I think that always I have been true to my pledge—that never would I utter a word which would be calculated to fan the flames which unfortunately this subject has rekindled. I have stated before, and again I repeat, that in the consideration of the measure which was to be brought forth, and which has been brought forth by the Administration; we would be guided by its merits, and by its merits alone. My right hon. friend, the other day, in presenting his resolution—and he presented it in terms to which I do not take exception, as I said at the time—stated that he was animated—this may not have been his exact words, but it is the effect of what he said—by no other purpose than to promote the welfare of Canada and of the Empire to which we belong. Let me say to my right hon. friend that I am glad to meet him upon this ground. If we differ from him on the policy which he has presented to the House, it is because we are firmly convinced, in our consciences and our souls, that the policy which we advocate is more conducive to the end which he says he has in mind than the policy which he has presented.



## No Emergency. England in No Danger

Sir, the country expected and waited with great impatience for the announcement to be made, and which has now been made by the right hon. the Prime Minister after consultation with the Admiralty. Mr. Asquith, Mr. Churchill, Sir Edward Grey, had again and again asserted that England had no enemy, that she was prepared and ready for all comers. Still, there was an apprehension far and widespread that, somehow, somewhere, some mysterious danger was threatening England. And, indeed, some went so far as to say that England was on her knees, begging for support—an assertion which surely was more calculated to wound the pride of those to whom it was addressed than to create respect for those who uttered it. All these apprehensions, however, have been removed by the document which was placed on the table of the House by my right hon. friend. England is always England; she bows the knee to no one; she asks no favour from anybody; she does not come here as a suppliant, still less as a mendicant; but, to the enquiry of our ministers, she answered: Here are the facts set forth in this paper; judge for yourselves and act as you please. This is the language, and it is no other than what we might expect from English statesmen and the English people.

Sir, in other respects there is cause for rejoicing. This document shows that there is no emergency, that England is in no danger, whether imminent or prospective. But the document discloses a condition of things, of which indeed we knew, but upon which has now been placed the sanction of official correspondence. It shows that there has been going on in Europe for some years past a certain movement to which we cannot be indifferent. The armament of the great powers has compelled England to alter the strategic lines which hitherto have been essential to her security. The document discloses the fact that, on account of this increased naval armament, England, in order to maintain her security in her own waters, has been obliged to withdraw some of her naval forces from the distant seas. This, I believe, is a fair statement of what is disclosed by the document laid upon the table by my right hon. friend. In the face of this position, I now ask the question: What is the duty of the House of Commons, what is the duty of the people of Canada? That is the question.

### Appeals to Prejudice by Conservatives in Quebec

But, before I proceed to give my answer, I think it would be advisable that I should come nearer home, and review the situation as it has been made by the division of the two parties during the last contest. During the last contest in the province of Quebec, the Conservative party, as a whole, with some exceptions, which I could count upon the fingers of one hand, or at most upon the fingers of two hands—contended upon hundreds of platforms that Canada owed nothing to England—

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I am glad there are some hon. members who say, 'No, no,' to that statement. I cannot accept their denial; the facts are too patent. But at least the denial shows that these hon. gentlemen resent the conduct of some men with whom they are now forced to associate. The position taken, I repeat, by the Conservative party in



the province of Quebec—at that time they were not the followers of my right hon. friend; they were an independent party—was that Canada owed nothing to England and discharged its whole duty in the matter of defence simply by providing for the defence of her own shores. I am glad to say there is another spirit prevailing now. Conditions seen from another angle have changed the view. But when harmful doctrines of that kind have been preached for months and years, that preaching leaves behind it an impression which it is much more easy to create than it is afterwards to destroy.

We have recently heard throughout the province of Quebec that we owe nothing to England, because in the long chapter of our diplomatic history she has sacrificed our interests in the adjustment of the boundaries between ourselves and our neighbours to the South. For my part, I have often stated that in such questions British diplomacy has not shown itself to advantage. And what conclusion are we to draw from this? Are we to draw the conclusion that England was indifferent to our interests? Nothing of the kind. Are we to draw the conclusion that England wantonly sacrificed our interests? Still less may this be presumed. The only conclusion we can draw is that in these matters British diplomatists were not as well informed as those of the United States in regard to every inch of ground which was in issue. This shows conclusively that local matters are always better dealt with by those responsible for local administration. The fact is undeniable that, practically ever since we have had in our hands the conduct of our diplomatic relations, Canada has suffered no sacrifice. In the last dispute we had with our neighbours, on the question of the Atlantic fisheries, not only did we not suffer any sacrifice, but we obtained recognition of rights which had been long denied.

As a result of this deleterious preaching to which I referred a moment ago, we have lately heard in the province of Quebec that England, forsooth, had sacrificed our interests because she had not interfered on behalf of the South in the American civil war! The young gentleman who made that assertion I know quite well. It was not his better nature that thus spoke, and I am sure he will some day appreciate the fact—if he has not already done so—that if there is one thing which tends to the glory of England it is that when the North and the South were engaged in that titanic struggle resulting in the abolition of African slavery, she would not interfere as against what might have been her own interests; and, as a result of her non-interference, that blot upon Christian civilization has forever been wiped out. England is too great to fear or to begrudge the greatness of the United States, and no British subject, wherever he may be, has any cause to resent or fear the rise of any other power.

### **Canada's Position Within the Empire**

Sir, there does not exist the necessity for our saying what we owe to England. We are British subjects; we do not want to be anything else; and that settles the whole question. If there are men in the Province of Quebec who will not recognize this truth, let me appeal to them from another point of view—from the baser motive of selfishness. We have been immune from invasion by the sea ever since we became subjects of England by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. But can we say to-day that

we are now immune from invasion by the sea? At the end of the seventeenth century, there were only three maritime powers in Europe—England, France and Spain. In 1805, at the memorable battle of Trafalgar, the naval forces of France and Spain were crushed. Spain never recovered from the blow; but France, owing to her marvellous recuperative strength, soon built a navy second only to that of England. The navy of France ranks to-day second or third among those of the different countries of Europe; but, happily, we have nothing to fear from France. The *entente cordiale* has brought France and England together in such close friendship that war between these countries would, I am sure, be regarded by either nation as equivalent to civil war in any one of them. I have heard that the late Queen said on one occasion she would rather die than see another war between England and France. The good Queen did not live to see accomplished that dream of her life, the '*entente cordiale*,' but it was left to her son to accomplish it, and we to-day receive the benefit of it. There are other maritime powers to which we are exposed, although I do not apprehend any attack from them, nor do I consider that there is even any contemplated; but I am sure we must all agree that when increased armaments are going on we cannot afford to be idle and rest upon a sense that our security in the past would be a guarantee of security in the future.

It has also been said in the province of Quebec during the last contest that we could rely on the Monroe Doctrine. To anyone who would rely upon the Monroe Doctrine, I would say, let him examine the record of Cuba after the Spanish-American war. When the Cubans were desirous of removing the yoke of Spain, they appealed to the United States for help, and they got it, but when, with the assistance of the United States, they had freed themselves from the control of Spain, they found that they had a rather high price to pay for the help they had received. That price was the abridgement of a portion of their independence. After the war was over, the people of Cuba naturally wanted to establish a regular government of their own. They called a convention and adopted a constitution, but that constitution had to go to Washington for revision, and there after three months discussion, certain conditions were imposed upon Cuba which to the people of that country were extremely distasteful, which convention they adopted by a narrow majority of five. The following conditions were made part of the constitution of Cuba:

Cuba shall not make any foreign treaty which may tend toward placing the independence of the island or any portion thereof in jeopardy; no loans can be issued unless a surplus of revenue is available for the service of such obligations; the United States can intervene to preserve the independence of Cuba or to insure protection for life and property; the Acts of the United States military administration in Cuba since 1898 are recognized as valid; proper hygienic precautions must be taken to protect public health on the island; the ownership of the Isle of Pines is left for future consideration; coaling stations shall be sold or leased to the United States in localities to be hereafter decided.

This shows how much Cuba had to discard of her sovereign power for the sake of the Monroe Doctrine. We have to take our share in the defence, not only of our native shores, but of the Empire as a whole. We can defend ourselves only by the assistance of the Mother Country.

## **The Need at the Present Time**

Now, I come back to the question which I put a moment ago upon the condition disclosed by the memorandum of the Admiralty. Let me state it again. As a result of the armaments which are now going on in Europe, England has been obliged to increase the margin of security which she relies on for her own defence, by reducing her naval forces in the outlying seas. Such is the condition; and, I ask once more, what is the remedy? In our humble judgment, the remedy is this, that wherever, in the distant seas, or in the distant countries—in Australia, Canada or elsewhere—a British ship has been removed to allow of concentration in European waters, that ship should be replaced by a ship built, maintained, equipped and manned by the young nation immediately concerned. If the young nations of the Empire take hold of the equipment and manning of ships to look after the distant seas, concentration can easily take place in the waters of Europe, and the British Admiralty knows what zones it has to defend. This is the Australian policy; this ought to be the Canadian policy. I insist once more upon what is stated in the memorandum: There is no emergency, there is no immediate danger, there is no prospective danger. If there were an emergency, if England were in danger—no, I will not use that expression; I will not say if England were in danger, but simply if England were on trial with one or two or more of the great powers of Europe, my right hon. friend might come and ask, not \$35,000,000, but twice, three times, four times \$35,000,000. We would put at the disposal of England all the resources of Canada; there would not be a single dissentient voice.

### **Both Parties Favored a Canadian Service Naval**

But this is not the condition with which we have to deal. The condition that we have to deal with to-day is simply what I described a moment ago. This is not new. The memorandum which my right hon. friend submitted the other day disclosed nothing which we did not know before. Every word that is there we knew; every figure we knew. I may say more; every word, every figure in that memorandum we discussed four years ago. We discussed it in the month of March, 1909; and then we came to the conclusion, the unanimous conclusion, that the best method of helping England, of discharging our duty, was not by contribution, but by the creation of a Canadian navy. Sir, I remember very well the question on that occasion, and those who were present in the House at that time cannot have forgotten it. This question gave rise to one of the most important debates which, in the some thirty years of my own experience, the Parliament of Canada ever saw. I remember the speech of my hon. friend from North Toronto (Mr. Foster), an excellent speech, one of the very best he ever made, and that is paying a great compliment, well deserved. I remember the speech of my right hon. friend (Mr. Borden), the present Prime Minister, and if ever a man gave reasons against the policy which he has now introduced, my hon. right friend gave those reasons on that occasion. This is his language:

In so far as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister to-day outlined the lines of naval defence of this country, I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should



proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that. The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the Mother Country and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect. In Great Britain the contribution has perhaps been regarded as rather unsatisfactory. In Australia it failed, in the end, to meet with the approval of the people for the reason that Great Britain felt constrained to ask Australia that the field of operations of the squadron should be extended to the China and Indian seas; and when the operation of that squadron was so extended, the Australians felt that the contribution which they had been making for some years past was not really being used to give that protection to Australia which her interests demanded. So that the policy of Australia at the present time is to build up a flotilla of submarines and torpedo boats which, in case of war, would co-operate with the armed cruisers and battleships of the British navy.

Mark these words, Sir:

So that the policy of Australia at the present time is to build up a flotilla of submarines and torpedo boats,—

I have heard that described as a tin-pot navy——  
—which, in case of war, would co-operate with the armed cruisers and battleships of the British navy. It was pointed out in discussing this question that Australia in providing a force of that kind would provide a force which it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for Great Britain to send across the seas and that in thus protecting themselves they were providing the best possible force for the protection of the Empire. So, I am at one with the Prime Minister so far as this is concerned.

No less forcible was the language of my hon. friend from North Toronto. He said:

The first and greatest objection which I have to a fixed money contribution is that it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ourselves ought to do; as though a man, the father of a family, in lusty health and strength, should pay his neighbour something per month for looking after the welfare and safety of his home instead of doing that duty himself. That seems to me, when you work it out, to be a basic objection to this form of aid. It goes still further than that. Suppose you contribute this year your sum, and next year your equal sum, and thereafter year after year. After ten or twelve, or twenty, or thirty years, you will have paid out an immense amount of money. You will have been protected in the meantime; but in Canada itself there will be no roots struck, there will be no residue left.

There will be no preparation of the soil, or beginning of the growth of the product of defence. Yet some time or other, no one can doubt that with resources and with a population constantly increasing, we must and will have in this country a naval force of our own for our coast and home defence.

### How the Change Came About to a Hybrid Policy

Four years ago, my right hon. friend said we must and will. To-day, he no longer says we must and will; but we on this side of the House continue to say we must and will. Now, Sir, I ask, why is it that my right hon. friend and his first lieutenant, the leaders of the Opposition then, who to-day have the responsibility of office, will not go on with the policy so forcibly put forward by them, instead of a policy under which, in the language of my right hon. friend, there will be no preparation

of the soil or beginning or growth of the product of defence? The reason, Sir, is not far to seek. The reason is well known: there is one, and only one, and it is because this subject of Imperial defence has been made the subject of contentious politics. It is the result of the alliance, the unholy alliance, which has been formed by hon. gentlemen opposite.

What is this contribution that we have to-day before us, and upon which we are asked to vote? It is big in money; it is big in figures. Is it as big otherwise as it ought to be? I ask every hon. member of this House; I ask every hon. gentleman sitting there: You give England two or three Dreadnoughts, to be paid for by Canada, but to be equipped, maintained and manned by England. Did I say, manned by England? I must qualify that statement. In justice to my right hon. friend, I must qualify that statement; because he told us that he had secured from the Imperial authorities the privilege of having Canadian officers serve on those ships. Oh, ye Tory jingoes, is that the amount of the sacrifice you are prepared to make? You are ready to furnish admirals, rear admirals, commodores, captains, officers of all grades, plumes, feathers, and gold lace; but you leave it to England to supply the bone and sinews on board those ships. You say that these ships shall bear Canadian names. That will be the only thing Canadian about them. You hire somebody to do your work; in other words, you are ready to do anything except the fighting. Is that, Sir, the true policy?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Is that the true policy? It is a hybrid policy, it is a cross between jingoism and Nationalism. Unless I mistake the spirit of the Canadian people, if they are true to their ideals, if they are true to their own blood, no matter to what province they belong, they will not be satisfied with this hybrid policy, but they will insist that their contribution shall be a contribution of money and of men as well, as was provided in our resolution of 1909.

### **A Canadian Naval Service Remains the True Policy**

Mr. Speaker, it is not money that England wants at this moment. England never was wealthier than she is at the present time; her coffers are overflowing. What she wants is the hearts, the brains, and the brawn of her subjects all over the world. It has been stated—I hope it will prove true—that this generous contribution of \$35,000,000 to the Imperial treasury will create a deep impression in Europe amongst the great powers. I hope it is true, but would not the impression be much greater yet if, instead of this money contribution, the nations of Europe were to see the young daughters of the Empire, the young nations scattered over the whole world, building fleets of their own, to use the language of the resolution of 1909—

—in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world.

Would not that create a greater impression? Many there are, and I am one of them, who deprecate the important fact that upon the distant

seas they do not count as many pennants as they counted some few years ago, but let this policy be adopted, and then the full quota, which we saw at one time, of our ships on the distant seas, would be re-established, and the white ensign, which has been for so many centuries the symbol of England's naval pride, would again unfurl its folds on the seven seas. Then, Sir, we would see, besides the white ensign, the colours of the young nations themselves, attesting the solidarity between mother and daughter. That is the policy which we adopted, that is the policy which we intend to follow.

But I may be told that that is not the policy recommended by the Admiralty to the Prime Minister. Sir, I deny that altogether. My right hon. friend did not go to England to consult the Admiralty about a policy. It is evident that when my right hon. friend went to England, he had abandoned the policy of a Canadian navy. He went to England—it is very clear from the last paragraph of the memorandum—to ask what they would accept for immediate aid. In other words, he went to England to ask what England would accept in the case of an emergency, although there was no emergency.

Therefore, we come back to the question: what is the true policy? Is it a policy of emergency, which, as stated by my hon. friend from North Toronto, which produces nothing and leaves nothing behind, or is it a policy of naval organization in Canada? That is the problem we have to deal with at the present time. Australia has adopted the same policy, and she has adopted it for the reason stated by my hon. friend in the debate of 1909: that having tried contribution, she found that contribution would not work. Australia, therefore, came to the conclusion which we came to: she came to the conclusion that gentlemen now sitting on the Government benches came to, but which they have abandoned, and abandoned for what reason? For no other than the well known reason of their alliance with the Nationalist party of Quebec.

Well, Mr. Speaker, we went on with the execution of our policy. We asked for tenders, with the intention of having ultimately a double unit, one on the Pacific ocean and one on the Atlantic ocean; we asked for tenders for four cruisers and six destroyers, which would cost \$11,280,000. We did not choose to award the contract, in view of the impending change of Government.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Yes; we thought as the general elections were coming, that it would not be fair, in a matter of this kind, which was at issue between the two parties, to award the contract in case there might be, as there was, a change of government. I say now that the Government in power would have been better advised if they had awarded the contracts, and, had they done so, we would, at the present time, have under construction on the stocks in Montreal four cruisers and six destroyers.

There is another reason which causes us to stick to our policy of a Canadian navy. I have to thank my right hon. friend the Prime Minister for bringing down to-day some papers—not those for which I enquired yesterday—but some papers which show us the policy of Canadian construction of our navy is so strong that he and his Government are trying



to trifle with that question by endeavouring to get some ships built in Canada, which he tells us may happen some time in the spring. There is a better way of doing it. Let us have a Canadian navy, and as soon as practicable, and then all the ships will be built in Canada. I have reason to believe that the Minister of the Naval Service has actually an offer from one of the great British firms, to build the largest possible plant in Montreal if he chooses to have it.

### Concerning Canada's Participation in Imperial Wars

I now come to another subject, which I would not have mentioned at all were it not for some observations made during the Debate on the Address by the hon. member for Kingston (Mr. Nickle). During the last electoral contest, I heard it many a time, and I read it many a time, that our Canadian navy was a separatist navy, and that it was, on account of something which was to be found in the Act, liable to be neutral in time of war. I have been too long in the fight to care very much for what may be said of me during an electoral contest; but when a thing is repeated upon the floor of Parliament within my hearing, I owe it to myself to take notice of it. And, just here, apropos of this, let me recall a classical and historical incident. On the eve of the battle of Salamis, Themistocles offered advice to the commander of the fleet of the Greeks, and, although that advice ultimately prevailed and carried the Greeks to victory, the Greek commander at first refused to accept it; and, on Themistocles persisting, the commander raised his staff to strike him. Themistocles said: 'Strike, but hear me.' Sir, I have been struck, but I still say: 'Hear me.' In refutation of the charge that the Navy Act was intentionally, on my part, separatist, I think it is sufficient for me to set up the record of my seventy years of life. I do not entertain, at the age of seventy, many of the ideas I had at twenty, or at thirty, or even at forty; but I trust I have not lived in vain, and that in the course of my long career I have learned something from observation and experience. Let the matter be settled once and for all, not only for myself, but for my friends here and outside, by my declaration: that any thought of separation from Great Britain, if any such thought exists anywhere, and I do not believe it does—would be a folly and a crime. As to the contention of my hon. friend from Kingston that in case of war our navy would be neutral, I have only this to observe. I said a moment ago that I hope I have not lived in vain, and I hope I am to be given credit for some common sense and some knowledge, and my answer to that contention is: when England is at war, we are at war, and the thought of being neutral would be like the command of King Canute to the sea to recede from his feet. No action of ours could bring that about. When England is at war, we are at war; but it does not follow that because we are at war we are actually in the conflict.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: We can be in the conflict only through two things, namely, actual invasion of our soil, or, the action of the Parliament of Canada. That seems to arouse the hilarity of gentlemen on the other side of the House.

Mr. GRAHAM: They have not read much history.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Perhaps, if I answer these hon. gentlemen opposite by citing history, that will be the best answer of all. How many wars have we had since Canada became a British possession? Speaking from memory, we had first, in 1776, the war with the American colonies; we had next the war with France, which commenced in 1793 and lasted until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815; we had the war with the American Republic in 1812 and 1813; we had next the war with Turkey for the independence of Greece in 1827; we had next the Crimean war with Russia in 1854; we had next the war with China in 1860; we had next the expedition to Abyssinia in 1868; we had the expedition to Egypt in 1882; and last of all, we had the Boer war in 1899.

Mr. BENNETT (East Simcoe): We were in it.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I did not expect such a compliment to the Liberal Government would come from my friend from East Simcoe. We were in it on account of the action taken by the Canadian Government and the Canadian Parliament at that time.

We were in it in the war with the American colonies in 1776; we were in it in the war with the American republic in 1812-13; but we were not in it in the war with France; we were not in it in the war with Turkey; we were not in it in the Crimean war; we were not in it in the expedition to Abyssinia or the Soudan war of 1885. We might have been in that, but Sir John A. Macdonald, then leader of the Government, refused. Why should we attempt to trifle with such questions as these? Is it not a fact that our forces can go to war only by the action of this Parliament? You may give your sanction, now or at any time if you choose; but no one in this country will claim that we can go to war, except by the will of Parliament or by the force of circumstances.

### **A Comparison of the Two Policies**

Some objections have been made to our Naval Act, because it was said that the British Admiralty could not count at all times upon the support of the Canadian navy. I simply say that the Admiralty can count at all times upon the Canadian navy, because last year we passed an agreement with the Admiralty, whereby naval stations were created for the Canadian navy. The Canadian Atlantic station would include north of 30 north latitude and west of the meridian of 40 west longitude. The Canadian Pacific station would include north of 30 north latitude and east of the meridian of 180 west longitude. So the Admiralty knew that at all times in those bodies of water there were Canadian ships to guard the waters; and the moment the ships of an enemy of England appeared in those waters it was the duty of our navy to pounce upon them, to grapple with them and to sink them, in the same manner as if they had been in the harbour of Halifax. That is the interpretation placed upon that Act. My hon. friends, however, have to-day the administration of the Act; they can interpret it themselves; but surely they will not interpret it in the way it is said they could. They can amend it as they please; but, whatever they do, if they are sincere, as I hope they are, they cannot put any other construction than the construction I put upon this Act.

The present policy which my right hon. friend proposes settles nothing. The problem that you have to deal with is one which demands a permanent policy—a policy for to-day, for to-morrow, and for every day, so long as the armaments grow in Europe; and the duty which you owe to yourselves, to Canada, and to the Empire, is the enactment of a permanent policy. As regards the creation of a Canadian navy, you have apparently decided against that. In respect to contribution, does any one imagine that you will have only one contribution? Contributions must be recurring and again recurring, and, in the words of my hon. friend from North Toronto, they leave no trace behind them. As I understand from the speech of my hon. friend, he does not want to have a permanent policy on this subject, because, he says, 'Before we have a permanent policy, we must have a voice in all questions of peace or war.' This is a very large contract. If we are to have a discussion of that question, this is not the time for it. It is not germane to the question which we have before us to-day. We have the question of defence to deal with. When we have to deal with the danger of an enemy rushing upon us, whom we must be called to face at any moment, are we to fold our arms and do nothing until we have settled the question as to whether or not we shall have a voice in all matters of war or peace? My hon. friend is like the Emperor of Constantinople, who went to Italy to discuss questions of theology, when his city was on the eve of being assaulted by the Turks, who finally captured it. If we go on discussing the question of having a voice in matters of peace and war, the enemy may be upon us before we have settled that question, and we may never have any occasion to deal with it at all. It is a very important question, and I do not minimize it in any way; but it must be discussed separately and not in conjunction with the present question, or we shall be at a standstill.

Whether we shall or shall not have a voice in all questions affecting peace and war is a very large proposition, and I would not, at the present time, pronounce finally upon it; but there are certain objections that present themselves at once to my mind. The diplomatic service of England is carried on by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and it is to-day in as good hands as it ever was. These transactions are very minute, very serious, and sometimes must be carried on with great secrecy. I understand that my right hon. friend proposes to the English Admiralty that there should be a representative of the Canadian Government all the time in England to confer with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on all questions on which war may probably arise. If this is done for Canada, it must be done for Australia, for New Zealand, for South Africa and for Newfoundland, and I doubt very much if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would receive much assistance from such a multitude of advisers. Supposing they do not agree, or supposing they do agree, how can we pretend to dictate in these matters, or even to take a part? The Foreign Office, only last year, had to deal with the question of the division of Persia. Are we to understand that Canada and all the other Dominions would be invited to discuss such a question with the Foreign Office? A few years ago, the Afghan boundary question was a burning question with the Foreign Office. Of late years, it has been put in the background by the fact that Russia has not been in a position



to be aggressive. But that question may be revived. Within the last year, when the German Emperor sent warships to Agadir, the Foreign Office had to take immediate action upon the question whether Germany should be allowed a footing in North Africa. Would the Dominion of Canada also be interested in and be consulted upon this question? If so, it seems to me that this is opening a door to consequences which must be carefully considered before any action is taken. I do not wish to condemn the view taken by the right hon. gentleman; I do not now approve or condemn it; the subject is too new. But the point upon which I appeal to him, and to which I ask the attention of the House, is this, that we cannot postpone our preparation for defence until this question is settled. It may take a long time to settle it. Therefore, let it be settled by itself; but, in the meantime, let our preparations go on.

### Autonomy the Real Basis of Empire

My right hon. friend concluded the argumentative part of his speech with the statement that, in claiming for the overseas dominions the power to have a voice in all questions of peace and war, he was inviting the attention of the statesmen of Great Britain 'to the real problem of Imperial existence.' Mark the words: 'the real problem of Imperial existence.' I think it would be difficult for my right hon. friend, or anybody else, to convince us that the existence of the British Empire rests upon so slender a thread. We have been accustomed to believe, and we will continue to believe, that it rests upon a firmer basis. Sir, I am not indifferent—far from it—to anything that concerns the unity of the British Empire. This agglomeration of continents under the British Crown has something in it which strikes the imagination, something which has always had, at all events for me, a great attraction. But I have always believed, and will continue to believe, that the firm basis of the British Empire is, next to the British Crown, the local autonomy of the different dependencies; that is to say, their working out of their own destinies to the central end of the Empire. The Crown is the great bond, the cement, which binds together the scattered continents over the whole world. The Crown is a purely sentimental bond; but that bond, though purely sentimental, has proven itself stronger than armies and navies; has shown itself to be equal to all occasions. I do not believe the Empire is in danger; I do not believe it can be cemented by the means suggested by my right hon. friend. I believe the relations of the different parts of the Empire to the Mother Country are not perfect, but that essentially they are perfectible. You can discuss problems of improvement; there is no occasion to discuss problems of existence.

It is with these views that we approach this subject. And I repeat now, in conclusion, what I said at the beginning, that I have endeavoured to approach this subject on the same plane as my right hon. friend. I do not question his motives when he says that what he has in mind is the grandeur of our common empire. I hope he will not discuss my motive when I say that I approach the question in the same spirit. If we differ with him, it is because we believe that under existing circumstances our policy is more conducive to what he has in mind than the policy which

he has announced. Therefore, I beg to move the following as an amendment to the resolution:\*

### The Liberal Amendment

That all the words after the word 'That' be struck out, and the following be substituted therefor:—

'This House declines to concur in the said resolution and orders that the same be referred back to the committee with instructions to amend the same in the following particulars, namely, to strike out all the words after clause (a) and substitute therefor the following:

'The memorandum prepared by the Board of Admiralty on the general naval situation of the Empire and communicated to this House by the right hon. the Prime Minister on December 5th, shows that several of the most important of the foreign powers have adopted a definite policy of rapidly increasing their naval strength.

'That this condition has compelled the United Kingdom to concentrate its naval forces in home waters, involving the withdrawal of ships from the outlying portions of the Empire.

'That such withdrawal renders it necessary that Canada, without further delay, should enter actively upon a permanent policy of naval defence.

'That any measure of Canadian aid to Imperial naval defence which does not employ a permanent policy of participation by ships owned, manned and maintained by Canada and contemplating construction as soon as possible in Canada, is not an adequate or satisfactory expression of the aspirations of the Canadian people in regard to naval defence, and is not an assumption by Canada of her fair share in the maintenance of the naval strength of the Empire.

'This House regrets to learn the intention of the Government to indefinitely postpone the carrying out by Canada of a permanent naval policy.

-'It is the opinion of this House that measures should be taken at the present session to give effect actively and speedily to the permanent naval policy embodied in the Naval Service Act of 1910 passed pursuant to the resolution unanimously approved by this House in March, 1909.

'This House is further of the opinion that to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial navy by the addition by Canada, under the above Act, of two fleet units, to be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada, respectively, rather than by a contribution of money or ships, is the policy best calculated to afford relief to the United Kingdom in respect to the burden of Imperial naval defence, and, in the words of the Admiralty memorandum, to restore greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons in every sea and directly promote the security of the dominions and that the Government of Canada should take such steps as shall lead to the accomplishment of this purpose as speedily as possible.'

\*The Resolution, as moved by the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, M.P., was as follows:—

" Resolved, That it is expedient, in connection with the Bill now before this House

intituled An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire, to provide:—

(a) That from and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire;

(b) That the said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type;

(c) That the said ships, when constructed and equipped, shall be placed by the Governor in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire; and

(d) That the said sum shall be paid, used and applied, and the said ships shall be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the Governor in Council and His Majesty's Government.

Copies of this pamphlet may be had on  
application to the Central Liberal Inform-  
ation Office, Ottawa, Canada



## CANADA AND THE NAVY.

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# The Memorandum Prepared by the Board of Admiralty on the General Naval Situation.

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*(Communicated to the House of Commons of Canada by the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, M.P., Prime Minister, on the occasion of the introduction of a Bill to authorize measures for increasing the effective Naval forces of the Empire.—December 5th, 1912.)*

## WHAT IT DISCLOSES.

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### WHICH POLICY SHOULD CANADA ADOPT?

**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate gift of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battle-ships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office  
of the  
Canadian Liberal Party, Ottawa, Canada.

( Publication No. 5 )

1913

## THE TWO POLICIES.

In a consideration of the Memorandum prepared by the Board of Admiralty on the General Naval Situation, it will be well to keep in mind the following **official utterances** which have a direct bearing on the means by which it is proposed to deal with the General Naval Situation which the Memorandum discloses.

### THE SHARE OF THE DOMINIONS IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE AS OUTLINED BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

"If the main development of the past ten years has been the concentration of the British fleet in decisive theatres, it seems to me, and, I dare say, to you, not unlikely that the main development of the next ten years will be the growth of the effective naval forces in the great Dominions overseas. Then we shall be able to make what I think will be found to be the true division of labour between the Mother Country and her daughter states—that we should maintain a sea-supremacy against all-comers at the decisive point, and that they should guard and patrol all the rest of the British Empire."

\* \* \*

"The Admiralty see no reason why arrangement should not be made to give the Dominions a full measure of control over the movements in peace of any naval forces which, with our help, they may bring into efficient existence. We know that in war our Countrymen over the seas will have only one wish, and that will be to encounter the enemy wherever the need and the danger is most severe. The important thing is that the gap shall be filled so that while we, in the Old Country, guard the decisive theatre, our comrades and brothers across the seas shall keep the flag flying on the oceans of the world."

—The Times, London, May 16, 1912. From a speech of the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty, at a banquet of the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights, London, May 15, 1912.

### THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY—AS OUTLINED BY THE RT. HON. R. L. BORDEN.

"They will be the three most powerful battleships in the world."

\* \* \*

"Every Canadian will realize, in seeing or reading of these ships, that they are a gift in which he has participated."

\* \* \*

"The total cost of three such battleships, which when launched will be the most powerful in the world, would be approximately \$35,000,000 and we ask the people of Canada, through their Parliament, to grant that sum."



"They will be built under Admiralty supervision in the United Kingdom."

\* \* \*

"There have been proposals, to which I shall no more than allude, that we should build up a great Naval organization in Canada. In my humble opinion, nothing of an efficient character could be built up in this country within a quarter or perhaps half a century."

—From the speech of the Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden. Hansard, House of Commons Debates.—Dec. 5, 1912.

#### THE LIBERAL POLICY—AS OUTLINED BY THE RT. HON. SIR WILFRID LAURIER.

As a result of the armaments which are now going on in Europe, England has been obliged to increase the margin of security which she relies on for her own defence by reducing the Naval forces in the outlying seas. Such is the condition, and I ask once more, what is the remedy? In our humble judgment, the remedy is this, that wherever in the distant seas, or in the distant countries—in Australia, Canada or elsewhere—a British ship has been removed to allow of concentration in European waters, that ship should be replaced by a ship built, maintained, equipped and manned by the young nation immediately concerned. . . . . This is the Australian policy, this ought to be the Canadian policy."

\* \* \*

"The Memorandum which my right Honourable friend submitted the other day disclosed nothing which we did not know before. We discussed it in the month of March, 1909, and then we came to the conclusion, the unanimous conclusion, that the best method of helping England, of discharging our duties, was not by contribution but by the creation of a Canadian Navy."

\* \* \*

"It has been stated, I hope it will prove true,—that this generous contribution of \$35,000,000 to the Imperial treasury will create a deep impression in Europe amongst the great powers. I hope it is true, but would not the impression be much greater yet, if, instead of this money contribution, the nations of Europe were to see the young daughters of the Empire, the young nations scattered over the whole world, building fleets of their own,— to use the language of the resolution of 1909—in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference?"

—From the speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Hansard, House of Commons Debates.—Dec. 12, 1912.

## THE ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUM.

During the introduction in the House of Commons on Dec. 5th, 1912, of his bill to authorize the expenditure of \$35,000,000 towards a gift to the British Admiralty of the three most powerful battleships in the world, the Right Honourable R. L. Borden, the Prime Minister, read from a Memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty at Mr. Borden's request on the general Naval situation, which, in answer to a specific question put by Mr. Borden to the Admiralty, concludes by stating that after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances it is desirable that any immediate aid that Canada might give should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war. This Memorandum is being made to serve the purpose in public discussion of conveying the impression that an emergency exists, and is being interpreted as a request, or an expressed preference, on the part of the British Admiralty, for the presentation by Canada of dreadnoughts to the Mother Country. In point of fact, the Memorandum contains nothing to justify the view that, in the opinion of the Admiralty, an emergency exists, or that the British Government either desires or expects a contribution of the kind Mr. Borden proposes. An analysis of the document will show that it carefully avoids all expressions of opinion. The facts, it discloses, however, afford ample grounds for believing that had a free expression of opinion been granted the Home Government as to the best course for Canada to pursue, the opinion expressed would have been in entire accord with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of Canada of March, 1909, and the present proposals of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party.

The quotations which follow and which are taken from the Memorandum speak for themselves:—

### THE MEMORANDUM LEAVES CHOICE OF METHODS SOLELY TO CANADA.

The Memorandum was not presented by the Admiralty to Mr. Borden, but was prepared by the Admiralty in compliance with a request of Mr. Borden. The letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to H.R.H. the Governor-General transmitting the Memorandum is sufficient evidence of this. It is as follows:—

"Downing Street, 25th Oct., 1912."

"Sir:

1. I have the honour to transmit to Your Royal Highness the accompanying copy of a memorandum relating to the requirements of the Naval Defence of the Empire.

"2. *This document has been prepared by the Admiralty on the instruction of His Majesty's Government in compliance with the request of Mr. Borden with a view to presentation to the Dominion Parliament if, and when, the Dominion Ministers deem it necessary.*

I have, etc.,

L. HARCOURT."



The first sentence of the Memorandum is also evidence of this. It is as follows:—

*"1. The Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada has invited His Majesty's Government, through the Board of Admiralty, to prepare a statement of the present and immediately prospective requirements of the naval defence of the Empire for presentation to the Canadian Parliament if the Dominion Cabinet deem it necessary."*

The Memorandum expressly disclaims any intention to influence public opinion in the matter of the policy to be adopted respecting naval defence, and expressly states that this is a matter for the people of Canada to decide. The last two paragraphs of Section 1 of the Memorandum are as follows:—

*"The Admiralty set the greatest store by the important material, and still more important moral, assistance which it is within the power of Canada to give to maintaining British Naval supremacy on the high seas, but they think it necessary to disclaim any intention, however indirect, of putting pressure upon Canadian public opinion, or of seeking to influence the Dominion Parliament in a decision which clearly belongs solely to Canada."*

The Admiralty, therefore, confine themselves, in this statement, exclusively to facts, and *it is for the Dominion Government and Parliament to draw their own conclusions therefrom.*

#### THE MEMORANDUM CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.

There are ten sections in the Memorandum altogether.

Section 1 contains the foregoing declarations.

In Sections 2 to 4 inclusive, it is pointed out that the power of the British Empire is to be measured by reference to other naval forces, and that the development of the German fleet during the last fifteen years is the most striking feature of the naval situation. The extent of the present and possible growth of the German navy is set forth in detail. Paragraph four concludes: *"The facts set forth above were laid before the House of Commons on the 22nd July, 1912, by the First Lord of the Admiralty."*

There is, therefore, nothing in the Memorandum respecting the German situation which has not already been given to the British public and the world, and which was not before the British Parliament at the time the naval estimates were under discussion and Mr. Borden and his colleagues were in England. With these facts before them, the British Government saw no existence of an emergency. Why, therefore, should the Canadian Government draw inference of any such existing? The statement of British Ministers made in the debates when these facts were laid before the British Parliament are significant, and should be read in Canada when considering the inference to be drawn from the Memorandum.

**Section 5** sets forth the effect of the new German Law in producing a remarkable expansion of strength and readiness, all of which information has been before the British Parliament and the public ever since the Law was passed.

**Section 6** directly disproves the existence of an emergency by pointing out, in the plainest manner, the superior strength of British ships over German in home waters as far ahead as 1915. The Memorandum says:

"It is now necessary to look forward to the situation in 1915.

### IN HOME WATERS.

"In the spring of the year 1915:—

"Great Britain will have 25 'Dreadnought' battleships and 2 'Lord Nelsons.'

"Germany will have 17 'Dreadnought' battleships.

"Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.

"Germany will have 6 battle cruisers."

### THE MEMORANDUM DISCLOSES NEED FOR FLEET UNITS.

Section 6 is divided into three parts, (one) HOME WATERS, (two) MEDITERRANEAN STATION, (three) OVERSEAS.

The part relating to the Overseas is one of the strongest of arguments for the establishment of local fleet units. It is as follows:—

"It has been necessary within the past decade to concentrate the fleet mainly in Home waters.

"In 1902, there were 160 British vessels on the overseas stations against 76 to-day."

In this connection, it may be well to consider what the Right Honourable Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, said on this subject at the time the British Government was looking forward to Mr. Borden's visit to England; many months after the Laurier administration had been defeated. The London Times of May 16 gives an account of a speech delivered by Mr. Churchill at a dinner of the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights on May 15th. The Times' article is headed:—

#### "AN EMPIRE NAVY.

#### "THE COLONIES' SHARE IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

#### "MR. CHURCHILL ON THE DIVISION OF DUTIES."

The account given is verbatim, and as it refers to the approaching visit of Mr. Borden and his colleagues to England "*to consult with the Government and the Admiralty upon the course of policy which should be adopted in the future*" may be regarded as giving the true expression of opinion of the British Government on the best policy for Canada to adopt. It is an expression of opinion freed from all Canadian party influence. The views it expresses cannot be attributed to either Sir Wilfrid Laurier or Mr. Borden. Sir Wilfrid was out of office, and Mr. Borden had not yet decided upon any policy. It is therefore an unprejudiced expression of opinion by the First Lord of the Admiralty.



Mr. Churchill is reported in the Times as follows:—

"Another subject I would refer to. The British fleets are now practically concentrated. The recent great review before the King is only one proof of the quality of concentration which the Admiralty has lately brought to its final act—a policy of naval concentration which has given a real measure of security to the centre and heart of the British Empire. But there is one aspect of naval concentration which requires the attention of thinking men here and elsewhere throughout the British Empire. The fact that our fleet has not only concentrated in the decisive theatre of European waters, but must be kept concentrated and in a certain sense tied to that theatre has been for some years creating a new want, a new need, a new opportunity for the great self-governing Dominions of the Crown. Naval supremacy consists in our being in possession of naval forces sufficient to overcome in war the strongest fleet or fleets which any reasonably probable combination of powers may bring against us. That we should be always in a position to do. That we believe ourselves to be now and in the immediate future in a position to do. But a war may go on for a long time before a decision is obtained or gained and this is the more likely of the two contingencies—if we act, as we shall do, with discretion, with sobriety, with simplicity, with goodwill to all nations and rancour and prejudice against none, it is much more likely, I say it with sincere conviction,—that war will never come in our time, and perhaps will have passed from the world, at any rate for periods which our most adventurous imagination enables us to foresee. Meanwhile, and pending a decision in the critical theatres, there is no doubt that the general mobility of our fleet is reduced. It cannot move safely and freely to every part of the world to the same extent as in former years. At present, of course, and for some years to come, we are not only able to maintain a sufficient margin within home waters at the decisive points, but we could, by making special arrangements, by effecting partial mobilization we could, if the need arose, fit out and despatch strong squadrons to the aid of any of our colonies or dominions across the sea whose vital interests were menaced or attacked.

"That is the duty which we are able to discharge, and which we are proud to discharge—a duty which we should not hesitate to run the risk of discharging, which we should not hesitate to make sacrifices for—the protection of our great self-governing dominions. And when I speak of this I mean not only by a general supremacy which operates simultaneously and universally at every portion of the globe, but by the despatch, if necessary, of particular squadrons to any point or any part of the British Empire where special danger might menace our fellow-countrymen. That we can do now, next year, and in the years which are immediately before us.

"Still here we are, gathered together, a company of practical shipwrights, accustomed to deal with real and great facts, we must face them and we must recognize them, for with every new development in continental navies, with every fresh squadron which takes water abroad, with every fresh step in the ceaseless accumulation of naval strength with which we are confronted, the world-wide mobility of the British Navy becomes restricted.

"And here is the great opportunity, the great chance of the self-governing dominions, those strong young nations which have grown up all over the world, under the shelter of the British Flag and by the stimulus and protection of British institutions. And they have already begun to seize it. Already we have seen the development in Australia of a strong modern fleet unit. New Zealand has contributed a noble ship to the general services of the British Navy.

"And in Canada men of all parties and of both races are deeply stirred upon the problem and of the share which the great Dominion should take in the means by which it and all the other parts of the British Empire are kept from harm. And we are soon to receive, I understand, representatives of the new Canadian Administration, who will come over here to consult with the Government and the Admiralty upon the course of policy which should be adopted in the future.

"If the main development of the past ten years has been the concentration of the British fleet in decisive theatres, it seems to me, and, I dare say to you, not unlikely that the main naval development of the next ten years will be the growth of the effective naval forces in the great Dominions overseas. Then we shall be able to make what I think will be found to be the true division of labour between the Mother Country and her daughter states—that we should maintain a sea-supremacy against all-comers at the decisive point, and that they should guard and patrol all the rest of the British Empire.

"I am certainly not going to attempt to forecast or to prescribe the exact form which these developments should take. But the march of opinion appears to be proceeding along thoroughly practicable lines.

"This, however, I will venture to say. The Admiralty see no reason why arrangement should not be made to give the Dominions a full measure of control over the movements in peace of any naval forces which, with our help, they may bring into efficient existence. We know that in war our Countrymen over the seas will have only one wish, and that will be to encounter the enemy wherever the need and the danger is most severe. The important thing is that the gap shall be filled so that while we, in the Old Country, guard the decisive theatre, our comrades and brothers across the seas shall keep the flag flying on the oceans of the world.

"That is the principle which I have come here to-night to expound, and if the observations which I have ventured to make should contribute in any way to its furtherance, should contribute in any way to the achievement of such a result, then I think we shall be found to have done more to-night for the British Empire and the British Navy than merely respond to the toast which Sir William White has so happily proposed."

### A Comparison with the Liberal Policy.

Could any policy be wiser under these circumstances than that suggested by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his reply to Mr. Borden? Referring to the Admiralty Memorandum Sir Wilfrid said:—

"This document shows that there is no emergency, that England is in no danger, whether imminent or prospective. But the document discloses a condition of things, of which, indeed, we knew, but upon



which has now been placed the sanction of official correspondence. It shows that there has been going on in Europe for some years past a certain movement of affairs. The armament of the great powers has compelled England to alter the strategic lines which hitherto have been essential for her security. The document discloses the fact that, on account of this increased naval armament, England, in order to maintain her security in her own waters, has been obliged to withdraw some of her naval forces from the distant seas. This, I believe, is a fair statement of what is disclosed by the document laid upon the table by my right hon. friend. In the face of this position, I now ask the question: What is the duty of the House of Commons, what is the duty of the people of Canada?

\* \* \*

"Let me state it again. As a result of the armaments which are now going on in Europe, England has been obliged to increase the margin of security which she relies on for her own defence, by reducing her naval forces in the outlying seas. Such is the condition; and, I ask once more, what is the remedy? In our humble judgment, the remedy is this, that wherever, in the distant seas, or in the distant countries—in Australia, Canada or elsewhere—a British ship has been removed to allow of concentration in European waters, that ship should be replaced by a ship built, maintained, equipped and manned by the young nation immediately concerned. If the young nations of the Empire take hold of the equipment and manning of ships to look after the distant seas, concentration can easily take place in the waters of Europe, and the British Admiralty knows what zones it has to defend. This is the Australian policy; this ought to be the Canadian policy.

\* \* \*

"England never was wealthier than she is at the present time; her coffers are overflowing. What she wants are the hearts, the brains, and the brawn of her subjects all over the world. It has been stated—I hope it will prove true—that this generous contribution of \$35,000,000 to the Imperial treasury will create a deep impression in Europe amongst the great powers. I hope it is true, but would not the impression be much greater yet if, instead of this money contribution, the nations of Europe were to see the young daughters of the Empire, the young nations scattered over the whole world, building fleets of their own, to use the language of the resolution of 1909, in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world.

"Would not that create a greater impression? Many there are, and I am one of them, who deprecate the important fact that upon the distant seas they do not count as many pennants as they counted some few years ago, but let this policy be adopted, and then the full quota, which we saw at one time, of our ships on the distant seas, would be re-established, and the white ensign, which has been for so many centuries the symbol of England's naval pride, would again unfold itself on the seven seas. Then, Sir, we would see, besides the white ensign, the colours of the young nations themselves, attesting

*the solidarity between mother and daughter. That is the policy which we adopted, that is the policy which we intend to follow."*  
(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, December 12, 1912.)

### Other Arguments from Memorandum for Canadian Fleet Units.

**Section 7** of the Memorandum is a further argument for the establishment of Canadian fleet units to assist in the protection of the growing trade of Canada. The section contains the following:—

"The rapid expansion of Canadian sea-borne trade, and the immense value of Canadian cargoes always afloat in British and Canadian bottoms, here require consideration. On the basis of the figures supplied by the Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the overseas trade of the Dominion of Canada in 1909-10 was not less than \$72,000,000, and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was 717,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still increasing. For the whole of this trade, wherever it may be about the distant waters of the world, as well as for the maintenance of her communications, both with Europe and Asia, Canada is dependent, and has always depended upon the Imperial Navy, without corresponding contribution or cost."

The last paragraph of **Section 7** is a positive statement to the effect that not only does an emergency not exist, but that Britain, without courting disaster at home, can send an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers out of home waters to all parts of the Empire. The paragraph is as follows:

"Further, at the present time and in the immediate future, Great Britain still has the power, by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion of the reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand. And these communities are also protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of Great Britain so long as her naval strength is unbroken."

### Canada Dependent on Australia for Defence.

This section contains an interesting admission and one that surely discloses the need for Canadian fleet units, unless the security and self respect of Canada is to be wholly forgotten. In so many words, it states that British Columbia is dependent for its defence on the Royal Australian Navy, co-operating with an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers to be sent from England, and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific. It is worth re-reading.

"Further, at the present time and in the immediate future, Great Britain still has the power, by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion of the reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons



in China and the Pacific *for the defence of British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand.*"

Would it not be more befitting the dignity of the premier Dominion were the British Admiralty in a position to say that the **Royal Canadian Navy** might co-operate with other British squadrons in the defence of its own coasts, and, if need be, in the defence of Australia and New Zealand as well?

Section 8 is a statement that the naval power of Britain diminishes and increases with the increase or diminution respectively of the fleets of other countries. It concludes:—

*"Anything which increases our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our security and our chances of being left unmolested."*

It is scarcely necessary to point out that **fleet units newly constructed would be composed of the newest ships**, and as such would diminish the strain and augment Britain's security and her chance of being left unmolested.

A preceding paragraph points out that larger margins of superiority at Home would, among other things, restore a greater freedom to the movements of the British Squadrons in every sea, and directly promote the security of the Dominions. It will be apparent that **fleet units which directly promote the security of the Dominions would also restore a greater freedom to the movement of the British Squadrons**, and, in this particular, would have the same effect as larger margins of superiority at Home.

The concluding Sections 9 and 10 are the ones, which, along with the reference to Canadian trade in Section 7, refer more particularly to Canada. They, therefore, deserve a more detailed analysis.

#### WHAT THE ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUM REALLY IMPLIES.

Section 9, if it means anything at all, means that the **British Government has experienced some disappointment at the apparent neglect, on the part of the Dominion, to proceed with the carrying out of the resolution of March, 1909, under which the construction of a Canadian Naval Service was commenced.** It expresses no opinion as to why, after a fair beginning had been made, the Dominion, for a year or more, at a time which the Prime Minister of Canada says is one of great emergency, should have failed to do anything in the way of helping to maintain the integrity of the Empire at sea, but states that whether the causes which have been operating to paralyse action shall continue or not, Great Britain, in any circumstances will not fail in her duty to the Overseas Dominions, also that the Admiralty are fully assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require. It distinctly points out that it is **not so much the nature of what is done, as the doing of something which is likely to be of greatest service at the moment.** It implies that the unwillingness to do anything which has been so marked since the present Government assumed office has shaken confidence in the purpose of the

Dominion, and that the evidence of some renewed resolve is important.

The section in full is as follows:—

"Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present juncture, Great Britain will not, in any circumstances, fail in her duty to the Dominions of the Crown.

"She has before now successfully made headway, alone and unaided, against the most formidable combinations, and *she has not lost her capacity* by a wise policy and strenuous exertions *to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire.*

"The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require. *Any action on the part of Canada* to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial Navy and thus widen the margin of our common safety, would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire and to *the renewed resolve* of the Overseas Dominions to take their part in maintaining its integrity."

What possible meaning can be attached to the words "renewed resolve" other than that the resolve to which expression was given in the resolution of March, 1909, has, since the present Government assumed office, wholly failed of further execution? Surely there is nothing in this section to warrant the departure from the policy of a Canadian Naval Service. Remembering the whole purport of the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty at the Shipwright's Banquet, is there any action on the part of Canada, in view of existing circumstances, more likely to "increase the power and mobility of the Imperial Navy and thus widen the margin of our common safety" than that Canada should do what he describes as the important thing, namely, "fill up the gap" that has been occasioned by the withdrawal of the Atlantic and Pacific squadrons, so that, to quote his own words, "while we in the old country guard the decisive theatre, our comrades and brothers across the seas shall keep the flag flying on the oceans of the world?"

### Mr. Borden Shown to Have Deliberately Restricted the Admiralty.

There remains, then, only Section 10. Does it imply a departure from this policy? Here is the Section in full—

"The Prime Minister of the Dominion, having enquired *in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective*, we have no hesitation in answering, that after a *prolonged consideration of all the circumstances*, that it is desirable that *such aid should include* the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply."

What of the words "It is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply?" These words, it need hardly be said, imply **no preference what-**



ever as between a contribution of money or ships and the construction of fleet units.

A fleet unit consists of 1 armoured cruiser ("Dreadnought" type); 3 unarmoured cruisers ("Bristol" type); 6 destroyers; 3 submarines. The fact that in speaking of the aid it is desirable should be provided, the section makes use of the words **"should include"** in referring to the largest and strongest ships of war, would almost seem to imply that the Admiralty had in mind, not the **"exclusive"** presentation of Dreadnoughts, but rather the construction of **fleet units, which would necessarily "include" these largest and strongest ships of war.**

But there is something more significant than this in the section as it is worded, and the wording clearly is not without design. It will be noticed that the Admiralty does not say that under all circumstances it is desirable that the aid to be given should take the form here mentioned, but that **in answer to a specific question which is specifically limited in its nature,** the Admiralty gives the answer therein contained.

It is necessary at this point to consider **what was in Mr. Borden's mind when he went to England, and what it was which gave rise to the question which he put to the Admiralty,** and to which he requested an answer. Because of his compromise with the Nationalists, Mr. Borden was pledged not to adopt a permanent policy without appealing to the people. On the other hand, to satisfy the jingoës, he was obliged to do something. He was not anxious to make an appeal to the people and, therefore, when he went to England, **he did not go with a view of trying to arrange a permanent policy, but rather to find a means of escape from one.** He went to England to find or create an emergency which might help him out of his own difficulties. The real emergency was not any danger to British Supremacy on the high seas, but the situation as it had developed in his own cabinet, and that is the emergency which his present proposals are intended to meet.

What had Mr. Borden reason to believe would be the view of the Admiralty when he went to England? What possible view could he have expected them to have other than the one to which public expression had so freely and constantly been given? He knew very well that to ask, without any restriction one way or the other, what it was best to do in the matter of naval defence, the reply of the First Lord of the Admiralty would have been to lay special emphasis on what is contained in his own speech at the Shipwright's Dinner and which is in accord with the purpose of the unanimous resolution of March, 1909, and advise the bringing to completion, as soon as this could reasonably be effected, the fleet units on the Atlantic and Pacific in accordance with the permanent policy already decided upon.

But how different was Mr. Borden's action from that which the Admiralty and the British Government had reason to expect! No sooner had Mr. Borden landed in England than he made the public pronouncement that **"any great Dominion undertaking to share upon a permanent basis in the sea defence of the Empire must have some voice in the policy which shapes the issue of war"**

or of peace, and that Canada did not propose to be merely an adjunct of even the British Empire."

This attitude he doubtless maintained in all his interviews with the British Ministers. In other words, he gave the Home Government, and in particular the Admiralty, to understand that until the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was prepared to abandon the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and to allow to Canada the right of helping to determine the foreign policy of England, Canada would absolutely refrain from adopting any permanent policy in the matter of Imperial Naval defence.

Is it any wonder that the British Ministry were somewhat surprised at this extraordinary demand? They had looked forward expectantly to the visit of Mr. Borden and his Ministers, anticipating a hearty co-operation in some permanent plan of Imperial naval defence. They were summarily told that nothing of the kind could be considered until Great Britain was prepared to make a radical change in constitutional practice, and to concede further rights to the Dominion. They had expected an acknowledgment of past obligations; they did not expect a demand for further privileges.

Under the circumstances, the British Admiralty and the British Government seem to have exhibited wonderful forbearance.

What Mr. Borden was told by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for the Colonies in England with respect to obtaining a voice in foreign policy has become public in an official despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to H.R.H. the Governor-General, dated London, January 6th, and made public by Mr. Borden himself. Here are the words of the despatch:—

"Mr. Asquith and I had several conversations with him (Premier Borden) at which he expressed the desire that the Canadian and other Dominion Ministers who might be in London as members of the Committee of Imperial Defence, should receive in confidence knowledge of the policy and proceedings of the Imperial Government in foreign and other affairs. We pointed out to him that the Committee of Imperial Defence is a purely advisory body and is not, and cannot, under any circumstances, become a body to decide on policy, which is, and must remain the sole prerogative of the Cabinet, subject to the support of the House of Commons."

All consideration of anything in the nature of a permanent policy having been thus swept completely to one side, what was left? Section 10 gives us the answer:—

"The Prime Minister of the Dominion having enquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering that, after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances, that it is desirable that such aid should include a provision for a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build ro money supply."



"After a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances." This sentence is rather significant. "All the circumstances." What were all the circumstances? We do not know all, but one, at least, we know and that is, that nothing of a permanent nature would be done. That in considering the aid that Canada might give, nothing which might have to do with a permanent policy could be considered until the question of Canada's right to participate in the shaping of the foreign policy of the United Kingdom had been determined. Besides, it was not left to the Admiralty to give a general opinion; the Admiralty was asked to answer a specific question, restricted to form and immediate aid, namely, "in what form any immediate aid" that Canada might give would be most effective.

Mr. Borden, in his speech on Dec. 5, 1912, makes it quite plain that this was all the Admiralty was asked. He said, "We have asked His Majesty's Government in what form temporary and immediate aid can best be given by Canada at this juncture."

Is it possible to conceive, having regard for the circumstances, of any other answer being made by the Admiralty? The Admiralty was not even asked if immediate aid was necessary, or whether it was preferable to something of a permanent nature. According to the question put, respecting which an answer as to form was requested, the aid had to be immediate, and of immediate aids that Canada might give, all connection with any permanent policy being completely ruled out, could any kind of aid have been thought of which, under the circumstances, would be at all likely to be effective, other than such aid as would include the provision for a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war?

Does not the Admiralty statement, on the face of it, bear out the truth of what Sir Wilfrid said in commenting on Mr. Borden's proposal?

"It is a hybrid policy, it is a cross between jingoism and Nationalism.

\* \* \*

"My right hon. friend did not go to England to consult the Admiralty about a policy. It is evident that when my right hon. friend went to England, he had abandoned the policy of a Canadian navy. He went to England—it is very clear from the last paragraph of the Memorandum—to ask what they would accept for immediate aid. In other words, he went to England to ask what England would accept in the case of an emergency, although there was no emergency."

#### WHAT GREAT BRITAIN REALLY WANTS.

It only remains to point out that what the Admiralty appears to lay the greatest emphasis on, is not so much the form of aid given by Canada, as the moral effect of anything that may be done by the Dominion.

Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum has the following:—

"The Admiralty set the greatest store by the important material, and *still more important moral, assistance* which it is within the power of Canada to give to maintaining British Naval

supremacy on the high seas, but they think it necessary to disclaim any intention, however indirect, of putting pressure upon Canadian public opinion, or of seeking to influence the Dominion Parliament in a decision which clearly belongs solely to Canada."

Paragraph 8 has the following:—

"*Anything* which increases our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our security and our chances of being left unmolested."

Paragraph 9 has the following:—

"The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provisions the circumstances of each year require. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. *Any action on the part of Canada* to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial Navy, and thus widen the margin of our common safety, would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire, and to the renewed resolve of the Overseas Dominions to take their part in maintaining its integrity."

#### THE MORAL EFFECT ALREADY MET, THE QUESTION OF METHOD REMAINS.

The main purpose, the moral assistance which Canada might render, has already been met by the Opposition agreeing to the amount proposed by the Government, namely, a vote of \$35,000,000 toward naval construction; this is evidence sufficient of a united determination on the part of both political parties in the Canadian Parliament to incur a like expenditure on Naval defence with a view of assisting the Mother Country. *There can no longer be any doubt as to Canada assisting the Motherland.* This purpose, the only one to which the Home Government attaches any real importance, having been effected, *the question, so far as Canada is concerned, becomes now one of method only,* and this the Memorandum expressly states is "*a matter which clearly belongs solely to Canada*" and as to which the Memorandum itself expresses absolutely no preference.

It is, therefore, for the Parliament and people of Canada to decide whether the form to be taken shall be an immediate contribution of Dreadnoughts at a cost of \$35,000,000 as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to a permanent policy or a Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909, The Admiralty Memorandum, rightly understood, should serve a useful purpose in rendering possible a decision as to which course is the most likely to prove of greatest benefit.

Copies of this pamphlet may be had on applying to the  
Central Liberal Information Office, Ottawa, Canada.

CANADA AND THE NAVY.

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## IS THERE AN EMERGENCY?

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Conflicting Opinions Examined in the  
Light of Facts.

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### WHICH POLICY SHOULD CANADA ADOPT ?

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**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

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## THE TWO VIEWS.

When in March 1909 the subject of Canada's share in naval defence was first discussed in the House of Commons, and during all subsequent discussions, both political parties were agreed that as respects any action Canada should take, it was necessary to distinguish between an "emergency" and a "permanent" policy; that the action to be taken by the Canadian parliament should differ according as there was an emergency or not. The circumstance that after debate in 1909 the House unanimously passed a resolution approving of "any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service," and voted nothing for purposes of an "emergency," is evidence sufficient that parliament at that date, was not prepared to sanction an "emergency" policy, but was united on the wisdom of putting a permanent policy of a Canadian naval service into effect. At that time, however, a difference in the attitude of mind of the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties in Canada towards existing conditions in Europe asserted itself. There was no difference in their point of view as to what Canada's duty would be should an "emergency" exist, but on the question of fact as to whether or not there was an "emergency", there was according to what was expressed, a real difference.

### MR. BORDEN'S ATTITUDE IN 1909 AND 1910.

The Hon. George E. Foster who proposed the first draft of the resolution respecting naval defence, said in introducing the same on the 29th of March of 1909, (nearly four years ago) "to-day, peril stands at the gateway. It is not for me to say how great it is, but I cannot brush it aside. To-day it impresses itself upon the greatest Statesmen of the old country; today it appeals to Australia until public subscriptions are taken, and the government is being importuned to do even more than its settled policy to meet the emergency; today little New Zealand gives one Dreadnought and offers a second, and today, Canada faces that position of peril, that imperial emergency. Let me say to my Right Honourable friend (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) that if after careful consideration he proposes to this parliament a means for meeting that emergency adequately, by the gift of Dreadnoughts, or the gift of money, this side of the House will stand beside him in thus vindicating Canada's honour and strengthening the Empire's defence."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, page 3503.)

Speaking in the House of Commons on January 12th, 1910, the Right Honourable R. L. Borden, at that time, the Leader of the Opposition, referring to the debate on March 29th, 1909 said, "My Hon. friend from North Toronto (Mr. Foster) said in that debate with my concurrence—"Today, peril stands at the gateway," and then Mr. Borden quoted in full the above extract from Mr. Foster's speech.

Mr. Borden then went on to enlarge upon the emergency and to repeat the proposal of an offer of dreadnoughts or money as a means of meeting it. He did so in the following words :

“Has the peril passed? No, Sir, we are nearer to it by nearly a year. Has Germany’s policy been modified in the meantime? No, on the contrary, Germany has put forward the greatest Naval Budget in her history.”——

“It is idle to assure us that there will be no war. The war has already begun, the war of construction, the victory will be as decisive there as in actual battle. Does the dissolution of the Empire signify nothing to Canada and her people?——

“When the British Empire goes the British North America Act goes also and with it there departs every constitutional guarantee which it contains. All beyond is chaos and darkness. ——

“I say to my Right Honourable friend the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him : Go on with your naval service. Proceed cautiously and surely. Lay your proposals before the people and give them if necessary opportunity to be heard, but do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend this empire asunder before the proposed service is worthy of the name. In the face of such a situation immediate, vigorous, earnest action is necessary. We have no Dreadnought ready; we have no fleet unit at hand. But we have the resources and I trust the patriotism to provide a fleet unit or at least a Dreadnought without one moment’s unnecessary delay. Or, and in my opinion this would be the better course, we can place the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the admiralty to be used for naval defence under such conditions as we may prescribe.”

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, January 12, 1910, pages 1799, 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818.)

#### SIR WILFRID LAURIER’S ATTITUDE IN 1909 AND 1910.

This was in March, 1909, and January 1910. What was Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s attitude at that time? It was what it is today. A full recognition of the rights and duties of Canadians as British subjects, but an unwillingness to allow Canada to be stamped from a settled and approved course, by spectacular action, because of jingo appeals. Speaking on March 29th, 1909, Sir Wilfrid said—and his words then were prophetic with reference to the present situation, “We are British subjects ; Canada is one of the daughter nations of the Empire, and we realize to the full the rights and obligations which are involved in that proud title. It has been, it is, it shall be our unalterable determination to meet and to carry out every duty which is implied by that title. I think, I make bold to say, that we will rise to every sacrifice that may be needed in order to maintain unimpaired the rank and status which is occupied by Canada in the British Empire, and the rank and status which is occupied by the British Empire throughout the world. But, Sir, I may say that we are not to be

carried away, we are not to be stampeded from what has been the settled policy and deliberate course which we have laid down, by any hasty, feverish action, however spectacular such action may be. It behooves us as free men to look at our position calmly and deliberately to ascertain where we are, and to determine whether we should alter or whether we should persist in the course we have adopted long ago."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, page 3505.)

"For my part I do not think the danger is imminent..... We know that the British nation is not unduly alarmed..... I have no hesitation in saying that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the high seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughter nations to close round the old motherland, and make a rampart about her to ward off any attack. I hope that day will never come, but should it come, I would deem it my duty to devote what might be left of my life and energy to stump the country and endeavor to impress upon my fellow countrymen, especially my compatriots in the Province of Quebec, the conviction that the salvation of England, is the salvation of our own country, and therein lies the guaranty of our civil and religious freedom, and everything we value in life. These are the sentiments which animate the government on this occasion."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, pages 3511, 3512.)

Again on February 3rd, 1910 speaking on the second reading of the Naval Service Bill, Sir Wilfrid said "For my part, I do not see any cause of danger to Great Britain at the present time, let me say further that if Great Britain were engaged in such a contest, a wave of enthusiasm to assist her would sweep over this country, and all other British countries..... I was impressed by one statement of my hon. friend the leader of the Opposition, though I do not know the basis for it. He said that if war came between England and Germany, it would come within the next three or four years. I have not been able to get any satisfactory answer to this query, what is the reason for supposing that war from Germany is to come within the next three or four years?"

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, February 3, 1910, pages 3050, 3051.)

#### A CONTRAST IN LEADERSHIP IN 1912.

These statements are sufficiently clear as to the attitude of the leaders of the two parties on the question of an emergency three and four years ago. An interval of time of this length having elapsed without any of the alarmist prophecies being justified, or anything being done by the Conservative party since its accession to power to relieve the alleged "emergency," Mr. Borden, for these as well as other reasons, has found it necessary to abandon the word "emergency", though in some of his speeches he has tried to convey the impression that an "emergency" still exists to an extent, which will justify a departure from the policy



of a Canadian Naval Service as outlined and unanimously agreed to in the resolution of March 29th, 1909, and be a sufficient warrant for an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000.00 for the three most powerful battleships in the world, as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later. In this connection he has not hesitated to use language as extravagant as that made use of in January 1910, when he said to parliament "the war has already commenced". Here are Mr. Borden's concluding sentences in asking parliament for the \$35,000,000 on December 5th, 1912. "Today, while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster. Almost unaided, the Motherland, not for herself alone, but for us as well, is sustaining the burden of a vital imperial duty, and confronting an overmastering necessity of national existence."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, December 5th, 1912, pages 714, 715.)

In contrast to this language of panic and consternation, the calm and dignified utterances of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in replying to Mr. Borden stand out in reassuring relief as did his statesman-like admonitions against spectacular and alarmist proposals in 1909 and 1910. On December 12th, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "I insist once more on what is stated in the Memorandum ; there is no emergency, there is no immediate danger, there is no prospective danger. If there were an emergency, if England were in danger—no I will not use that expression : I will not say if England were in danger, but simply, if England were on trial with one or two or more of the great powers of Europe, my right honourable friend might come and ask, not \$35,000,000 but twice, three times, four times \$35,000,000. We would put at the disposal of England all the resources of Canada ; there would not be a single dissentient voice—I do not believe the Empire is in danger, I do not believe it can be cemented by the means suggested by my right honourable friend. I believe the relations of the different parts of the Empire to the Mother country are not perfect, but that essentially they are perfectible. You can discuss problems of improvement : there is no occasion to discuss problems of existence."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, December 12th, 1912, pages 1059, 1068.)

#### THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIR WILFRID LAURIER AND MR. BORDEN.

Here then is the difference between Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mr. Borden. Sir Wilfrid Laurier denies that there is an emergency, but contends that Canada ought to go on with the permanent policy of a Canadian Naval Service, already commenced in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons in March 1909. Mr. Borden will not say that there is

an emergency, but to avoid bringing down a permanent policy, either the same as, or different from that to which parliament unanimously agreed, has felt it necessary to make it appear that an emergency exists and that Canada should present to Great Britain the three largest ships of war in the world at a cost of \$35,000,000 and then work out a permanent policy. Who is right? There are among others, three ways of determining.

(1) A consideration of the facts.

(2) A consideration of the declarations of responsible Ministers of the Crown in England.

(3) A consideration of the attitude of Mr. Borden and Canadian Ministers.

### **A CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.**

It was March, 1909, that the German scare arose, and it was declared by Mr. Borden and others that peril was imminent. This is 1913 and nothing has taken place. In the interval, the people of the United Kingdom who are the ones immediately concerned have had ample opportunity to consider the situation. Has their action been of a kind which bespeaks a nation in a state of alarm? Are not the following facts and circumstances incontrovertible evidence that the people of the United Kingdom have no belief in an emergency?

#### **THE ELECTORATE OF BRITAIN ARE NOT CONCERNED.**

There have been two general elections in the United Kingdom since it was stated in the Canadian parliament that there was an emergency. One in January 1910, and one in December 1910. In these elections the questions discussed were the Budget Social Reform, Tariff Reform, Reform of the House of Lords, and Home Rule. The question of an emergency was scarcely mentioned in public discussion. Is it conceivable that a Government and a nation could believe itself in danger, and the subject not be uppermost in the minds of the people at a time they were being appealed to for support by rival political parties?

There have been several by-elections in Great Britain and Ireland since 1909. In not a single by-election has the German menace, or the existence of an emergency been the subject of popular discussion. Is it conceivable that this could happen if the people of Great Britain and Ireland really believed that there was not adequate protection for the British Isles and the Empire? If invasion were really feared, if an emergency existed, would it not be the one topic of discussion on the occasion of every appeal to the people?

The Parliament of the United Kingdom is at present in session in Great Britain and not only has no statement been made by any responsible ministers justifying a belief in an emergency but it has been specifically denied that an emergency exists. The

**Parliament of the United Kingdom has not been asked to make any appropriation to meet an emergency.** Why should the parliament of Canada? It has been questions of Home Rule, of female suffrage, of education and other domestic problems that have been the subjects of primary interest in the British parliament. Does Canada know more about Britain's affairs than Englishmen themselves?

**THE DECREASE OF PUBLIC DEBT OUT OF SURPLUS REVENUES  
IS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF NO EMERGENCY.**

What would a nation do that has a surplus revenue and believes in an emergency? Would it not obviously use this surplus towards ensuring its security? Would it not borrow if need be? What has the United Kingdom been doing? Since the present Liberal government assumed office in Britain there have been surplus revenues many years just as there were in Canada after the Liberal government assumed office in this country subsequent to 1896. So secure has England felt that she has devoted a large part of her yearly surpluses not to making provision for an "emergency", but towards wiping off some of her public debt.

Speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster on June 24th, 1912, the Rt. Hon. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer said "I want to say exactly what the government will have done, including the provision made this year for the reduction of the debt. The total reduction of the debt effected by the present government, inclusive of the £5,000,000 will be £78,184,000 (or at the rate of \$4.87 to the £—\$380,756,080) that is for seven years. That is a net reduction of debt.....What has the reduction of the debt by the present government up to the end of last year been? It amounted to £63,000,000 (or at the rate of \$4.87 to the £—\$306,810,000).....In addition to that we have provided for an increase during the last three years of £13,500,000 on the Navy estimates. We have borne on the estimates the cost of dock construction and ship building, items which abroad are financed out of loans. So we have paid £63,000,000 in addition to the £13,500,000 added to the Navy Estimates, without negotiating any loan for that purpose.

"This is a purely net reduction of the amount of the indebtedness of this country. If you pay off debt with one hand and borrow with the other that is not a reduction. I am dealing with the net reduction of the indebtedness of this country and I say that no government that has ever existed in this country was ever near to this government in the reduction of debt."

(British Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1912, Vol. XL, pp. 54-57.)

**The reduction in the British National Debt year by year since the Liberal administration assumed office in the United Kingdom has, according to the statistical abstract for the United Kingdom 1912 been as follows :**



At Close of the Fiscal Year ending March 31st.	Gross Reduction in Pounds.	Gross Reduction in Dollars (calculating the pound at the average exchange of \$4.87.)
1906	11,852,132	57,719,882.84
1907	13,714,432	66,789,283.84
1908	18,029,680	87,804,541.60
1909	8,787,968	42,797,404.16
1910	10,442,489	50,854,921.43
1911	28,012,949	136,423,061.63
1912	10,487,892	51,076,034.04

**Reduction during 6 years \$333,475,665.**

**Average rate per year \$55,579,277.**

Mr. Borden's proposal is that Canada should increase her national debt by borrowing from England \$35,000,000 to present a gift to Britain to relieve her of an emergency at a time when Britain is actually reducing her public debt on an average of over \$55,500,000 per year.

#### **THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IS EVIDENCE OF NO EMERGENCY.**

Since the supposed emergency is in reference to Germany what is the relative strength of the German and British fleets? Here is the statement of the Rt. Honourable Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, given in the House of Commons at Westminster on Monday, July 22nd, 1912, in the course of an explanation of the scope and character of the New German Navy Law and its effect.

"Thus we shall have available during 1914, and onward 5 battle squadrons comprising 41 battleships of which 4 squadrons will be in full commission, and one on the basis I have described, and all of which will be manned by trained active service ratings without calling upon the Reserves, and we shall endeavor to arrange matters so that 4 out of these 5 will always be available at short notice. Very often in the ordinary course of events, and at any time when there is anxiety, the whole 5 will be available. It is necessary, however, to notice that besides her 25 battleships in full commission, the Germans have 4 parent ships of their reserve division which are fully manned with active service ratings, and on an emergency these might conceivably be employed. Thus we shall have at the end of 1914, a minimum of 33 and a maximum of 41 battleships fully manned and in full commission against which the comparable German figure is 29....it is after a full and minute examination of the qualities of the ships and

the squadrons that the Admiralty are able to announce that they are satisfied with the margins proposed so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. . . . I hope it will be sufficient for me to say that the arrangements proposed will, in the opinion of the Admiralty, be adequate for the needs of 1914 and 1915."

In the face of such a statement as this how can Mr. Borden and his followers with any pretence of justification contend there is an emergency at the present time, or even the likelihood of one in the immediate future? Elsewhere in the same speech Mr. Churchill refers to what could be done "at any time when the Admiralty consider that there is an emergency," clearly indicating that the Admiralty has no belief in any emergency at the present time.

There is the further statement contained in the Admiralty memorandum on the general Naval situation communicated to parliament by Mr. Borden on December 5th, 1912, which contains in section 6, a statement of the relative strength of the British and German ships. The section in this connection reads as follows :

"It is now necessary to look forward to the situation in 1915.

"In Home Waters.

"In the spring of the year 1915—

"Great Britain will have 25 'Dreadnought' battleships and 2 'Lord Nelsons'.

Germany will have 17 'Dreadnought' battleships.

"Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.

"Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

With this relative proportion in 1915 of 27 to 17 of the largest ships of war where is the need for the immediate presentation by Canada to Great Britain of \$35,000,000, for "the three most powerful battleships in the world" to save Great Britain in an "emergency"?

## **THE DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS IN ENGLAND DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.**

So much for facts. Consider now the official statements of Members of the British Cabinet, who by their oaths of office are sworn to the truth and to the safeguarding of the welfare of the nation. It is a fact, which seems to have escaped the notice of those who are seeking to alarm the Canadian people, that since the Borden government assumed office never once has a responsible Minister of the Crown in England so much as hinted at an emergency whereas the British Ministers have repeatedly explicitly denied its existence and have as frequently commented upon the very friendly relations existing between the United Kingdom and Germany. Who is to be believed in regard to a matter of

such grave concern to the United Kingdom ? The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith and his Ministers, who form the Government of England, or Mr. Borden and his Ministers in Canada ? If Mr. Asquith and his Ministers, then here are some of the declarations of the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom made (1) prior to Mr Borden's visit to England, but after he had taken office; (2) during Mr. Borden's visit to England; and (3) since Mr. Borden's visit to England, and his return to Canada.

**OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS  
PRIOR TO MR. BORDEN'S VISIT TO ENGLAND.**

On Naval defence the statements by the First Lord of the Admiralty are of first importance. He is the responsible Minister of the Crown whose duty it is to keep the country informed of the efficiency of its navy and the nation's strength in comparison with possible rival powers, and in particular the need, if any, of increased armaments and equipment. For the purpose of considering any existing emergency, Mr. Churchill's speeches delivered during 1912 are sufficient. In not one of them is the idea of an emergency put forth. On the other hand they contain repeated assurances of England's security and repeated protests against sensational and violent departures from existing methods.

Speaking at Glasgow as the guest of the Clyde Navigation trustees, on Friday, February 9th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said.

"I can give you a very good account of the British navy. In ships it is possible to match every other type of ship in the world and show clear superiority ship for ship.....The rumors which have filled some of the papers during the last few months that the navy was last year unprepared, are absolutely baseless. ....I am glad to be able to tell you that there is no need at all for alarm, there is no need for the raising of any excited panic and there is no need for disparaging the resources of our country. We may face the situation with great composure because it is just and true to say that on every point and on every detail, we have had it well in hand.....We were never in a better position and the country was never more united in its resolve to see the supremacy of the British Navy maintained.....

"It might be supposed by reading the accounts from the great organs of both parties that financially Great Britain was in a tottering, weak and perilous condition. But of course as you know, that is all our talk. The resources which the British Chancellor of the Exchequer can commend are amply equal to all requirements of the day.....

"Our credit has been sustained during the past 5 or 6 years by repayment of debt and reduction of capital liabilities on a scale unexampled in the history of this or any other country.....

"I learn from the newspapers that there is a considerable body of opinion in this country which favors the flotation of a



great naval loan. I cannot help thinking that that suggestion is put forward by persons who have not had an opportunity of properly apprehending the problem of British naval supremacy as it now presents itself. It would no doubt be perfectly easy for the British Government at the present time to float a loan of fifty or a hundred million pounds for naval purposes.....But what would be the use to the navy of such a step? We have to build for the navy enough ships to secure us the effective mastery of the seas. It is sheer waste to build more ships than are necessary for that purpose in any one year.....

"What is wanted is steady building on a regular plan. No sensational or violent departure from our existing methods is required or will be required.....

"We are under no anxiety about money. Whatever is needed for the safety of the Empire will be asked for by the Government and granted by the representatives of the nation with universal assent. (Cheers).....

"There is no chance whatever of our being overtaken in naval strength unless we want to be.....

"Whatever may happen abroad there will be no whine here. No signals of distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or succour will go up. (Cheers).....If there are to be increases on the continent of Europe we shall have no difficulty in meeting them to the satisfaction of this country."

(Times, London, February 10th, 1912.)

Speaking in the British House of Commons on March 18th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said :

"We possess more Dreadnoughts than any other two powers in the world today and if all the Dreadnoughts in the world were sunk tonight our naval superiority would be greater than it is at the present time. We can not imagine the course of a naval war which would not tend steadily to increase the relative fighting value of the large resources we possess in pre-Dreadnoughts, until, as time went on, quite old vessels would come out and play an important part.....It is wrong and wasteful to build a single ship for the Navy before it is wanted.....It is an ill-service to the Navy and to the State to build a single ship before its time.....What I might venture to call "the more the merrier" argument is as detrimental to efficiency as to economy. The only safe rule which the British Admiralty can follow is to maintain the minimum consistent with full security.....I should like to make it clear, that as a result of the measures taken by my right hon. friend the Home Secretary, there is no cause whatever for alarm or despondency. The Admiralty are prepared to guarantee absolutely the main security of the country and of the Empire, day by day for the next few years, and if the House will grant us what we ask for in the future, that prospect may be indefinitely extended.....The Germans will be no gainers so far as Naval power is concerned over us, by any increases which they may,

make, and no losers for the basis I have laid down by any diminution.....I am pleased to say that we can build, arm and equip great ships each year—and continue the process year after year—upon a scale largely in advance of any other single power in the world, according to its present resources. **The House may take it for certain, therefore, that there is absolutely no danger of our being overtaken unless we decide as a matter of policy to be so."**

**"I am glad to be able to assure the House that no difficulty will be experienced in making arrangements to retain our relative position in the near future and to secure as nearly as we need them, adequate margins of safety. I am glad also that these measures will not involve any excessive or disproportionate expense."**

(House of Commons Debates, March 18th, 1912.)

Again when the House was in Committee on the Naval Estimates on March 20th, Mr. Churchill said :

**"The Hon. member for Chester has asked me why we are taking so little for battleships this year' (1912). We calculate when we shall lay down each battleship according to the actual dates at which we think we shall require them. If we thought we should need one of these ships at an earlier month than that which we have fixed in our minds as necessary, there would be no difficulty in laying down the vessel a little earlier. The true policy is to wait till the last minute you can with full security in order to get every advantage of design at a time like this when Naval science is moving on from week to week."**

Later Mr. Churchill said that **Britain's most urgent need at the present time was an increase in her number of torpedo destroyers**, and referring to mention by other naval authorities in the House to the strength of the British fleet added **"Both of them have a knowledge which far exceeds anything I have been able to acquire in the short time I have been at the Admiralty. I recognize very gladly the statements they have made that our position at the present is a thoroughly satisfactory one, and I do not think there is any chance of it becoming unsatisfactory in the future."**

(Times, March 21st, 1912.)

**Speaking at the Shipwright's dinner in London on May 15th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said :**

**"Naval supremacy consists in our being in possession of Naval forces sufficient to overcome in war the strongest fleet or fleets which any reasonably probable combination of powers may bring against us. That we should be always in a position to do : that we believe ourselves to be now and in the immediate future in a position to do.....At present of course, and for some years to come, we are not only able to maintain a sufficient margin within Home waters at the decisive points, but we could, by making special arrangements, by effecting partial mobilization, we**

could if the need arose, fit out and despatch strong squadrons to the aid of any of our colonies or dominions across the sea whose vital interests were menaced or attacked.....That we can do now, next year and in the years which are immediately before us."

(The Times, May 16th, 1912.)

On July 2nd, Lord Crewe, speaking for the government in the House of Lords said, "So far as our existing position in any part of the world is concerned we are not afraid to declare that we consider the security of the country is achieved.....Taking March 31st of this year, we find that we have 16 battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought type, as against 15 possessed by all the other Powers in European waters. Next year we shall have 24 ships of this type as against 21 possessed by all the other Naval Powers in Europe. These battleships represent a distinct margin over the two power standard."

(Times, July 3rd, 1912.)

#### OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS DURING MR. BORDEN'S VISIT TO ENGLAND.

Mr. Borden left Canada for England on June 25th, arriving in Bristol on July 4th.

Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is better informed than any other statesman in the British Empire on England's foreign relations, said in the House of Commons July 10th, with reference to Germany "Our relations with the German Government at the present moment are excellent. We are perfectly frank with each other about all questions of mutual interest and I believe both governments are convinced that their mutual interests can be perfectly reconciled."

(Times, July 11th, 1912.)

On July 22nd and the days immediately following a debate took place in the House of Commons at Westminster on the Navy Estimates. According to the London papers, Mr. Borden was present in the gallery of the House and heard what was said. Here are the views of some of the British statesmen as expressed on that occasion.

The Rt. Hon. Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, after discussing the scope and character of the new German law said :

"Cool, steady, methodical preparation, prolonged over a succession of years, can alone raise the margin of Naval power. It is no use flinging millions of money about on the impulse of the moment, by a gesture of impatience, or in a mood of panic. Such a course only reveals your weakness and impotence. Those who clamour for sensational expenditure, who think that the kind of danger with which we are faced needs to be warded off or can be warded off in that way, are either ignorant themselves of naval conditions or take advantage of the ignorance of others. The strain we have to bear will be long and slow, and no relief



will be obtained by impulsive or erratic action. We ought to learn from our German neighbors, whose policy marches unswervingly towards its goal across the lifetime of a whole generation.....

"It is after a full and minute examination of the qualities of the ships and the squadrons that the Admiralty are able to announce that they are satisfied with the margins proposed so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. I hope I shall not be pressed to enter into any process of comparison..... I hope it will be sufficient for me to say that the arrangements proposed will, in the opinion of the Admiralty, be adequate for the needs of 1914 and 1915..... (and referring to the disposition of British ships elsewhere) I am content to say, leaning myself, as I must do, in these matters, upon the advice and opinion of the naval authorities on whom the Government rely, that we consider the arrangements described, not only the best possible in the circumstances, but satisfactory in themselves so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. The time has not yet come to provide for the latter part of the financial year 1915-16."

(House of Commons Debates, 22nd July 1912, Vol. 41, No. 102 Official Report.)

On July 24th, in the course of the same debate, Mr. Churchill expressed the "absolute confidence" of the government in the adequacy of their programme, and laid particular stress upon "the great material advantage of never laying down a ship till the last moment compatible with full security" in view of the rapidity with which the types of ships become obsolete. "That," he said amid the cheers of the House, "is my answer to the hon. gentleman below the gangway who is urging the immediate construction of the new ships before the moment when the best designs can be completed."

Proceeding to details as to the government's programme for the construction of Dreadnoughts, Mr. Churchill said :

"We expect in the fourth quarter of 1913 to have 18 Dreadnought battleships by the time that Germany has 13. In the fourth quarter of 1914 we shall have 24 and Germany will have 16 according to our calculations. In the fourth quarter of 1915 we shall have 27 and Germany 17. I am leaving the cruisers out, I am not counting the two Lord Nelsons, although those vessels are counted as Dreadnoughts by the French, and certainly are vessels of very great merit and power." As to battle cruisers Mr. Churchill later said, "We shall have 8 battle cruisers when Germany has 4 in the fourth quarter of 1913. In the fourth quarter of 1914 we shall have 9 when Germany has 5, and in the fourth quarter of 1915 we shall have 10 when Germany has 6 and those are the total figures.

"Look at new construction. This year Germany has laid down 2 new ships : we are laying down 4. Next year we are

told Germany is going to lay down one extra ship : we are going to lay down 2 extra ships. Is that nothing ? This year Germany has laid down 2 small cruisers : we are laying down 8, not quite so large, but much faster, we are accelerating the construction of these 8 vessels. It is true that this year Germany is accelerating the construction of 12 destroyers : we have accelerated the construction of 20 destroyers. In the course of the next 18 months it is expected that the German fleet will be reinforced by 21 destroyers. We shall be reinforced by 43 destroyers in the same period.

“The main principle of the German Navy law is the creation of a third battle squadron which will be gradually developed and become perfected towards the end of 1914. We have already created our new squadron. It is in full existence. We are told that is foreseeing the danger but taking no steps to meet it. Such statements defeat themselves. I do not think extreme statements are at all likely to serve the cause of methodical, steady and tireless naval development, which is the cause I stand here to plead.....

“We have the situation well in hand. There is no need whatever for panic or alarm. It is entirely our own fault if we are not able to produce at the different dates in future the margin necessary for our security. We believe if our recommendations are accepted by the House, and the ample provision we are asking for is granted by the House, we shall have an adequate margin of security for our purposes in 1914, and in 1915 we shall be no worse off than in 1914. In 1916 there will be a slight upward tendency in the proportion of ships we shall have. No new development which can affect 1914 can take place now, and any new development which affects 1915 or 1916 can be dealt with effectively when it makes itself known.”

(The Times, July 25th, 1912.)

The Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Herbert Asquith, in the same debate said, “I deprecate anything in the nature of panic or scare. I do not think there is the least occasion for it..... There never has been a moment and there is not now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which can reasonably be anticipated.....

“I have maintained the opinion in this House and elsewhere, that it is a very great mistake in such a shifting art as naval ship-building.....to make your provisions too far in advance, or you may find you are left with ships that are obsolete, out of date, and which are not really fit for the growing requirements and exigencies of naval warfare, in which case you will have lost your money, and will have to spend it over again in having to provide substitutes. There are many illustrations of that in our past naval history, and I should be sorry that we should repeat that experiment.”

(Times, July 23rd, 1912.)

Speaking in the Commons on July 25th, Mr. Asquith said :  
 "Our relations with the great German Empire are, I am glad to say, at this moment—and I feel sure are likely to remain—relations of amity and goodwill."

(Times, July 26th, 1912.)

On July 24th, Lord Crewe, speaking on behalf of the government in the House of Lords, said :

"If you are to consider every possible country as our potential enemy and scarcely one as our probable friend, it seems to me impossible to argue on that basis. Putting the case in that way you produce the most bloodcurdling combinations which could possibly be conceived.....

"If you hurry on your programme to the utmost extent you lose the benefit of the continued improvements possible in design and almost certain in construction and armaments.

"There is another thing, if you come forward with a great splash of a programme, you help to bring about the particular evil which you wish to avoid, because the people to whom you announce that you are building against them are positively spurred on to the acceleration, and possibly to the enlargement of their programme, to that extent you tend to defeat your own object.....

"I cannot conceive a condition of affairs for dealing with which the margin of time is not sufficient for our purpose."

(Times, July 25th, 1912.)

Mr. Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition, following Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, on July 26th, said :

"I am quite sure that if this country really believed that there was danger, they would refuse no possible sacrifice which the government could ask. (Cheers) But in spite of all that has been said, does the country, do the House of Commons, do any of us really believe that there is danger, any vital danger ? (Cries of "No, No.") I confess that I have the greatest difficulty in believing it myself—(Ministerial Cheers)—I confess it."

(Times, July 26th, 1912.)

The Rt. Hon. Arthur Balfour, former Conservative Leader of the Opposition, said :

"Looking at it from the naval point of view, it seems to me that the fleets of the triple entente are not inadequate now, and are not going to be inadequate, to any strain that is going to be placed upon them."

(The Times, July 24th, 1912.)

In the face of statements such as these delivered by responsible Ministers of the Crown and the Leaders of the Opposition in the British Parliament during Mr. Borden's stay in England, what can Mr. Borden's estimate of the Canadian people be, when



he seeks to alarm them into supporting his proposal of an immediate gift of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world by saying, "Today, while the clouds are heavy, and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster." ?

#### A LEADING CANADIAN CONSERVATIVE'S POINT OF VIEW.

Summing up the gist of these and other public utterances of responsible Ministers in Britain, **Mr. C. H. Cahan**, a leading Conservative barrister in the City of Montreal, in a letter to the Editor of the Montreal Gazette, dated Montreal, Oct. 3rd, 1912, and published in the Gazette of Tuesday, Oct. 8th, 1912, says :

"The positive official declarations which I have quoted above categorically affirm :—

(1) That the political relations between Great Britain and Germany are excellent.

(2) That, even if those relations were not relations of amity and good will, Great Britain enjoys "enormously superior power" upon the North Sea ; and moreover is, to use the words of Prime Minister Asquith, "overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which could reasonably be anticipated."

(3) That an increasing superiority of British naval strength is now assured till 1916.

(4) That the British Government, in next year's naval estimates will supply all the moneys that the British Admiralty think necessary to fully and adequately safeguard British interests.

(5) That "a great splash of a programme" is not only not necessary, but would "help to bring about the particular evil which you wish to avoid."

(6) That to make greater haste in construction must result in waste of public funds ; and that even the British Government cannot conceive a condition of affairs for dealing with which "the margin of time is not sufficient for our purpose."

(7) That, in fact, the British Government has the situation well in hand and "there is no need whatever for panic or alarm."

"Such", says Mr. Cahan, "are the pronouncements of the highest officials of the Government and of the Admiralty of Great Britain. Is it any wonder that the people of Great Britain refuse to take alarm at the suggestion of politicians out of office, who are unable on the floors of parliament to make good their querulous complaints ? The people of Great Britain are confident that their Government has made, is making and will make adequate provision to maintain British naval supremacy. That Government is exclusively responsible to the electors of Great Britain."

Mr. Cahan concludes in words the common sense of which is apparent.

"So long as the British electorate is content with their Government's conduct of foreign affairs, and with the ample provision made by their Government for their naval defence, why should Canadians attempt, by free gifts of their public funds, to express want of confidence in the British Government, which is not responsible to us, or seek to make up an alleged deficiency in British naval construction, when the British Government and their experts of the Admiralty so positively declare that no such deficiency really exists ?.....

"It is inconceivable that any of the facts made known to the Canadian Ministers should be inconsistent with the official statements above quoted. If so, there is no reason for immoderate haste ; and there is every reason why any contribution that Canada may undertake, while commensurate with our wealth and consistent with our self-respect, should also be made on a basis that shall ensure popular approval in this country and regular and continuous Canadian support for the maintenance of the naval supremacy of the Empire of which we form a part."

(The Gazette, Montreal, Oct. 8th, 1912.)

#### OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS SINCE MR. BORDEN'S VISIT TO ENGLAND.

Since Mr. Borden left England and returned to Canada, responsible British Ministers have on many occasions made reference to existing conditions, and one and all have been most emphatic in what they have said as to the friendliness between Great Britain and Germany, the absence of any emergency and the sufficiency of the land and naval forces to meet existing needs.

A Canadian Associated Press cable, dated London, Oct. 25th, had the following despatch which appeared in most of the Canadian papers :—

"The Rt. Hon. Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Agriculture, a member of the Asquith Cabinet, speaking at a meeting tonight said he deplored Lord Roberts' Manchester speech. He did not believe that an Anglo-German war was inevitable, and a statement like that of 'Bobs' was not only deplorable, but pernicious and dangerous. The rivalry between Germany and Great Britain was more commercial than military, and the only persons who wished to turn it into military were a small group of journalists, a few soldiers and makers of armaments, and a small section of the people who believed the dignity of the nation was raised by irritating its neighbors."

"It's about time," he added, "that the industrial and commercial classes expressed their opinions in a thoroughly organized manner upon this important subject."

On November 9th, two important speeches were delivered at the Mansion House in London, one by the Rt. Hon. Herbert Asquith, the Prime Minister of England, and the other by the

Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. In the course of his speech, Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister said : "It is a satisfaction to be able to assure you, that so far as this country is concerned its relations with other powers have, without a single exception, never been more friendly and cordial."

Mr. Churchill in responding to the naval forces, said, "It is with a greater authority than last time I was here that I invite you to place your full confidence in the solid efficiency of our naval organization." Referring to Germany he said, "the relations have steadily improved between the two countries during the year." Also, "We have no reason to apprehend trouble of any kind, but my advisers at the Admiralty are satisfied that the number of fleets and flotillas in home waters is by no means unequal to any task that might be imposed upon them."

(The Times, Nov. 11th, 1912.)

Col. Seely, the Secretary of State for war, speaking on Dec. 5th, 1912, at the presentation of prizes to the London Scottish, said, with reference to the military and naval forces of the United Kingdom :

"I feel bound to add this, that after the most searching enquiry, and taking the position at its worst for us at every stage of the investigation, the Committee of Imperial Defence have it as their considered opinion that with our military and naval forces as they stand, the danger of invasion may be faced without fear, and this too, while leaving a great expeditionary force free to safeguard our vital interests overseas."

(The Times, Dec. 6th, 1912.)

### THE ATTITUDE OF MR. BORDEN AND CANADIAN MINISTERS DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.

It was March 29th, 1909, that the Hon. George E. Foster, with the concurrence of Mr. Borden, said in the Canadian House of Commons, "To-day peril stands at the gateway,.....to-day Canada faces that position of peril, that imperial emergency." It was January 10th, 1910, that Mr. Borden, then leader of the Opposition, repeating these words added, "Has the peril passed, No Sir, we are nearer to it by nearly a year....It is idle to assure us that there will be no war. The war has already begun, the war of construction, the victory will be as decisive there as in actual battle.....When the British Empire goes the British North America Act goes also....all beyond is chaos and darkness.....do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend the Empire asunder."

On October 10th, 1911, Mr. Borden was chosen Prime Minister. From that moment he had it in his power to have Canada take some immediate action to meet an emergency if any such really existed. Is it conceivable that if Mr. Borden really believed in an emergency, such as his own words had described,



he would have allowed Parliament to assemble, and the speech from the throne at its first session to be delivered without so much as an allusion to it? Would he have permitted the whole of a session to pass without requesting some authoritative statement from the Admiralty? Would he have allowed more than a year to pass without devising some means of helping to meet a situation so critical?

### OVER A YEAR OF OFFICE AND NOTHING DONE.

As Prime Minister, Mr. Borden had it in his power to request the Admiralty for a memorandum on the day of assuming office. Relief in an emergency would have led him to take immediate action. His actions and those of the members of his government were all of a nature to indicate that if they entertained any beliefs they were quite the reverse. They avoided, on every possible occasion an answer to every overture that was made to secure a statement of their views on the naval situation, and their intentions as to naval policy; they endeavored to create the impression that it was their intention to repeal the Naval Service Act which Parliament had passed in 1910; they declined to proceed with the construction of ships for a Canadian Naval Service, though the unanimous resolution of March, 1909, approving of this construction, and containing Mr. Borden's own insertion of the word "speedy" before construction, remained a mandate from Parliament unrepealed, and tenders for construction were in their possession; they discouraged recruiting for the Naval Service and tried to make it appear that ships which had been secured for training purposes only were "the Laurier Navy." They did absolutely nothing, and only when the pressure from parts of the country become so great that it was irresistible, fourteen months after the assumption of office, dreading a second session of Parliament with no policy, they fell back upon the emergency device as a means of escape from their difficulties and an expedient for retaining office. In the face of behaviour such as this, will the Canadian people believe that during all these months of office Mr. Borden was haunted by the awful presentiment disclosed to Parliament when in asking for \$35,000,000 as a gift for the three largest battleships in the world, he said to the House, "To-day, while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster"? If these words are not true and yet are believed they are not the utterances of a statesman, but of a man with an hallucination. If they are true, and Mr. Borden really believes them, and they are part of the belief expressed in 1909 and 1910, when Mr. Borden said the war had already commenced, how can Mr. Borden justify the lack of any action on the part of himself and his government from the date of assuming office in October, 1911, up to the presentation to Parliament of his Bill asking for \$35,000,000 in December, 1912? It is kinder to Mr.

Borden and his followers to assume that his actions, rather than his words or proposals, are an indication of his real beliefs.

## TWO SESSIONS OF PARLIAMENT AND THE BRITISH PREFERENCE WITHIN A YEAR.

It is idle to say that being a new administration time was required. The question was not new, it had been freely and fully discussed ever since March, 1909.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier was sworn in as Prime Minister on July 11th, 1896, after the Conservative administration had been in power over 17 years. He called his first Parliament together on August 19th, 1896, and held a brief session for the purpose of securing the necessary supplies, the House proroguing on October 5th, 1896. Immediately after the House rose Sir Wilfrid and his colleagues actively prepared for the carrying out of their tariff programme. Exhaustive investigations were made into the general conditions of trade, and the best method of revising the tariff both in the interests of Canada and Great Britain, a Commission of several of the Ministers being engaged in this work. This was completed early in the following year, and on March 25th, 1897, Sir Wilfrid Laurier again called Parliament, and on April 25th, just one month later, the Hon. W. S. Fielding, Minister of Finance introduced the famous Fielding Tariff, which included a very considerable readjustment of the whole series of Customs schedules, while its main feature was the introduction of the British Preference, one of the most important measures affecting the British Empire ever enacted by an administration of any Overseas Dominion. The introduction of the British Preference was received with great enthusiasm, both throughout Canada and Great Britain, involving as it did an immediate reduction of 12½% on British goods and a provision for a further reduction to 25% on July 1st, 1898.

Then while Parliament was still in session, Sir Wilfrid Laurier left for England on June 3rd, 1897 to represent Canada at the Queen's Jubilee, and also took a prominent part at the Imperial Conference of that year, at which a discussion of a system of inter-empire Tariff Preferences, along the lines originated by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was one of the most important subjects dealt with.

On June 29th, 1897, the second session of that Parliament was prorogued, and the royal assent given to the British Preference and other tariff changes. It will be seen that all this was accomplished within a year of the time Sir Wilfrid Laurier had assumed office. Mr. Borden had this example and this precedent before him when he came to power in October, 1912, either he was unwilling or incapable of following it, or did not deem that the situation was urgent enough to demand like expedition. Will not his own followers prefer to believe it was the last of these alternative situations?

**LIBERAL MINISTERS WERE TOLD OF NO EMERGENCY—CONSERVATIVE MINISTERS HAVE DISCLOSED NONE.**

Sir Wilfrid Laurier and colleagues attended the Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911, and members of his cabinet, Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, and Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, attended meetings of the subsidiary conferences on Military and Naval defence in July and August 1909 and in June 1911. They were on all these occasions given the fullest confidence of the British Ministers and the Admiralty, and **no grounds of any emergency were disclosed to them.**

**Mr. Borden and the colleagues** who accompanied him to England during the summer of 1912 **have given Parliament no evidence** which in any way discloses that the situation has changed since the Conference on Military and Naval defence in June 1911. In the absence of any new disclosures, is it not reasonable to assume that in reality no change has taken place and that no emergency exists ?

**RESIGNATION OF HON. F. D. MONK, MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS IN BORDEN CABINET, AN EVIDENCE OF NO EMERGENCY.**

But there is even stronger evidence than the silence of Mr. Borden and his colleagues ; there is the resignation on Oct. 22nd, 1912, and the reasons for the resignation, of the Hon. F. D. Monk, Minister of Public Works in Mr. Borden's cabinet. **Mr. Monk as a member of the Administration, heard in the most intimate confidential relationship all that Mr. Borden and his colleagues were in a position to disclose.** Having listened to everything, Mr. Monk was unable to see any necessity for the course Mr. Borden was proposing to take, and has since taken, and resigned from the Cabinet rather than be a party to it.

In connection with Mr. Monk's resignation it is important to have in mind the following statement made by Mr. Borden, as Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on November 20th, 1911, in defending his action in taking Mr. Monk into his Cabinet after Mr. Monk had taken a stand in Parliament that nothing should be done in the way of Naval assistance to Britain till the people had been given an opportunity of pronouncing upon it. Mr. Borden said, "It is true that the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Monk) and I did not see eye to eye, but the point that divided us at that time was not a question of policy, but a question of fact, because the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Monk) had said over and over again that when any emergency confronted this Empire he and those who think with him would be prepared to do their duty."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 20th, 1911, page 60.)

There are two very obvious deductions to be drawn from this statement ; one is that when **Mr. Monk left the Cabinet he**



left it on a question of fact. Having heard everything the Prime Minister and his colleagues were in a position to disclose he saw no existence of any "emergency confronting the Empire," and the other, that when Mr. Monk was taken into the Cabinet in Oct. 1911, and during the year he was in office, the fact of an emergency must have ceased to exist even in the mind of Mr. Borden.

Either Mr. Borden must have, in order to gain the support of Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies at the time of the formation of his Cabinet, been prepared to sacrifice for the sake of office, the interests of Canada and the Empire at a time when, to use his own words, we were "confronted with an emergency which may rend this Empire asunder", or, he must have believed that this emergency no longer existed. Indeed, Mr. Borden himself clearly saw, that his action in taking Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies into the Cabinet was capable of only one construction or the other, and in defending his position virtually admitted that he had been wrong when he previously differed from Mr. Monk on the fact of an emergency, and virtually conceded that, at the time of taking Mr. Monk into his Cabinet he was rather of Mr. Monk's own mind, that an emergency did not exist. Here are his own words in further defence of his position :—

"I have no fault to find with the Rt. Hon. gentleman (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) for calling attention to the fact that my Hon. friend the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Monk) when this matter was under debate two sessions ago, did not see eye to eye with me on the question of emergent conditions which at that time I thought confronted the Empire. Those conditions appealed to me in that way at that time by reason of very grave declarations that had been made by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty of Great Britain. I am ready to admit, in fact we were afterwards taunted in this House by Hon. gentlemen opposite with the fact that these declarations were to a very considerable extent, modified by subsequent statements made in the British House of Commons by the advisers of the Crown, by the Prime Minister himself, I think, and also by the First Lord of the Admiralty."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, November 20th, 1911, page 60.)

In view of this apologetic attitude, and in the absence of a single statement by himself or his colleagues, to show wherein a new emergency has arisen since he came into office, can Mr. Borden expect that the people of Canada will regard as a sufficient justification for a departure from the unanimous resolution of March 1909, and for a vote of \$35,000,000 for the three largest battleships in the world, his impatient and alarmist pronouncement : "To-day while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait" ? Something

more authoritative and convincing is necessary where others fail to see the clouds, or lightning flashes and are unable to hear the booming of the distant thunder. The statement is so extreme as to be ridiculous.

#### THE RIGHTS AND THE DUTY OF THE PEOPLE OF CANADA.

The question of an emergency being disposed of, it should be for the people of Canada to choose between the two policies.

THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY of an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

THE LIBERAL POLICY of a Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Copies of this pamphlet may  
be had on applying to the  
Central Liberal Information  
Office, Ottawa, Canada.

## Canada and the Navy

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# Canada's Position in Military and Naval Defence

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## An Outline of Important Events

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*(Prepared with a view of illustrating past conditions and considerations in their bearing upon the present question of Canada's duty in National and Imperial Defence)*

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## Which Policy should Canada adopt?

### THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY :

An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world, as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

### THE LIBERAL POLICY :

A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

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CENTRAL INFORMATION OFFICE  
OF THE  
CANADIAN LIBERAL PARTY  
OTTAWA, CANADA  
1913



# Centralization or Co-operation

Canada's position in defence falls naturally for purposes of consideration under two heads, (1) **Military** defence, or defence by land, and (2) **Naval** defence, or defence by sea; and as respects both military and naval defence should be viewed with reference to (1) her own defence, and (2) assistance or co-operation in the defence of other parts of the Empire.

**Previous to Confederation** the defence of what now constitutes the Dominion of Canada was entirely in the hands of the Imperial Government, who for that purpose maintained troops in each Province supported by various local Volunteer Militia Corps.

**After Confederation**, the Imperial troops were gradually withdrawn from this country and at present none remain.

**During the Red River Rebellion in 1870 and the North-West Rebellion in 1885**, Great Britain sent officers and soldiers from the Home Land to assist the Canadian forces in suppressing these uprisings. In the case of the Red River Expedition, 800, or about one-third of the force were imperial troops; in the case of the North-West Rebellion, staff officers alone were loaned.

At the time of **the Soudan War in 1884**, when New South Wales offered the Imperial Government a body of troops, Canada declined **under the Conservative Administration of Sir John A. Macdonald** to send any troops from Canada to participate in this war. Sir John maintained the position that it was for Canada to say to what extent she would participate in European, African or Asiatic conflicts in which Great Britain might be involved, and sustained this position by refusing to participate at all.

Great Britain was relieved **under the Laurier Administration**, of the expense of maintaining garrisons in Canada, this obligation being assumed by the Canadian Government. Great Britain, moreover, was not called upon during Sir Wilfrid's Administration to render military aid of any kind to the Dominion.

**During the South African War**, Canada voluntarily came to the assistance of the mother country and despatched fully equipped contingents of infantry, artillery and cavalry to take part in that war. This was done, not as the recognition of an obligation on Canada's part to participate in all wars no matter where arising, or what the cause, but, voluntarily, in accordance with the position resolutely maintained to determine "as the need arises" the extent of her co-operation. The attitude of the government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier towards participation in imperial wars was exactly the same as that of the government of Sir John Macdonald, the only difference in application being that Sir John asserted it by refusing to participate, Sir Wilfrid by offering to lend assistance, and actually aiding.

**Since the South African War**, arrangements to facilitate co-operation between different parts of the Empire in matters of defence have been much considered, and a scheme of organization effected which,

whilst preserving to all the self-governing Dominions complete control of their own forces, is intended to render assistance more effective, should the need arise and the Dominions decide to participate.

Repeated efforts have been made by one or two British statesmen in England to have Canada, by one means or another, commit herself in advance to **participation in wars in which Britain may be involved**, without reserving to herself any say as to what course she should pursue as the need arises. These efforts have always failed, because Britain naturally has been unwilling to relinquish the exclusive control she exercises over foreign policy, and Canada has been equally unwilling to part with any measure of self-government.

**The British Government, on the one hand**, has strongly maintained that any body on which Canada, or the other Dominions, may be represented in matters of defence, shall be advisory and consultative only, and that matters of policy affecting peace and war must be exclusively the prerogative of the British Cabinet, subject only to the Parliament of Great Britain. **Canada, on the other hand**, has as resolutely maintained the position that she should not be asked to sacrifice in any particular her rights of self-government and should be permitted to say, as the need arises, the extent to which she will participate in international conflicts, unconnected in any way with her own territory or policies, and which may arise because of circumstances wholly beyond her knowledge or control. In imperial affairs the difference as between advocates of different systems of organization in matters of defence has been between centralization and co-operation: and thus far **both the mother country and the self-governing Dominions have regarded co-operation as the only basis on which imperial unity and local autonomy can be maintained.**

In naval defence the whole course of development has been along identical lines. A **complete departure**, however, is **involved in the announcement of Mr. Borden** on December 5th, 1912, of the proposal of his Government to present to England, at a cost of thirty-five million dollars, the three largest battleships in the world, this either as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other permanent policy to be announced later. These three largest battleships in the world are, to use Mr. Borden's own words "to range themselves in the battle line of the Empire" and to be "maintained and controlled as part of the Royal Navy." This means that there has been **reserved to the people of Canada** who are being taxed thirty-five million dollars for their construction, and who may later on be called upon for further contribution, **no kind of control** as to the ends they may be made to serve, or with respect to the conflicts in which they are to participate.

It will thus be seen, that **Mr. Borden's policy is a complete reversal of the attitude assumed by Canada ever since Confederation with respect to defence both military and naval.** It is a reversal of the position which, with the full concurrence and endorsement of the British Government, Canada, in common with the other self-governing Dominions, has maintained in respect of the right of control which, as a self-governing Dominion, she is entitled to exercise over expenditure for military, naval or other purposes and with regard to the outcome of policies with which she has had nothing to do, and which may or may not meet with her approval.

Mr. Borden himself is saying at the present time that Canada should do nothing of a permanent nature in the matter of imperial naval defence until she has a voice in the issues that determine peace and war, and giving this as a reason why he is unable to adopt a permanent policy. A despatch, dated London, December 10, 1912, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Rt. Honourable Lewis Harcourt, to His Royal Highness the Governor General of Canada "for the information of Borden's Cabinet," states that "policy is and must remain the prerogative of the Cabinet, subject to the support of the House of Commons" (at Westminster). Without expressing any opinion as to the matters, it is to be observed that **what Mr. Borden is proposing to do is the very thing which he says should not be done.** By the gift of the three largest battleships in the world to the British Admiralty he commits Canada irrevocably to participation in any and every conflict that may arise into which these ships may be brought, and places wholly beyond the power of the Canadian Parliament to exercise control should there be a course of policy or action of which the people of Canada do not approve.

Circumstances afford **only one of two possible explanations of this complete reversal** of what, wholly irrespective of party, has to be understood as the accepted basis of relationship between the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions with respect to naval and imperial defence,—either that, entirely irrespective of the views of the people, Mr. Borden deliberately proposes to **substitute a policy of centralization for one of co-operation in matters of defence**, or, that because of the compromised position of himself and his government through the alliance between the Nationalists and the Conservatives, he is prepared to resort to the expedient of voting the five million dollars for dreadnoughts, to escape, for the time being, the framing of a permanent policy, and yet appear to be doing something substantial in aid of Britain. No matter which explanation is accepted the consequences are the same; **a complete reversal of the policy which the Canadian parliament and people have hitherto maintained with so much pride and with results so wholly beneficial to British connection**, and the opening of the way to endless party dissensions both in the United Kingdom and in Canada as to what is and is not understood, and what may, or may not be involved, with the elements of possible disintegration and estrangement with these differences may be fraught.

It may be that a section of the Canadian people are willing to accept with what difficulty Canada has attained her rights of self-government and control, and the advantages she derives from them, and are not prepared to substitute **centralization without control, for co-operation with control** in inter-imperial relations, but Mr. Borden is hardly justified in forcing the whole Dominion into this position, without giving the people of Canada an opportunity of expressing their views in a manner which vitally affects the present rights, and future position of the Dominion.

The following brief chronology will serve to illustrate the various considerations which have determined Canada's part in the matter of military and naval defence and may serve to throw some light on the conditions which have helped to bring about the present situation.



7—**Confederation**—Canada chooses between making a contribution to the British War Office for purposes of land defence and undertaking to provide in some measure for her own defence. By the agreement reached, Canada was to spend about one million dollars annually on the military system of the Dominion, and Great Britain, at her own expense, to station and maintain, in addition, troops in the Dominion.

70—**The Red River Expedition**—General Wolseley and British troops assist Canadian volunteers.

84—**The Soudan War**—New South Wales offers the Imperial Government to send, at her own expense, a body of troops.

Canada, under the government of Sir John A. Macdonald, declines to send troops, but offers to sanction recruiting in Canada for service in Egypt or elsewhere on condition that the entire cost must fall on the Imperial exchequer. Lord Melgund, the Governor General's Secretary, in compliance with instructions received from the Imperial Government, advertises for 600 boatmen to take part in the Expedition up the Nile. They were recruited and sent to Alexandria at expense of Home Government.

85—**The North West Rebellion**—General Middleton with staff officers loaned from the Imperial service assist Canadian Volunteers.

**The Colonial Defence Committee established in London**—Its duty to study Colonial defence.

96—**The Imperial Defence Committee established in London**—An enlargement of the Colonial Defence Committee—a purely consultative body, having no executive power or administrative functions, called together by the British Prime Minister when the Prime Minister wants advice. Prime Minister asks who he wishes to attend, and does with advice as he pleases. This body is assisted in its deliberations by the Colonial Defence Committee, which is regarded as its Sub-Committee.

97—**Colonial Conference held in London**—Canada declines to interchange regiments with different parts of the Empire.

99—**South African War**—Canada co-operates with other Dominions in assisting Great Britain.

Oct. 15th—Canadian Government cables offer of 1,000 infantry.

Oct. 30th—First contingent (57 officers and 1,224 men) sails from Quebec, S.S. Sardinia.

Nov. 2nd—Canadian Government offers second contingent. At first declined. 1900.

Jan. 21st—First quota second contingent leaves Halifax, S.S. Laurentian.

Jan. 27—Second quota second contingent leaves Halifax, S.S. Pomeranian.

March 16th—Strathcona Horse (537 officers and men with 573 horses) leaves Halifax on S.S. Monterey, also (121 men) to fill up "casualty lists."

1902.

Jan. 14th—Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles (454 officers and men and 514 horses) leave Halifax S.S. Manhattan.

Jan. 24th—Canadian Mounted Rifles (440 officers and men and 454 horses) also Canadian Field Hospital Army Medical Corps (62 officers and men and 30 horses) leave Halifax, S.S. Victoria.

1902—**Colonial Conference at London**—Canada declines because of "departure it involves from the principle of self-government" to set apart certain of her forces for foreign service, notwithstanding the proposal made that the United Kingdom would contribute to their pay. Canada agrees, however, to consider the sending of military contingents "whenever the need arises," but expresses unwillingness to pledge contingents in advance for all cases of European war.

1903—**Imperial Defence Committee meets in London**—Canada represented by Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia.

1905—**Garrisoning of Halifax taken over by Canada**—Imperial troops replaced by officers and men of the Canadian permanent corps.

1906—**Garrisoning of Esquimalt taken over by Canada**—Imperial troops replaced by officers and men of the Canadian permanent corps.

(The additional annual expense to Canada in taking over these two fortresses was approximately \$1,000,000.)

\*The annual expenditure by Canada on the militia for 10 years from 1901 has been as follows:—

1902-3.....	\$2,503,689
1903-4.....	3,544,589
1904-5.....	3,945,141
1905-6.....	5,593,518
1906-7 (9 months).....	4,320,967
1907-8.....	6,795,678
1908-9.....	6,484,806
1909-10.....	5,921,314
1910-11.....	6,909,211
1911-12.....	7,579,884

For 1912-13 the amount voted for militia by the Borden Administration was \$8,896,397.

For 1913-14, the amount to be voted is fixed at \$10,479,065.

1907—**Imperial Conference held in London**—Canada represented by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Frederick Borden. A resolution carried making provision for calling of subsidiary conference of Imperial Conference whenever thought advisable.

**Imperial Defence Committee meets**, Canada represented by Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence.

**The Imperial General Staff Organized**—for giving advice and furnishing information, to study military science, collect and disseminate military information and intelligence, undertake preparation of schemes of defence, advice as to training, education and organization,—a purely advisory organization of which command is not a function.

With reference to the Imperial General Staff, the Imperial Conference expressly noted that its existence would not commit any of the governments represented, and that it would not interfere in questions connected with command or administration.

1909—**Local sections of the Imperial General Staff established in Canada, Australia and New Zealand** on recommendation of Imperial General Staff.

Canadian section approved February 10, 1909, after express reference by Canadian Order in Council to the circumstance that **the principle of local control** by responsible Ministers concerned over officers of local section **has been fully safeguarded.**

**July & August—Subsidiary Conference\*** (of Imperial Conference) of representatives of self-governing Dominions **on the naval and military defence of the Empire convened in London.** Canada represented by Sir F. W. Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, Honourable L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Major-General F. H. N. Lake and Rear Admiral G. E. Kingsmill.

At this Conference on the Military side a plan was arranged of so organizing the forces of the Crown, that, to quote Premier Asquith's words (House of Commons, Aug. 26, 1909), "while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, **should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency** their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial army."

General concurrence was expressed in the proposition "that each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it **should it so desire** to take its share in the general defence of the Empire."

Mr. Haldane, Minister of War, in laying the proposals before the Colonial representatives, said, "**the representatives of the over sea Dominions cannot at the Conference pledge their governments, or undertake in any way to bind the officers and men composing over sea Dominion forces to engagements beyond the shores and boundaries of their own countries**"—and that "whatever is done must be done spontaneously and with due regard to the circumstances in which each one of them is situated."

\*See also reference to this Conference under heading "Naval Defence."



## NAVAL DEFENCE.

1887—**Canada declines**, at Colonial Conference held in London, to send cash contribution to the British Navy.

1897—**Canada again declines**, at Colonial Conference at London, to send cash contribution to the British Navy.

1902—**Canada again declines**, at Colonial Conference at London, to send cash contribution to the British Navy.

Canada expresses appreciation of duty of Dominion as it advances in population and wealth to make necessary outlay for the necessary preparation of self-defence.

**Canada prepared to consider naval side of defence** and states that on sea coast are numbers of men qualified to form a naval reserve, hopes to devise a system leading to training of these men and making their services available in time of need.

At this Conference, Canada's representatives placed on record their opinion as to **what the Canadian policy should be**. They did so in the following words:—

“The Canadian Ministers regret that they have been unable to assent to the suggestions made by Lord Selborne respecting a navy, and by Mr. St. John Brodrick respecting the army. The ministers desire to point out that their objections arise, not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals would entail **an important departure from the principle of Colonial government**. Canada values highly the measure of local independence which has been granted her from time to time by the Imperial authorities, and which has been so productive of beneficial results, both as respects the material progress of the country and the strengthening of the ties that bind it to the Motherland. . . . . At present, Canadian expenditures for the defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval system of defence as well. On the sea coast of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a naval reserve, and it is hoped that at an early date a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.”

1906—Jan. 1—**The dockyard and shipping plant with government buildings at Halifax taken over by the Canadian Government.**

**British squadrons withdrawn** from Halifax Atlantic station about this time.

Halifax and Esquimalt are both harbours of refuge, coaling stations and repair yards. They were transferred to the Canadian Government without any consideration, (Esquimalt, November 1st, 1910,) but with an agreement that they must be properly kept up in equipment and stores, so as to be available at all times for the British fleet, while British vessels at all times were to have precedence over other ships. In addition, there are large stores of the British Admiralty at Esquimalt, which are cared for by the Canadian Garrison.

—March 29—**Hon. Geo. E. Foster moves resolution** as follows:—

“ That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the **suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports.**”

**The House of Commons of Canada unanimously adopts following resolution:—**

“ This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

“ The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions, **the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the questions of defence.**

“ The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote **the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service** in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world.

“ The House expresses its firm conviction that **whenever the need arises**, the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the Empire.”

**April 30—Invitations sent out by Secretary of State for the Colonies to self-governing Dominions to send representatives to a subsidiary Conference of the Imperial Conference to be held in London during July and August to consider resolution of Canadian House of Commons, to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the Empire with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to proposals from Australia and New Zealand.**

**July & August—Subsidiary Conference held in London.**

Canada represented by Sir F. W. Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, Honourable L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Major General Sir F. H. N. Lake and Rear Admiral C. E. Kingsmill.

**July 20th—Admiralty Memorandum intended as basis for consultation on naval defence sent by First Lord of the Admiralty to representatives of the Dominions. States that duty of Conference is to formulate the broad prin-**

principles upon which the growth of colonial naval force should be fostered.

July 28th—Conference opened.

Aug. 31st—First meeting of Conference to consider naval defence

On the naval side, an arrangement was effected whereby Canada and Australia would undertake to provide local Naval services, and New Zealand provide dreadnought and continue contribution in part payment of coast protection to be provided by Home Government.

At this Conference the Admiralty proposed that "the Dominion government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet unit." As regards Canada, it was considered that her double seaboard rendered the provision of a fleet unit unsuitable for the present. It was proposed according to the amount of money that might be available that Canada should make a start with cruisers of the "Bristol" class and destroyers of an "Improved River" class—a part to be stationed on the Atlantic seaboard and a part on the Pacific.\*

1910.

Jan. 12th—Naval Service Bill introduced in House of Commons by Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

March 4th—Naval Service Bill receives royal assent and becomes known as "The Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada."

Contains provision for organization of a Department of Naval Service, the establishing of Naval forces, a Naval college, etc.

Nov. 1st—Esquimalt dockyard and shipping plant taken over by the Canadian Government.

British squadrons withdrawn from Esquimalt Pacific station about this time.

1911.

Jan. 19th—Naval College at Halifax formally opened.

June—Subsidiary Conference of Imperial Conference held in London between the British Admiralty and representatives of the Dominion of Canada and Australia at which it was agreed "That Naval services and forces of the Dominion of Canada and Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective governments." Agreed also that each country should have its own naval stations. For Canada the latitude and longitude of the Canadian Atlantic Stations and of the Canadian Pacific Stations were definitely determined.

(On July 29th, the Canadian Parliament was dissolved and on September 21st, the Dominion General elections were held and Laurier Administration defeated on Reciprocity.)

1912.

Dec. 5th—Premier Borden, as leader of Conservative Administration introduces Bill to authorize measures for increasing the effectiveness

\*See also reference to this Conference under heading "Military Defence."



naval forces of the Empire to be cited as "The Naval Aid Act" and proposes **the expenditure of thirty-five million dollars on the three largest battleships in the world**, to be presented to the British Admiralty as a gift from Canada.\*

The Resolution, as moved by the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, was as follows:—

"Resolved, That it is expedient, in connection with the Bill now before this House intituled An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire, to provide:—

(a) That from and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire;

(b) That the said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type;

(c) That the said ships, when constructed and equipped, shall be placed by the Governor in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire; and

(d) That the said sum shall be paid, used and applied, and the said ships shall be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the Governor in Council and His Majesty's Government.

Dec. 12th—**Sir Wilfrid Laurier moves an amendment** as follows:—

That all the words after the word 'That' be struck out, and the following be substituted therefor:—

'This House declines to concur in the said resolution and orders that the same be referred back to the committee with instructions to amend the same in the following particulars, namely, to strike out all the words after clause (a) and substitute therefor the following:—

'The memorandum prepared by the Board of Admiralty on the general naval situation of the Empire and communicated to this House by the Right Hon. the Prime Minister on December 5th shows that several of the most important of the foreign powers have adopted a definite policy of rapidly increasing their naval strength.

'That this condition has compelled the United Kingdom to concentrate its naval forces in home waters, involving the withdrawal of ships from the outlying portions of the Empire.

\*Mr. Borden has since changed the nature of his proposal. In introducing the resolution in the House of Commons on Dec. 5, 1912, he said, "Every Canadian will realize in seeing or reading of these ships that they are a gift in which we have participated." In speaking on the second reading of the resolution in the House of Commons on Feb. 13, 1913, he said, "We do not propose that these ships shall pass out of the ownership of the Canadian people or government. Our proposal is that those ships shall be in the ownership of the Canadian people."

‘ That such withdrawal renders it necessary that Canada, without further delay, should enter actively upon a permanent policy of naval defence.

‘ That any measure of Canadian aid to Imperial naval defence which does not imply a permanent policy of participation by ships owned, manned and maintained by Canada and contemplating construction as soon as possible in Canada, is not an adequate or satisfactory expression of the aspirations of the Canadian people in regard to naval defence, and is not an assumption by Canada of her fair share in the maintenance of the naval strength of the Empire.

‘ This House regrets to learn the intention of the Government to indefinitely postpone the carrying out by Canada of a permanent naval policy.

‘ It is the opinion of this House that measures should be taken at the present session to give effect actively and speedily to the permanent naval policy embodied in the Naval Service Act of 1910 passed pursuant to the resolution unanimously approved by this House in March, 1909.

‘ This House is further of the opinion that to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial navy by the addition by Canada, under the above Act, of two fleet units, to be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada, respectively, rather than by a contribution of money or ships, is the policy best calculated to afford relief to the United Kingdom in respect to the burden of Imperial naval defence, and, in the words of the Admiralty memorandum, to restore greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons in every sea and directly promote the security of the Dominions; and that the Government of Canada should take such steps as shall lead to the accomplishment of this purpose as speedily as possible.’

## BEGINNINGS OF ORGANIZATION OF A CANADIAN NAVAL SERVICE UNDER LIBERAL ADMINISTRATION.

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It has become a part of the tactics of the Borden Administration to seek to belittle the work of the Laurier Administration in putting into effect the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 29, 1909, approving of the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service. An examination of what was actually accomplished will show that, having regard to the magnitude of the undertaking, the necessary conferences with the British Admiralty, the time required for the enactment of legislation and obtaining appropriations from Parliament, as well as the time required for the preparation and consideration of tenders for the construction of ships, both by Government and firms tendering, **the record of the Laurier Government in this, as in all other matters of administration, was both progressive and expeditious.**

The resolution was passed at the session of 1908-09. Before the session had ended, the Minister of Marine and the Minister of Naval Defence left for England to attend a subsidiary Conference of the Imperial Conference called for the express purpose of considering the Canadian Resolution and a similar resolution by Australia. An agreement was reached at this Conference as to what Canada and Australia should do viz.: to each enter upon the organization of a naval service of their own. The Ministers returned and immediately a bill was drafted, with the aid and advice of Naval experts loaned to the Canadian Government by the Admiralty. It was introduced at the session immediately ensuing (the session of 1909-10) and passed by Parliament on March 4, 1910. **This measure could not have been enacted earlier,** and until it was enacted and the necessary appropriation for giving its provisions effect voted by Parliament, the Administration could go no farther. That was March 4, 1910. Parliament was dissolved on July 29th, 1911, just a year and a little over four months later. The following brief outline will show **what was accomplished in these sixteen months.** Having regard to the circumstance that the whole work was concerned with bringing into existence an entirely new branch of Administration, and that interests, both Canadian and Imperial, of vast importance were involved, will be generally conceded that **to have attempted to do more in the time would have rendered the Government liable to censure** on the ground of undue consideration and immoderate haste.

1910.

March 4th—**The Naval Service Act passed.** Steps immediately taken to organize a Department of Naval Service under five branches (1) Naval, (2) Fishery Protection, (3) Tidal and Current Survey, (4) Hydrographic Survey, (5) Wireless Telegraph.

March 5th—G. J. Desbarats appointed **Deputy Minister of Department of Naval Service.**

Rear Admiral C. E. Kingsmill appointed **Director of Naval Service.**



July. 8th—**Advertisements** inserted in leading newspapers of Canada for the **construction of vessels for Canadian navy**. Canadian and British firms invited to tender. The following is a copy of the advertisement:—

**“NOTICE CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION OF VESSELS FOR THE CANADIAN NAVY.”**

The vessels will be built according to the plans and specifications of the British Admiralty, which, being of a confidential nature, will only be exhibited to approved firms. The Department of Naval Service will, therefore, be glad to hear from any Canadian or British firm who would wish to tender for **BUILDING IN CANADA ALL THESE WARSHIPS**.

It would be necessary for such firms to show that they have or propose to put in a ship-building plant that would be considered sufficient for the building of cruisers of the Bristol class and that they have had such experience as will enable them to guarantee the building of such ships according to the Admiralty specifications.

It should be borne in mind that the Rush-Bagot Convention provides that no warships should be built on the Great Lakes and therefore ship-building firms should arrange for establishment elsewhere than on these Lakes.

Further information can be obtained by parties who propose to tender on application to the undersigned.

(Signed) G. J. DESBARATS,

Deputy Minister of the  
Naval Service.

Department of Naval Service,

Ottawa, Ontario, July 8th, 1910.”

Aug. 18th—Second class **cruiser “Rainbow”** previously purchased by Canadian Government from British Admiralty for use **as training ship on the Pacific**, sails from England.....**arrives at Esquimalt November 7th.**

Oct. 10th—First class **cruiser “Niobe,”** previously purchased from British Admiralty by Canadian Government for use **as training ship on the Atlantic**, sails from England.....**arrives at Halifax October 21st.**

**Recruiting for both “Rainbow” and “Niobe” started on their arrival**, also the organization of the dockyard at Halifax. According to the report of the Deputy Minister of the Department of Naval Service for the year ending March 31st, 1911, **recruiting was satisfactory** and the complement of the “Niobe” was practically complete on that date. There were still a few vacancies on the “Rainbow.”

November—**Dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt transferred to Canada by Imperial Government and taken over by the Naval Department.** These dockyards are administered at present by the Naval Service Department.—A dockyard staff has been organized at Halifax for general work.

1911.

Jan. 19th—**Naval College at Halifax formally opened.**

May 1st—**Tenders**, in accordance with the advertisement and information furnished, **received by the Government** of Canada from the following firms at prices quoted:—

William Beardmore & Co., Dalmuir, Scotland.....	\$13,055,804
Armstrong Whitworth & Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne.....	\$12,842,000
Vickers Sons & Maxim, Barrow-on-Furness.....	\$12,712,152
The British and Canadian Shipbuilding and Dockyard Co., Sydney, C.B.....	\$12,464,518
Swan, Hunter & Wigham Richardson, Newcastle-on-Tyne.	\$12,174,000
Cammel Laird & Co., Birkenhead.....	\$11,280,000

All these tenders were for **building the whole number of ships entirely in Canada.**

These tenders did not include armour plate, armament or certain fittings usually supplied by the Admiralty, but included the fitting of these articles on board the vessels, mounting the armour and guns, and putting anchors and chains on board, etc.

May 12th—Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Department of Naval Service, sails for England to attend subsidiary conference of Imperial Conference on Naval Defence.

June 29th—**Agreement concluded between the British Admiralty and representatives of the Dominions** of Canada and Australia, respecting the control of the Naval Service and forces of the Dominion of Canada and Australia, and setting forth **the limits of the Canadian and Australian naval stations** respectively.

The limits of the Canadian stations are described as follows:—

“**The Canadian Atlantic Station** will include the waters north of 30 degrees north latitude and west of the meridian of 40 degrees longitude.”

“**The Canadian Pacific Station** will include the waters north of 30 degrees north latitude and east of the meridian of 180 degrees longitude.”

July 16—Hon. L. P. Brodeur returns to Canada.

On July 29th, the Canadian Parliament was dissolved and on September 21st the Dominion general elections were held. Because of the impending elections, the tenders for the construction of ships, were not awarded by the Laurier Administration, and after the Government's defeat, these tenders were transferred to the Borden Ministry which was formed on October 10th, 1911.

The Borden Administration took no action in regard to the tenders, and deliberately sought to minimize in as many directions as possible, the beginnings which had been made in the Canadian Naval Service under the Laurier Administration. Recruiting was discouraged to make it appear that difficulty would exist in obtaining the necessary complement of men; and the **Rainbow** and the **Niobe**, which had been obtained for training purposes only, were referred to as the “Laurier Navy.”

The first annual report of the Deputy Minister of the Department of Naval Service which was for the year ending March 31, 1911, the Liberals being still in office, contains the following reference to **recruiting for the Canadian Naval Service.** “Recruiting has been satisfactory, and the complement of the **Niobe** is practically complete whilst there are still a few vacancies in the **Rainbow.** As the advantages of the

service become more widely known, **it is anticipated that there be no difficulty in obtaining recruits.**"—(Report of the Department of Naval Service for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1911, page 8)

The report of the Deputy Minister for the year ending March the Conservatives being then in office, contains the following statement which speaks for itself.

"Owing to the uncertainty of the future Naval policy, a limited accommodation available, **no special efforts have been to obtain recruits for the Navy.**"—(Report of the Department of Naval Service for the fiscal year ending 31st March, 1912, page 8)

The same expression is used throughout the report in reference to other branches of the Naval service, as, for example, with respect to **the reorganization of the Naval Establishment at Esquimaux, Halifax,** the report says, on page 10, "having regard to the fact that **the future Naval policy of the Government has not been definitely laid down,** it has been thought desirable not to," etc.

This **deliberate effort to thwart development of the Canadian Naval service** was, doubtless, necessitated by the compromise entered into by Mr. Borden with the Nationalists prior to the elections, and resulted in the time of three of their members, Messrs. Monk, Nantel and Poirer, being taken by him into his ministry.

Though a longer period of time has elapsed since Mr. Borden assumed office than the Liberal Administration had for giving effect to the provisions of the Naval Service Act, **absolutely nothing has been done by the Borden Administration,** either by way of effect to the provisions of this Act, which is still on the Statute Book, or in carrying out the provisions of the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909, which has never been rescinded. Not only has nothing been done as respects Naval defence in any other way, but it is even more serious is that, in the absence of any definitely permanent policy, the several branches of the Naval Service which have been established, are being held, as it were, between heaven and earth. They are being maintained at considerable cost to the Dominion, but, from the point of view of efficiency, or of service to Canada or the Mother Country, are being rendered valueless.

On December 5, 1912, Mr. Borden introduced a bill to authorize the expenditure of \$35,000,000 on the three largest battleships in the fleet, as part of a permanent policy of contribution by Canada to the Admiralty, or as part of some other policy to be announced later. It remains to be seen if this proposal will receive the sanction of the House of Commons.

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Copies of this pamphlet may be had on applying to  
the Central Liberal Information Office, Ottawa, Can.

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**CANADA AND THE NAVY**

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# **THE REAL EMERGENCY**

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**The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance**  
and  
**Some of Its Consequences**

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## **How British Interests Have Been Sacrificed to Serve Party Ends**

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**What Policy Should Canada Adopt?**

**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office  
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1913

## THE NATIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND SOME OF ITS CONSEQUENCES.

What is the explanation of Mr. Borden's present proposal of an expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battle-ships in the world to be owned by Canada, but to be given to the British Admiralty, as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later? It is not to be found in any "emergency" in Britain, it is not to be found in any expressed desire of the Canadian people. It is the fact, **in open defiance of the wish of the people's representatives** as given expression to in the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 1909, approving of the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service, to which further endorsement was given in the enactment by Parliament in March 1910 of the Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada. It is a **complete reversal of the hitherto accepted policy of co-operation in defence** between the Mother country and the Dominion, and a **deliberate attempt at abandonment of rights of self-government** on which alone imperial unity with local autonomy can be maintained. It is **in complete opposition to Mr. Borden's own previously expressed convictions** as to what is most in the interests of Canada and the British Empire. How can so extraordinary and far reaching a change in principle and policy be explained?

The explanation lies unhappily in **an alliance contracted for the sake of gaining office**, as unpatriotic as it was for the time being successful, but which for a year or more paralysed the hand of the Administration it helped to bring into being.

It is and will ever remain a reproach to the Conservative Party in Canada, and though of necessity openly avowed for some time past, it is without defenders among many loyal Conservatives even to-day. If it be true that a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good Wit, then the hybrid policy born of this unholy alliance is doomed once the will of an enlightened electorate, is given an opportunity of pronouncing upon it.

To appreciate the present situation aright, it is necessary to trace briefly the several steps by which it has been brought about. It is not necessary however, to go back earlier than the resolution of March 1909, which embodied the unanimous expression of opinion of the parliament of Canada as to **the policy which wholly irrespective of party, should be pursued by Canadian Statesmen** with respect to Naval defence.

### How the question of Naval Defence Arose.

The Resolution of March 1909 owes its introduction to a motion by the Hon. George E. Foster which expressed the opinion that "in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that **spirit of self-help and self-respect** which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to **the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports.**" It was the responsibility and financial burden of the protection of **Canada's coast lines, and Can-**

ada's great seaports, that out of a spirit of self-help and self-respect Canadians were to take their proper share in assuming. It was this object that members of the House of Commons had in mind when later, in the spirit appealed to, they voted unanimously to approve of any necessary expenditure towards the speedy construction of a Canadian Naval Service, which was the main feature of the resolution as finally adopted.

Prior to the passing of this resolution, Canada's recognition of her obligation in the matter of defence had been limited to defence on land. The resolution extended the obligation to defence at sea, of Canadian coasts and trade routes, and the provision thereby, should the need arise, of more effective means of co-operation with the other forces of the British Navy, in the common defence of the Empire at sea.

### **All the outlying Dominions concerned.**

But Canada, of the outlying Dominions, was not the only one to assume a larger measure of responsibility at that time. It will be remembered that one result of the discussions which took place at that time in the parliament at Westminster was an immediate response from all the self-governing Dominions to what then appeared to be an increasing need on the part of the Motherland. On the 22nd March, the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type, and of a second of the same type, if necessary. On the 29th March, the Canadian House of Commons passed its resolution. On the 15th April, Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the Australian Government, telegraphed that whereas all the British Dominions ought to share in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the British Empire, so far as Australia was concerned, this object would be best attained by the encouragement of naval development in that country.

In view of these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered the time was opportune for the holding of a conference to discuss afresh the relations of the Dominions and the United Kingdom, in regard to the question of Imperial Defence, and on the 30th April sent an invitation to the Dominion Ministers of the four Dominions and to the Cape Colonies to attend a Conference to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the Empire with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

### **Canada and Australia to organize Naval Services.**

The Conference was held in London in the summer of 1909. There were present representatives from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the Canadian representatives being the Hon. Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, the Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Major General Sir Percy Lake, and Rear Admiral C. E. Kingsmill. The question of naval defence was specially discussed at meetings of the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 3rd, 5th and 6th of August, the Earl of Crewe being in



the chair. As a result of this Conference an agreement was come to as respects Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the obligations they were to assume. **Canada and Australia were to begin the organization of Naval services of their own**, New Zealand to contribute to the British Navy, on condition of British ships being placed in her waters.

When the Ministers who attended the Conference on Imperial and naval defence returned from England in the fall of 1909, **a bill for the creation of a Canadian Naval Service was immediately prepared** by the Government with the aid of Admiralty experts and submitted to parliament at its next session.

After considerable discussion, it **received the Royal assent on March 4, 1910** and passed into law as "The Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada."

### **How the Naval Question was dragged into Party Politics.**

Mr. Foster's motion respecting the defence of Canadian coasts and trade routes was introduced, as has been mentioned, on March 29th, 1909. The resolution as finally adopted was passed during the evening of the same day. The discussion in parliament was therefore, brief. Once, however, **the Laurier Administration began to give effect to the resolution**, and it became apparent that it was to mean something more than a pious expression of goodwill on the part of Canada towards the Mother Country, **popular agitation was started in the country** against it. In the Province of Quebec especially, attention was drawn to what was looked upon as a new departure, and exaggerated and alarmist statements as to what it might involve were widely circulated. It soon became apparent that naval expenditure, like increased expenditure on the militia, was not likely to meet with ready acceptance on the part of the people of the Dominion, and that a government undertaking the carrying out of a permanent policy in this connection was certain to incur great political risks. On the other hand, the growing sense of national self-respect was felt to demand that something be done which would relieve Canada of the reproach that notwithstanding her position among the outlying Dominions and her great development, she was prepared to rest for her security in a position of dependence upon the Mother land, at a time when the burden of sea defence was beginning to weigh heavily upon the tax payers of the British Isles. It was known, too, that a strong patriotic sentiment could be easily aroused whenever it could be made to appear, as was true in the case of the South African war, that the Mother country was in real need of assistance.

With this knowledge of the situation, **the leaders of the Conservative party decided to turn to their party advantage the difficult position in which the Laurier Government had been placed** in consequence of its endeavours to give effect to the unanimous resolution of parliament. Indifferent to the demands of a disinterested patriotism, they decided to drag the question of naval defence into the realm of contentious party politics, **to reap a party advantage wholly regardless of its effect upon national honour or duty**, or the larger "imperial claims" to which in their speeches, they were so

fond of alluding. They knew the resolution had placed the Laurier Government in a position where entering upon a permanent naval policy was a necessity, and they believed that with the apathy, and in some parts, open hostility throughout the country, to anything in the nature of a permanent obligation, it might be possible to embarrass the Administration once popular opinion became sufficiently aroused. They said, "this is our chance; let us take advantage of it."

### **One Attitude for Quebec Another for Ontario.**

The lack of enthusiasm over any naval policy was general throughout Canada. At best, it was looked upon as the discharge of a duty, and electors generally speaking are not as much concerned with duties as with rights. Liabilities are never as popular as assets. But it was in the Province of Quebec that the opposition to a permanent policy was strongest. There the people were led to believe that any permanent Naval policy involved more than the fulfilling of a national duty; it was held to include imperial obligations of a wholly new and in some respects dangerous kind. The whole thing was represented as a deliberate design on the part of British Imperialists to draw Canada, and especially French-Canadians, into the vortex of European militarism.

Entertaining the view that the policy was not popular in Quebec, and that once submitted to the people in that province the popular vote would be against it, the Tory Leaders decided that when the government brought down its measure, they would meet it by a **proposal to do nothing** involving permanent expenditures without first submitting the permanent policy to the people. On the other hand, it was well known that this purely negative attitude would not prove sufficient, and that such a course, by itself, would beget the active opposition of **the jingo element, who were loudest in their insistence on something being done**, and that without delay. While numerically this element in the population is by no means the most considerable, the wealth it commands, and the control it exercises over a considerable portion of the press, places it in a way, if it so desires, of making its voice heard and its influence felt. **How to retain the support of this jingo element and at the same time appear to be doing nothing of a permanent nature**, became therefore the all important question. The way out was found in the device of an "emergency". Let an "emergency" be proclaimed, and the British flag sufficiently waved, and the natural impulse of loyal affection for the Mother land might be counted upon to carry through such proposals as might be made and at the same time conceal all ulterior designs.

### **The Device of "An Emergency" Used to Serve Party Ends In 1910.**

There is no longer any room for doubt, that this was the plan the Conservative Leaders worked out after the session of 1908-09 and decided to begin putting into operation just as soon as the government brought down its measure.

In the belief that a plebescite would result in his province in a



veto upon all proposals, **Mr. Monk**, the French-Canadian leader of the Conservative party, was to ally himself with the Nationalists of Quebec, become their parliamentary leader, and oppose anything being done until the people were first consulted by plebescite or otherwise. **Mr. Borden**, as leader of the party for the Dominion, was to hold to opposition to any permanent policy until the people were consulted, but in order to retain the support of the jingo element was to raise the cry of an "emergency" and demand an immediate contribution of "money" or "dreadnoughts"! This, it was believed, to those who desired some recognition of Canada's obligations, would serve as an evidence of Canadian loyalty, and of Canada's desire to assist the Mother land, while to those who had little or no liking for the recognition of any permanent obligation, the emergency contribution could be pointed to as a means of getting rid of this obligation, and incurring no future liability. How this combination was worked out is familiar to all who followed the debate.

### **Mr. Borden and Mr. Monk Work Together While Appearing to Oppose Each Other.**

On January 12th, Sir Wilfrid brought down the government's measure, an Act to provide for a Canadian Naval service. **Mr. Borden** took up the role he had been assigned. He pictured the "emergency" in words as graphic as language could command. Having quoted Mr. Foster's remarks of the previous year to the effect that "peril stands today at the gateway" he asked, "**Has the peril passed?**" and replied, "**No, Sir, we are nearer to it by nearly a year.** Has Germany's policy been modified in the meantime? No, on the contrary, Germany has put forward the greatest Naval Budget in her history."

**Mr. Borden** went on, "It is idle to assure us that there will be no war. **The war has already begun**, the war of construction, the victory will be as decisive there as in actual battle. Does the dissolution of the Empire signify nothing to Canada and her people?"

**"When the British Empire goes the British North America Act goes also** and with it there departs every constitutional guarantee which it contains. **All beyond is chaos and darkness**....."

"I say to my Rt. Hon. friend the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him: Go on with your naval service. Proceed cautiously and surely.... Lay your proposals before the people and give them if necessary opportunity to be heard, but do not forget that **we are confronted with an emergency which may rend the Empire asunder** before the proposed service is worthy of the name. In the face of such a situation immediate, vigorous, earnest action is necessary. We have no Dreadnought ready: we have no fleet unit at hand. But we have the resources, and I trust the patriotism, to provide a fleet unit, or at least a Dreadnought, without one moment's unnecessary delay. Or, and in my opinion this would be the better course, we can place the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the admiralty to be used for naval defence under such conditions as we may prescribe."



**On February 3rd, Mr. Borden moved an amendment embodying these suggestions which he put in the following words.**

**"That no permanent policy should be entered upon involving large future expenditures of this character until it has been submitted to the people and has received their approval.**

**"That in the meantime, the immediate duty of Canada and the impending necessities of the Empire can best be discharged and met by placing without delay at the disposal of the imperial authorities as a free and loyal contribution from the people of Canada, such an amount as may be sufficient to purchase or construct two battleships or armoured cruisers of the latest Dreadnought type, giving to the Admiralty full discretion to expend the said sum at such time and for such purposes of Naval defence as in their judgment, may best serve to increase the united strength of the Empire and thus assure its peace and security"**

**Mr. Borden concluded at 6 o'clock. When the House re-assembled Mr. Monk rose and performed his part, by moving as an amendment to Mr. Borden's amendment that the Bill ought "to be submitted to the Canadian people in order to obtain at once the nation's opinion by means of a plebescite."**

**Mr. Borden voted for Mr. Monk's amendment, but Mr. Monk voted against Mr. Borden's. Mr. Borden was keeping an eye to all of Canada, Mr. Monk to Quebec alone. Both voted against the Naval Service Bill, which, notwithstanding, passed the House of Commons, and on March 4th, received the royal assent and became law. The Laurier Government then began to give effect to its provisions. This was the signal for taking up actively throughout the country the line of campaign commenced in Parliament. The first opportunity of testing popular opinion came with the by-election in Drummond-Arthabaska which took place in November 1910.**

### **The Beginning of the Nationalist-Conservative Alliance.**

What occurred in connection with the Drummond-Arthabaska election will not soon be forgotten. It was important in more ways than one. The Government candidate was defeated and the means taken to bring about this defeat mark **the beginning in the constituencies of the alliance secretly formed at the outset, but later openly proclaimed, between the Nationalist party of the Province of Quebec with its anti-British sentiments and propaganda, and the Conservative party of Canada with its profuse protestations of loyalty to the Empire and the flag, and which in the Province of Quebec, became the outstanding feature in the general elections of September 1911.**

**The Nationalist party as is generally known came into being in the Province of Quebec under the leadership of Mr. Henri Bourassa and Mr. Armand Lavergne, ostensibly for the purpose of championing the rights of the French-Catholics in the Dominion. There being little in the way of encroachment on the liberties of any class of citizens in Canada, this party might have failed of notice in Canadian politics, had it not been for the alliance with it for political purposes of the Conservative party. The alliance was effected, as has been indicated, to bring about the defeat if**

possible of the Laurier administration upon the naval policy unanimously agreed to in March 1909.

### **How the Conservatives Aided the Nationalists in Their First Anti-British Appeal.**

The constituency of Drummond-Arthabaska had long been looked upon as a Liberal strong-hold. The by-election which took place November 3, 1910, was occasioned by a vacancy which occurred upon the elevation of the sitting member from the House of Commons to the Senate. When the Liberal party placed its candidate in the field, he was immediately **attacked by the Nationalists** because of his being the supporter of an administration which was working out a measure of naval defence along lines approved by the **British Admiralty**, and which was seeking to create a Canadian Naval Service which in time of stress might co-operate with the other forces of the British navy in the maintenance of British supremacy upon the high seas. The Nationalists then placed a candidate of their own in the field to oppose him and the **granting of assistance to Britain, by the establishment of a Canadian Naval Service was made the ground of attack.**

Under circumstances such as these, one would have supposed that the Conservative party, so fond of boasting of its loyalty, would have seen well to enter the field with a candidate of its own, in support of Mr. Borden's idea of an "emergency contribution," or failing this, would have given its support to the candidate, who stood for at least some assistance being given Britain. Instead **the Conservative party not only refrained from placing a candidate in the field, but secretly did all in its power to aid the candidate of the Nationalists.** As a result the Nationalist-Conservative alliance carried the day. **The forces opposed to any assistance being given to Britain triumphed.** The Liberal candidate was defeated and Mr. Arthur Gilbert, the nominee of the Nationalists, was returned to Parliament as their first elected representative.

### **The Nationalist Conservative Alliance Secret at First.**

On the occasion of Mr. Gilbert's entry in the House of Commons, he was presented to the Speaker in the customary formal manner, the introduction being made by Mr. Monk, but in painful contrast to the rousing reception usually given a member who has carried a riding in a by-election, Mr. Gilbert was **compelled to take his seat in absolute silence, not a member of the Conservative party dared to openly avow the new alliance** which had been formed, or to extend a welcome to their newly elected fellow member.

When the Drummond-Arthabaska election took place, it was not anticipated that there would be a general election for two or three years at the earliest. The question of reciprocity, which became the main issue later, had not come up at that time. When, in 1911 it became apparent that a general election on this question would be held, what had been achieved through the alliance of Nationalists and Conservatives at the Drummond-Arthabaska election was naturally recalled. The effectiveness of this alliance for political



purposes had been so completely demonstrated in this by-election, Liberal defeat had been so pleasing, the taste of victory so alluring, that what had been entered upon light-heartily enough and mainly as a test, in this one particular instance, became irresistible as a temptation, when the prospect of a general election loomed in sight. What for a single occasion had been a secret understanding, became all along the line, a binding compact for the sake of gaining office. "Anything to win" became the watch-word, and the method of the Conservative party. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's efforts to do his part as a citizen of the Dominion, and a British subject in meeting Canada's obligation respecting naval defence, were forged into a weapon to be used against him in a different fashion in the several Provinces.

### **The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance An All Important Factor In The Elections of 1911.**

In Quebec the "loyal" Conservative party left it to Mr. Bourassa, Mr. Lavergne and Mr. Monk to stir up and play upon the fears and prejudices of their French-Canadian fellow-citizens, telling them that because of his efforts to consistently carry out the naval resolution of Parliament, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was too British, his policy too imperial, and that he was doing too much for England. Whilst in Ontario, and in other parts of the Dominion, Mr. Borden and his colleagues denounced Sir Wilfrid as anti-British, or not British enough, sought to discountenance the efforts he was making by referring to the proposed naval service as a "tin pot" navy, and alleged that his Government's policy on the trade question was one of annexation with the United States.

This appeal to passion and prejudice, unpatriotic as it was, had its results. In the Province of Quebec, the Nationalists came out of the struggle with 20 seats 4 of which had previously been held by Conservatives, but 16 of which represented gains over the Liberals. It is generally conceded these 16 seats were won by the Nationalists, partly because of the adherence of the Liberal party to a policy which recognized Canada's obligation in the matter of naval defence, and partly because of pledges given in the name and upon the alleged authority of Mr. Borden that if returned to power he would repeal the Naval Service Act and would adopt no policy as respects naval service without first submitting it to the people for approval. The latter undertaking, in the absence of any reference by Mr. Borden to the need for an emergency contribution, was taken to mean before anything at all would be done.

### **The Lengths to Which the Conservatives Went in Helping The Nationalists.**

But the Nationalist Conservative alliance was carried further than this in the general elections of 1911. By mutual agreement, the constituencies were divided between them so that where Nationalist candidates were most likely to carry, no Conservative candidate was put up, but Conservative support was given to the Nationalist, and where it was thought a straight Conservative was



most likely to carry, no Nationalist candidate was proposed, but Nationalist support was given the Conservative upon his agreeing to Nationalist conditions. **As in the case of the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election the Conservatives did all in their power to elect the Nationalist candidates.** But they went farther than in the case of the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election. The alliance in many ways was openly proclaimed. **Conservatives in some instances appeared upon the Nationalist platform,** and in the Province of Ontario in constituencies where there were a large number of French-Canadian electors, the alliance was evidenced to the extent of **Mr. Bourassa, Leader of the Nationalist party, appearing and speaking on behalf of Conservative candidates.** Even English-speaking Conservatives who were supported by Mr. Borden in person, but who happened to be in constituencies where there was a considerable French-Canadian vote, came out openly in the presence of Mr. Borden declaring their intention to withhold support from any Government which would attempt to carry out the purport of the resolution of March 1909, without first giving the people an opportunity of pronouncing upon it. For example **Mr. James Davidson, of Montreal, a wealthy manufacturer and Conservative candidate in the County of Shefford in the province of Quebec, issued a manifesto** which after mentioning that he had been absent from the convention on the day of his nomination, went on to express his desire to declare the course he would pursue if elected. This was set forth in the following words:

“Electors, you are called to pronounce yourselves on two great questions: the Reciprocity and the Navy.....

“I declare that if I am elected on the 21st of September next, I shall **work and vote against any Prime Minister of whatever party he may be, who shall continue the actual policy of the navy, as voted in 1910,** without having previously given to the Canadian people the occasion of pronouncing themselves upon this question by way of plebescite or special referendum”.....

Similarly **Dr. Pickel, another English-speaking Conservative in the constituency of Missisquoi,** where there are many French-Canadians, in an address to the voters in this constituency published in *Le Devoir* August 12th, 1911 said:

“If I am elected, I will give my **word and my vote—I declare it emphatically in advance—to obtain the repeal of the Naval Bill.** I will vote against any Prime Minister, whether Mr. Borden or anybody else, who will not repeal this Bill in its entirety.”

### **Mr. Borden's Own Attitude Through the Campaign of 1911 and Present Policy Designed to Further Nationalist Ends.**

**Mr. Borden himself** during the whole of the campaign, very carefully refrained from making anything in the way of a definite promise of assistance to Britain in connection with naval defence. He attacked the Laurier policy, but did not propose one of his own. **During the contest he published two important manifestos. In the first, issued to the electors of the Dominion, on the day Parliament dissolved, and the general elections proclaimed, there was no reference to the navy** and much was made of this circumstance in Na-

tionalist and Conservative organs in the Province of Quebec. **In the second**, published in the Montreal Gazette and other newspapers of August 15th there was a reference to the Laurier Naval service, but **no promise of assistance to Britain** by Mr. Borden himself. Referring to the policy of a Canadian Naval Service, the manifesto read, "It will cost immense sums of money to build, equip, and maintain, it will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many lives and it will not add an iota to the fighting strength of the Empire." From the plan of campaign followed it is now apparent, unbelievable as it may seem, that the words "It will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many lives", in this manifesto were put there by **deliberate design, to enable his followers to work upon the fears of the French-Canadians**. That Laurier's policy meant conscription, that it meant taking sons from their parents, and fathers from their children to sacrifice them in England's wars in Europe or Asia was the line of campaign successfully pursued through the Drummond-Arthabaska election and these words beyond a shadow of doubt, appear now to have been put there, that they might be quoted and the same kind of campaign carried on in all the Quebec ridings in 1911. A circumstance which strongly justifies this view, is that it has since been shown, that while these were in the manifesto as printed in the Quebec papers, they were omitted from the manifesto as printed in the Halifax and several other papers.

There are grounds for believing that **even today, it is this, among other reasons, which has led Mr. Borden to adopt the "emergency" expedient and refrain from bringing down a permanent policy**. His followers are telling the habitants of Quebec that a gift of dreadnoughts, so long as England is obliged to man and maintain them, means that we pay for our defence, but run no risks of any lives being sacrificed. If there are to be wars, Englishmen not French-Canadians, will be killed. Reading the speech on Mr. Borden's proposals delivered on December 13th, 1911 by the Hon. L. Pelletier, the Postmaster-General, one of the Nationalist members of Mr. Borden's Cabinet, it will be readily seen that what Mr. Pelletier was aiming at in his comparisons with the Liberal policy, was to convey the impression that a Canadian Naval Service meant "conscription" a word he repeatedly used, and that Mr. Borden's proposals meant the hiring of others to do the fighting should such ever become necessary. The speech was delivered within the hearing of Mr. Borden and his colleagues.

While in the campaign of 1911, Mr. Borden was issuing his manifestos in English for the whole Dominion, Mr. Bourassa, his Nationalist ally was issuing in French, appeals specially designed for the voters of Quebec, their distribution being aided as has since been shown, by funds supplied from Conservative sources. The translation of the concluding paragraph of a manifesto issued by Mr. Bourassa is as follows:

"We will prove, in the first place, that the Laurier-Brodeur navy is essentially an imperial institution, foreign to Canadian interest."



## How the Conservative-Nationalist Ministry came to be formed.

Sowing to the wind in **this** reckless fashion, Mr. Borden was sooner or later to reap the whirlwind. In the meantime more immediate consequences had to be satisfied; **the conditions of the compact had to be fulfilled, a Conservative-Nationalist Ministry had to be formed.** The first political act of the Leader of the Conservative party after his election as Prime Minister was in the nature of an embrace of the Parliamentary Leader of the Nationalists. Mr. Borden had little dreamed when he associated himself so intimately with the Nationalists at the beginning of the campaign, that the result could be more than a possible reduction of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's substantial majority in the House. He was prepared to risk a more or less doubtful association, but as the campaign proceeded he became more and more involved, and as has already been said it was "anything to win" and, the 'anything,' it now appears, included an understanding or pledges that if returned to power there would be in his Government ample Nationalist representation, and in any course of policy which he might follow, full recognition of the Nationalist point of view.

**The sacrifice of British interests as respects immediate action and permanent policy, the basis of Nationalist-Conservative union in Mr. Borden's Cabinet.**

The basis of union of the Nationalist-Conservative Ministry is apparent enough. **The Nationalists held firmly to their position as dictated by Mr. Bourassa and Mr. Lavergne, that there should be no permanent policy without an appeal to the people, and Mr. Borden, notwithstanding his insistence in 1909 on the insertion of the word "speedy" before the words "organization of a Canadian Naval Service" in the resolution of March 29, whether by silent or open consent, yielded absolutely.** It now appears that he is prepared to abandon the idea of a Canadian Naval service altogether, if only he can retain enough of his Nationalist following, and at the same time find some means of satisfying the jingoes.

Hon. L. P. Pelletier, Postmaster General, speaking at Jeune Lorette, before his electors of Quebec County, on October 27th, 1911, when re-elected by acclamation as a Minister in the Borden Government said: **"It has not been necessary in order that I might accept a portfolio in this new Government that I should retract one word of what I said when I was a candidate before.** As a re-elected Minister I am here before you on this question (the Navy) with the same ideas, the same words, the same programme as formerly. . . . I have declared that if there were a plebescite and the majority of the electors pronounced in favour of this new orientation in our politics that I would submit to that verdict, and I still hold to this declaration. In two words I was for the plebescite, I remain for the plebescite. If better were offered me it goes without saying I should not refuse it." (L'Evenement, Quebec, October 28th, 1911.)

But there are evidences that there were even further conditions either tacitly or avowedly made, in the union effected between the Conservatives and the Nationalists at the formation of Mr. Borden's Cabinet. It will be remembered that the position of the out-and-out Nationalist was that nothing should be done, no permanent policy,



no emergency policy, without a reference to the people, and that pledges to this effect were given by many Nationalists to their constituents. It is plain that Mr. Borden could not hope to hold the jingo end of his Cabinet on any such undertaking. **To do nothing at all is too far removed from doing a great deal as the jingoes wish.** Some compromise between the two had to be made. It is now pretty apparent that there was a compromise and that it was effected on a basis of time. Are there not grounds for believing that there something more than a coincidence, in the circumstance that Mr. Borden's Ministry was formed on the 10th of October 1911 and that Mr. Monk's resignation took place on the 18th of October 1912? **It was evidently agreed that for a year at least nothing should be done, and no proposal either of a temporary or permanent kind brought forward.** It is now an open secret that no concrete naval proposal was ever laid before his Cabinet by Mr. Borden, till within a very few days of Mr. Monk's resignation and rumours of Mr. Monk's intended resignation began then to circulate at once. Time is a healer of many ills, and it was evidently believed that a way out of the difficulty would be found in the course of a year's time. Naturally some price had to be paid for such a compromise as this, something had to be sacrificed, and **Canada's duty to herself and obligation to the Mother country in the matter of naval defence was made the sacrifice,** and with this such principles and views on the question as the Prime Minister, Mr. Borden, and his followers may have entertained.

### **How the Nationalists have made sure of their position ,**

It is perfectly clear that Mr. Monk's first stipulation was that **the majority of the Cabinet for Quebec should be Nationalist, not Conservative;** that, as it was to the Nationalist campaign in that province, Sir Wilfrid owed the loss of 16 seats, on the theory that "to the victor belongs the spoils," Nationalists rather than Conservatives should be given the portfolios. Accordingly, Mr. Nantel, who had been in the House for one parliament and followed Mr. Monk when the latter became the parliamentary leader of the Nationalists, was given the portfolio of Inland Revenue. Mr. Louis H. Pelletier, who had never been a member of the federal House but who on account of the anti-naval campaign was glad to join in vigorously with Messrs. Bourassa and Lavergne, was made Postmaster General and taken in to the exclusion of old time Conservative members of Parliament. In this way, **Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies succeeded in having the entire French-Canadian representation in the Cabinet of new-made Nationalist rather than of old-time Conservative persuasion.** Mr. Blondin, another Nationalist follower of Mr. Monk during the previous parliament was rewarded with the office of deputy speaker. This wholesale recognition of Nationalists in the Cabinet, out of all proportion to their numbers in the House, and to the exclusion of all French Canadians who had remained loyal to Conservative principles and refused to desert the old-time Conservative for the Conservative-Nationalist camp must have caused Mr. Borden some concern, but Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies knew that Mr. Borden was a weak leader, and that, in the alliance which had been contracted, he had seriously compromised himself, and they were determined that

he should be made to pay to the last exaction possible the price of the compromise effected.

### **The "Do-Nothings" and Jingoism in the Cabinet.**

This Nationalist representation to the exclusion of out-and-out Conservatives in the French-speaking element in the Cabinet had its intended and inevitable effect, namely, **the complete paralysis of the Administration so far as Naval aid or policy was concerned for the period of a year and more after the Ministry was formed.** To have had this paralysis continue for a longer period of time would have meant a revolt of the opposite faction, the jingo element of which Colonel, the Hon. Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence is the recognized leader. During the summer of 1912 Col. Hughes gave public expression in British Columbia to the fears that were agitating his own mind, and the minds of those of his colleagues in the Cabinet who think like him. Speaking at a public meeting in **Vancouver under the auspices of the Conservative Club on August 7th, the Minister of Militia is reported to have said:—**

"They pooh-pooh the idea that this country will ever be invaded. Gentlemen never under-estimate your foe. More unlikely things have happened. Remember that the British Empire is the mother of civil and religious liberties the world over. It stands for law and order and decent living; it is a trite saying that the British boyonet and the British missionary have reformed the world, but our great curse at present is apathy and laziness. Look at our crowded jails and we call ourselves civilized! Gentlemen we are no more than half civilized to-day, and **war is closer than you dream.** The great peril is from Germany. Why? Because Germany must have colonies within a generation or she will begin to go down. She is building ships on borrowed money and must seek new territory. She has large numbers of citizens in the South American countries, and there are only two fields where she can find the needed outlet for her surplus population. One is along the South American seaboard, the other is in British colonies.

It is well known that Germany made a tentative offer to stop the ship-building race in return for concessions of British colonies. But this will never happen so long as the old flag floats. There was grave danger last year. The world awoke one morning to find Germany established at Agadir, a port in Morocco. She meant to establish a naval base there, but Britain told her to get out. For two days war was very near.

**Germany has to be taught a lesson, and the lesson to be taught her is that Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand are behind the Mother Country.** We know that Germany was behind Kruger, and that there was a definite scheme to oust Great Britain from South Africa, but the fact that the colonies sprang to arms and sailed from all quarters of the globe to the assistance of Great Britain caused the scheme to be frustrated.

Now gentlemen the time has come when a definite plan of Empire defence must be adopted. Let it take the form of a full partnership with the Mother Country."



## **The Device of an "Emergency" again employed to reconcile Nationalist Conservative Differences**

It is clear that with men entertaining views such as this sitting side by side in a Cabinet with men holding diametrically opposite opinions, and pledged to do nothing without an appeal in the first instance to the people, a prime minister who feels insecure in office, and wishes above all else to avoid an election, has no bed of roses and no easy path ahead. **Here is the real emergency.** On the one hand, pledged not to adopt a permanent policy in the matter of Naval defence before submitting it to the people, on the other, unable to retain the support of his jingoist colleagues without doing something, what is Mr. Borden, whose desire is office at all costs, to do? **Nationalists and jingoes have both to be satisfied, or one or other of these elements in Mr. Borden's Cabinet will separate from him and a fatal dismemberment of the Administration take place.** Fall back on the idea of an 'emergency' confronting British Naval supremacy is his one and only recourse and this he has done in the hope that, by adopting a course which will permit of a continuance of the Conservative-Nationalist alliance, he may be enabled to retain a sufficient Nationalist following to hold power a little longer without the necessity of appealing to the people.

**Mr. Borden's visit to England to help himself rather than Britain out of an emergency.**

That this is Mr. Borden's object is abundantly apparent from his attitude while in England during the summer of 1912 and the question he put to the British Admiralty. **Mr. Borden did not go to England to consult the government on the best course of policy for Canada to pursue. He did not go even to ask if there were an emergency. He went to find a means of raising an emergency cry to serve his own party ends, and to meet the emergency in his own Cabinet.**

According to the words of the Admiralty Memorandum which Mr. Borden presented to parliament his inquiry was not; is there an emergency? do you want an emergency contribution? but, "in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective" or to quote his own words in the House of Commons on December 5th, 1912 "in what form temporary and immediate aid can best be given by Canada." **Mr. Borden returned not with any expressed opinion of the Admiralty or the British government to the effect that immediate aid was necessary, or that an emergency of any kind existed, but with the same purpose he had in mind when he left for England, namely, a determination to make it appear that his visit to England had disclosed the need for an emergency contribution which would be granted on behalf of Canada without an appeal to the people.**

Mr. Borden had first of all to get his Cabinet to consent to this somewhat doubtful course. But here he encountered opposition at once. Having been told all the premier knew, the **Hon. F. D. Monk, the Minister of Public Works was unable to see any necessity for the course he proposed, and tendered his resignation rather than be a party to it.** He did so in the following words,



contained in a letter, a copy of which was given to parliament on January 14th.

Ottawa, October 18th, 1912.

My dear Premier:—

I regret to find I cannot concur in the decision arrived at by the Cabinet yesterday to place on behalf of Canada an emergency contribution of \$35,000,000 at the disposal of the British government for naval purposes, with the sanction of Parliament, but without giving the Canadian people an opportunity of expressing its approval of this important step before it is taken. Such a concurrence would be at variance with my pledges, and the Act proposed is of sufficient gravity to justify my insistence that it goes beyond the scope of the Constitutional Act of 1867. Holding this view as a member of your Cabinet I feel it my duty to place my resignation in your hand. Permit me to add my decision has been reached with regret on account of my agreeable relations at all times with yourself.

Yours sincerely,  
(Signed) F. D. MONK.

#### **The British Cabinet Drawn in to Help Out Nationalist-Conservative Intrigues.**

The next difficulty Mr. Borden had to be prepared to meet, was not the opposition of his own Cabinet, but the opposition of the two Houses of parliament. To help him out in this he hit upon the device of presenting to parliament a state paper which might make it appear that he was carrying out the expressed wish of the British Government. Accordingly when parliament met, he introduced into the debate on December 5th a Memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty. The impression Mr. Borden sought to convey in his speech was that the Cabinet had this Memorandum before it at the time of deciding upon its policy, and that they had decided to ask a large expenditure for ships because the British Admiralty had requested it.

It now appears on the most conclusive evidence that the truth was quite the reverse. Mr. Monk the Minister of Public Works resigned from the Cabinet on October the 18th, 1912. His resignation was tendered Mr. Borden in the letter above quoted which expresses Mr. Monk's regret at not being able to concur in the "decision reached at the Cabinet meeting yesterday" (October 17th). This makes it perfectly plain that the Borden Cabinet decided upon its policy on October 17th. The communication from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Hon. Lewis Harcourt, forwarding the Admiralty Memorandum to His Royal Highness the Governor-General, is dated Downing St. (London), October 25th, 1912 a week after Mr. Monk's resignation, and eight days after Mr. Borden's Cabinet had reached a decision as to what course it would take.

What transpired in the interval, is very readily surmised. Mr. Monk's resignation on the ground that he saw no need for an

emergency contribution after having heard all that Mr. Borden and his colleagues had to say, made it perfectly plain to the Cabinet that it would be next to impossible to expect parliament in the face of Mr. Monk's resignation to acquiesce in the policy decided upon unless in some way something could be obtained from the British Admiralty which could be used in a manner that would help to support the decision reached. The Hon. George E. Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce had left for England just about the time that Mr. Borden and his colleagues returned to Canada. He was in England at the time of Mr. Monk's resignation and Mr. Borden having communicated with him by cable, there can now be little doubt that he spent the week following in having the British government prepare the Memorandum which Mr. Borden would have the people of Canada believe was the document on which the decision of the Cabinet and himself was based.

The Admiralty Memorandum being dated Downing Street, October 25th, could not have left England before that date and as a consequence, could not have reached Ottawa until early in the month of November fully a fortnight after Mr. Monk's resignation, and the decision of the Cabinet to vote \$35,000,000 as an emergency contribution without an appeal to the people.

**"How was this document used by Mr. Borden?** Here are his own words quoted from Hansard, on December 5th.

**"We have asked** His Majesty's Government in what form temporary and immediate aid can best be given by Canada at this juncture. **The answer** has been unhesitating and unequivocal. Let me again **quote** it." Having given the quotation which served his purpose from the memorandum which he had previously read aloud in full to the House, he proceeded precisely as he had done in February 1910, nearly three years before, to use **language which would convey the impression of some great impending calamity, and thereby conceal the ulterior purposes and ends in view.** He even held to the same metaphor as in 1910, the only difference being that instead of speaking of all beyond as "chaos and darkness," he confined himself to the storm itself, making its presence about as vivid as the English language would permit. Here are his words after requesting parliament to vote \$35,000,000.

**"To-day while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until the impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster."**

How grotesque these words sound when one remembers the Nationalist-Conservative alliance and the consequences which they are intended to conceal!

**The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance controls Mr. Borden and his Cabinet to-day.**

The situation to-day as respects Conservatives and Nationalists, and as respects permanent policy and emergency, is **just the same as in 1910 when this double game was worked for the first time. With this difference only.** In 1910 the 'emergency' cry was raised to help Mr. Borden and his followers to get into office, to-day it is being raised to enable them to retain office. The great advantage



of the emergency device is, that it can be brought out when it is wanted, and put away quickly when its presence is embarrassing, and it lends itself to a kind of oratorical display unsurpassed by less spectacular, though possibly infinitely more important situations.

**The 'emergency' was needed in 1910 to reconcile the Nationalists and jingoes in the country. Now in 1912-13 it is required to reconcile the Nationalists and jingoes in the Cabinet and parliament.** There has been a slight change in the use to which "the appeal to the people before the adoption of a permanent policy" attitude is being put. It was used in 1910 and 1911 as a means of leading the people to believe that the Conservative-Nationalist alliance had their interests at heart and that the people would be therefore given a chance to express their view. To-day it is being made to serve the interests of members of the alliance in the cabinet and parliament to prevent an appeal being made. It is stated that it is impossible to frame a permanent policy for years, notwithstanding that parliament in March 1909 unanimously agreed on the permanent policy Canada's Ministers should carry out. A resolution respecting an appeal to the people almost in identical words to that moved by Mr. Borden in 1910, and supported by himself and his following while in Opposition, was when proposed by Mr. Verville, representative of Labour in the House of Commons, almost as unanimously voted against by Mr. Borden and his followers including several Nationalists on February 11th of this year,

### **How the Game of Deception Continues to be Worked.**

The means adopted in 1910 to form the alliance, and the compromises effected, are serving to hold the alliance together so far as parliament is concerned, and thereby enable Mr. Borden to retain office without an appeal to the people. Mr. Borden refuses to bring down a permanent policy, and his Nationalist friends are led to believe that he thereby remains true to his Nationalist pledges, that no permanent policy will be adopted. To those who think that the permanent policy should be one of contribution to the Imperial Navy his proposals are pointed to as the first step in a permanent policy of contribution. The "emergency" has been brought out, and an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world is sufficient for the moment to satisfy the jingoes.

**One Minister, the Honourable F. D. Monk, and 7 Nationalists have remained true to their pledges,** the former by resigning from the Cabinet, because after hearing all Mr. Borden had to report, he saw no evidence of an emergency and was unwilling to go back on the pledge that the people should be consulted before any course involving large expenditures was entered upon, the others for probably the same reason, by voting on February 13th, against Mr. Borden's proposals. **Of the 20 Nationalists in Parliament, the remaining 12,** three of whom, Mr. Coderre (who succeeded Mr. Monk), Mr. Nantel and Mr. Pelletier, are in the Cabinet, **have continued their support** of Mr. Borden, so the Nationalist-Conservative alliance continues for the time being to hold its own.

Mr. J. O. Guilbault, member for Joliette, one of the Nationalist



who voted against Mr. Borden's proposals on the night of February 13th, and moved an amendment that a plebescite should be taken before effect was given to these proposals, gave as his reasons for so doing that in the last electoral campaign he had said "We condemn the Laurier law, **and we shall condemn later on, when the occasion presents itself, the project of contribution.** In order to be consistent with myself I have believed it my duty to propose the amendment which is now submitted to the Chamber. For me it is **a point of honour**, since I have engaged my word to my electors. that which I wish above all is to be faithful to engagements which I have taken in the past, and that is why I take my present attitude.

"I know that I shall disappear before any long time. Since I have an enemy much more dangerous than the Liberal party, that is the malady which will finish me before long by triumphing over me. I wish that it should be said in the time to come that **the member for Joliette has been faithful to his pledged word**, that he has kept the promises he had made, and that he had been consistent with himself.

"There in a few words are the reason which have led me to propose the amendment now before this Chamber. . . . What I hold above all is the approbation of my own conscience, and the satisfaction of a duty accomplished."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates: February 13, 1913, p. 3354.)

### **Mr. Borden's Loyalty Not to be Taken Seriously.**

Whether the Nationalist in and out of the Cabinet who continued their support of Mr. Borden on the night of February 13th, were less scrupulous in their sense of honour, or had other reasons for going back on similar pledges made during the general elections of 1911 does not appear since very few of them gave any reasons to parliament for their course of action. Be this as it may, the general public will be able to admire a man like Mr. Guilbault, who according to his light makes a pledge to the electors, and prefers the approbation of his own conscience in maintaining it to the blame of lesser men; but **the people of Canada will find it difficult to reconcile the action of Mr. Borden** in making and continuing an alliance for political ends with men whose pledge as respects British supremacy at sea has been "We condemn the Laurier law and we shall condemn later on when the occasion presents itself, the project of contribution" with his position at the time of leader of His Majesty's loyal opposition, and his present position as Prime Minister of a British Dominion.

In the light of his past and present compromises, with the Nationalists, in the circumstance that through the whole of the campaign of 1911, Mr. Borden never once spoke of a contribution of either money or ships, and when allusion was made to Naval policy, laid emphasis rather on what was to be done being placed in the first instance before the people; in the further circumstance that for more than a year after his Ministry was formed he did and said absolutely nothing towards assisting Britain in Naval defence, in view of the fact that in parliament since he has become premier, he has never once taken exception to Nationalists tactics and

utterances, it ill becomes Mr. Borden to-day to talk of loyalty, and by a kind of compulsion to seek to force through parliament on the plea of there being an emergency which "may rend this Empire asunder," a contribution from the taxpayers of Canada of \$35,000,000 for the three largest battleships in the world. Those who really understand the situation know that this is **only a device to enable him to retain power by further compromises**; a means of holding together the **Nationalist-Conservative alliance** by satisfying for the time being the jingo element in his Cabinet and party, and appearing at the same time to be holding to his pledge to the Nationalists that nothing of a permanent character would be done without first submitting the question to the people.

### **The Present Position and Question.**

In the light of the facts as they are, the present situation resolves itself into the question. Is not the Liberal party justified in doing all in its power by constitutional means to compel Mr. Borden to carry out the policy of a Canadian Naval Service as unanimously agreed to by parliament in 1909, and to prevent a complete departure from this position simply that by further compromises of an unpatriotic nature he and his followers may be enabled to share the emoluments of office. **In the absence of anything save deception to justify the course on which Mr. Borden is now proposing to embark, should not the people of the Dominion be given an opportunity of pronouncing upon the policy to be followed by Canada in respect of Naval defence, and to say whether they prefer the carrying out of a policy on which both parties have been agreed in parliament, or the entering upon a policy which not less from its origin than the ends it is intended to serve, is fraught with most serious consequences to the whole Dominion.**

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# CANADA AND THE NAVY

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## Australia and New Zealand

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### Methods of Naval Defence

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#### The Policies of other Self-governing British Dominions and their bearing upon the Naval Controversy in Canada

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#### Which Policy Should Canada Adopt?

**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for three battleships as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 1909.

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## The Australian and New Zealand Methods of Naval Defence Compared with Policies Proposed in Canada.

The policy of the Conservative party is one of contribution. The policy of the Liberal party is the organization of a Canadian Naval Service, in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons on March 29th, 1909. The Conservative contribution begins with an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for ships to be placed at the disposition of the British Admiralty, to be manned and maintained by Britain, and placed beyond the control of the Canadian parliament and government. The Liberal proposal is to have this money spent on the organization of a Canadian Naval Service, which will be for the protection of Canadian coasts and trade routes, and available should the need arise for co-operation with the other British Naval forces in the defence of any part of the British Empire.

In the controversy which has arisen, much has been said of **Australia and New Zealand**, and an effort has been made to make it appear that those outlying Dominions are doing more for the British Empire than Canada, that they are more "loyal," have a keener appreciation of national obligations. It is asked if "little New Zealand" can present the Mother Country with a dreadnought, ought not Canada at least to be able to present two or three? The latest form in which this appeal is made is to link up the Malay States, with New Zealand, and compare these two British possessions with the Dominion of Canada.

Fortunately for Canada, it is not difficult to get at the facts, and more fortunately still, they afford an opportunity of contrasting the relative merits of the policies of the two parties in Canada at the present time. **The Conservative policy of contribution is similar to the policy of New Zealand and the Malay States, the Liberal policy of a Canadian Naval Service is the same as the policy of Australia.** Canadians have therefore to choose whether the largest and most important of His Majesty's Dominions shall adopt a method of naval organization agreed to at an Imperial Defence Conference in London, in 1909 in common with Australia, or the method of contribution followed by New Zealand and the Malay States.

**Australia abandoned contribution for Naval Service of her own.**

**Australia has tried both policies herself. She began with a policy of contribution to the British Navy, and found that it was not acceptable, and from many points of view unsatisfactory to Britain as well as herself. She abandoned it and entered upon the policy of an Australian Naval Service which is her present policy.** Canadians have therefore to choose whether, with the example of Australia before them, they will enter upon a policy which the next largest Dominion has found it desirable to abandon, or begin with a policy similar to that which experience there has

shown to be the wisest and best. The Borden policy of contribution is similar to the policy of contribution which Australia entered upon and later abandoned. The Laurier policy is the policy which Australia is following at the present time.

### **New Zealand and Australian Contributions were Payments for Extra Coast Defence.**

There is one consideration of a very important nature which has been lost sight of in the references to New Zealand and Australia and that is that even when both were making contributions, and in the case of the New Zealand contribution at the present time, there were stipulations that these **contributions were to be for the protection of Australian and New Zealand coasts and were to go towards the payment of ships to be stationed in Australian and New Zealand waters**, also to be officered and manned as far as possible by Australians and New Zealanders, so as to open this career to the boys and men of these countries. Up to 1909 the ships, for the payment of which contribution was made, were not to be removed except "with the consent of the colonial government", and since 1909 other provisions have been made to ensure the maintenance of fleets in those waters.

**Mr. Borden's proposals contain no stipulations whatever as to the Canadian contribution being applied towards the protection of the Canadian coasts**, either on the Atlantic or the Pacific, or to the placing of ships in Canadian waters. Mr. Borden has in fact swung to the other extreme and has deliberately chosen a class of ship unsuited to service in this connection, huge battle-ships which in all probability will be kept in the war zone of Europe, or wherever the possibility of conflict may be greatest in any part of the world. Moreover the ships are to be placed wholly beyond the control of the Canadian parliament and government.

### **Comparison of Expenditures on Defence.**

Those who compare the naval contributions and expenditures of New Zealand, Australia, Newfoundland and other similar possessions with the naval expenditures of Canada are far from doing justice, in the matter of expenditures on defence, to this Dominion. Naval defence is only one part of defence, it is defence at sea, there is also military defence, or defence on land. **Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland, are all island dominions; to them, land defence is a matter of relatively small concern.** While Canada has important and extensive coast lines, her territory inland extends across a hemisphere a distance of nearly 4,000 miles. Her expenditures in defence have accordingly been for purposes of land defence, and that these expenditures have enabled her to effectively come to the assistance of the Mother country in time of need was well evidenced during the South African war, when Canadian contingents of infantry, cavalry and artillery fully equipped were transported across seas, and rendered valuable service to the Empire in those far off battle fields. **The only fair basis of comparison would be to bring to-**



gether all expenditure on defence, both Naval and Military, and deduct from this what Great Britain herself has been obliged to pay out towards maintaining land and sea forces, in the territories and adjoining waters of the several dominions. It will be found on this basis of comparison that **Canada is the only one of the Dominions named to whose immediate defence Great Britain is not obliged to contribute a single cent to-day.**

The following is a brief account of conditions which have helped to shape the Australian and New Zealand policies. It will serve to illustrate their bearing upon the Naval controversy in Canada, and the policies proposed here.

### **The Beginning of Contributions.**

At the Conference of 1887, **an agreement was made by the British Government with Australia and New Zealand** by which the British Government were to add 5 cruisers and 2 torpedo boats to the Imperial Australian squadron to be placed "within the limits of the Australian stations" and not to be removed except "with the consent of the colonial government" and that for such service the colonies (Australia and New Zealand) should pay £126,000 per annum. In 1903, the amount of this contribution was increased to £240,000 per annum. That was the commencement of colonial contributions to the British Navy. "It was **an agreement for defence by so many ships for so much money. The ships were provided and the money was paid, Canada had no apprehension of invasion: made no request, paid nothing and got nothing.**

### **Australia Informs England of Desire to Abandon Contributions.**

At the Colonial Conference of 1907, just 10 years later, Mr Deakin, the Prime Minister of Australia, told the British government and the representatives of the other self-governing Dominions that **the policy of contribution had proven a failure and had given satisfaction neither to the Admiralty or the Commonwealth.** He did so in language that is unequivocal, and unmistakable in meaning. Here is what he said,

"In Australia, for reasons which have already been put on record in the despatch which I had the honor of addressing to the Admiralty about two years ago, **the existing contribution has not proven generally popular.** It was passed because it was felt that some distinct recognition of our responsibility for the defence of our own country and of the Empire of which it is a part, was necessary, and though it did not take the form which commended itself most to the very large minority, possibly even a majority of the electors, we accepted that mode of co-operation until some better presented itself. **Further consideration has convinced the public that the present agreement is not satisfactory either to the Admiralty, the political or professional Lords of the Admiralty, or to the Parliament of the Commonwealth.** (Proceedings of Colonial Conference 1907 p. 473.)

## **How Canada came to join with Australia and New Zealand.**

In 1909 came the offers of the self-governing Dominions to meet what appeared to be an increasing need on the part of the Motherland. On the 22nd March, the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type, and of a second of the same type, if necessary. **On the 29th March, the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution approving the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service.** On the 15th April, Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the Australian Government, telegraphed that whereas all the British Dominions ought to share in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the British Empire, so far as Australia was concerned this object would be best attained by the encouragement of the naval development in that country.

### **A Conference on Naval Defence held in London.**

In view of these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered the time was opportune for the holding of a conference to discuss afresh the relations of the Dominions and the United Kingdom in regard to the question of Imperial Defence, and on the 30th April, His Majesty's Government sent an invitation to the Dominion Ministers of the four Dominions and to the Cape Colonies to attend a Conference to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the empire with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

**The Conference was held in London in the summer of 1909. There were present representatives from Australia, New Zealand and Canada,** the Canadian representatives being the Hon. Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, the Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Major General Sir Percy Lake, and Rear Admiral C. E. Kingsmill. **The question of naval defence was specially discussed at meetings of the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 3rd, 5th and 6th of August,** the Earl of Crewe being in the chair. It is important to recall that the discussion at this meeting was based on a memorandum prepared by the First Lord of the Admiralty and dated 20th July, which memorandum had been circulated previous to the conference. It was the Admiralty itself, not the representatives of the Dominions that fixed the basis of discussion, and did so before any of the ministers of the self-governing dominions had been consulted. The general discussion was followed by further discussion of arrangement and provision for naval defence between the Admiralty and the representatives of the self-governing Dominions.

**The Admiralty Prepare a Memorandum, as basis of Discussion and an agreement reached as respects Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.**

A perusal of the Memorandum adopted by the Admiralty as a basis of discussion shows that **the Admiralty recognized from the**

outset that in dealing with the Overseas Dominions in the matter of Imperial naval defence, **the choice lay between a contribution and Dominion navies**, and that the principle presented was a larger one than that merely of naval strategy. The contrast is drawn between contribution and local naval forces and in this connection the Admiralty Memorandum says "It has long been recognized that in defining the conditions under which the naval forces of the Empire should be developed, other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account."

Many of these considerations are set forth, not the least important of which is **individual national sentiment**, for the expression of which the memorandum states, "room must be found." So much was it taken for granted that the great Overseas Dominions would wish to recognize this national sentiment, that the memorandum sets forth distinctly as **the work of the Conference**, "**the formulating of broad principles upon which the growth of colonial naval forces could be fostered**," and distinctly states that the main duty of the Conference as regards naval defence would be to determine the form in which the various Dominion Governments could best participate in the burden of Imperial defence, with due regard to varying political and geographical conditions, and the opinion is expressed that "while laying the foundations of future Dominion navies, to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces would contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence."

As a result of this Conference, **an agreement was come to as respects Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the obligations they were to assume.**

### **Conference decides Canada to begin organization of Naval service with ships on Atlantic and Pacific.**

As respects Canada, **the report of the Conference has the following:**

"While, on naval strategical considerations, it was thought that a Fleet unit on the Pacific, as outlined by the Admiralty, might in the future form an acceptable system of Naval defence, it was recognized that **Canada's double sea board** rendered the provision of such a fleet unit unacceptable for the present". (Page 26, Imperial Conference 1909).

The Canadian Ministers expressed the amount which in their opinion Parliament would be prepared to vote annually, and **thereupon the Admiralty gave its advice as follows:**

"Taking, first, the plan for the expenditure of £600,000, after discussion the **Admiralty suggested that the Canadian Government might provide a force of cruisers and destroyers** comprising four cruisers of improved "Bristol" class, one cruiser of the "Boadicea" class, and six destroyers of improved 'River' class. As regards sub-marines, it would be advisable to defer their construction because they required a highly-trained and specialized complement.



**"The 'Boadicea' and Destroyers might be placed on the Atlantic side, and the 'Bristol' cruisers divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean.** The number of officers and men for this force of 11 ships would be 2,194, and the cost of the vessels suggested, including repairs and maintenance, interest and sinking fund on capital expenditure, and pay, &c., of personnel, at Canadian rates, would not, it was anticipated, exceed £600,000 a year.

**"Pending the completion of the new cruisers, which would be commenced as early as possible, an arrangement might be made for the loan by the Admiralty of two cruisers of the 'Apollo' class, so that the training of the new naval personnel might be proceeded with at once.** The vessels would be fitted up and maintained at the expense of Canada, and the officers and men provided by volunteers from the Royal Navy, but paid by the Canadian Government. They would be lent until they could be replaced from time to time by qualified Canadian officers and men. The Admiralty would be willing also to lend certain officers for organizing duties and for the instruction of seamen, stokers, &c.

**"Arrangements would be made to receive Canadian cadets at Osborne and Dartmouth."**

### **Conference decides Australia to construct, man, and maintain a Fleet Unit.**

The report gives a summary of what was agreed upon as respects Australia and New Zealand. In a word, the agreement was that **Australia would undertake the construction, manning and maintenance of a Fleet unit, which was to form part of the Eastern Fleet,** to be composed of similar units of the Royal Navy, to be known as the China and East Indies units respectively; and as respects the Australian unit the **vessels were to be manned, as far as possible, by Australian officers and seamen.** In peace time, and while on the Australian station this Fleet unit was to be **under the exclusive control of the Commonwealth Government.** (See report page 57.)

### **Conference decides New Zealand to Contribute in Payment for Defence.**

Sir Joseph Ward speaking for New Zealand said, **"I favour one great Imperial Navy with all the overseas Dominions contributing either in ships or money, and with Naval stations at the self-governing Dominions supplied with ships by and under the control of the Admiralty. I however, realize the difficulties, and recognize that Australia and Canada in this important matter are doing that which their respective governments consider to be best.** (See report page 59) And elsewhere, **"I fully realize that the creation of specific units, one in the East; one in Australia, and, if possible, one in Canada, would be a great improvement upon the existing condition of affairs."** The arrangement come to was that **New Zealand would contribute a Dreadnought, which was to**

become the flag ship of the China Pacific unit, and that a portion of the China Pacific unit was to remain in New Zealand waters, two of the New 'Bristol' cruisers, together with three destroyers and two sub-marines were to be detached from the China station in time of peace and stationed in New Zealand waters, that the flagship should make periodical visits to New Zealand waters; and that there should be an interchange in the service of the cruisers between New Zealand and China. The ships were to be manned as far as possible, by New Zealand officers and men. New Zealand was to continue her contribution of \$100,000 per annum which was to "be used to pay the difference in the rates of pay to New Zealanders above what would be paid under the ordinary British rate," any balance to be at the disposal of the Admiralty. (See report page 60).

### **The Australian and Canadian Methods were to be the Same.**

It will thus be seen that the agreement which was come to at the Conference of 1909 was that **Canada and Australia should each undertake local Naval services to be part of and in co-operation with the rest of the British Navy**, the only difference being that Australia would undertake one complete fleet unit to be stationed in Australian waters, Canada would incur a like expenditure, but divide it between ships to be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. **New Zealand was to present a Dreadnought and to continue her practice of money contribution**, though this was to be in consideration of ships being officered and manned by New Zealanders, maintained, and, excepting the Dreadnought, built at the expense of Great Britain, and stationed in or near New Zealand waters, as part of fleet units intended for the protection of her own coasts.

**Here are the two policies at present before the country: the Laurier policy, of a Canadian Naval service, corresponding to the Australian. The Borden policy of contribution by the presentation of three Dreadnoughts, corresponding to the New Zealand contribution of one Dreadnought and money, with these differences that in the case of New Zealand, the Government of that Dominion took care to secure from the Home Government a guarantee of coast protection, far in excess of what her contributions amount to, also the actual stationing of ships in New Zealand waters and opportunities of service by New Zealand officers and men, whereas the present Canadian Government, while beginning with a contribution of thirty-five million dollars, has made no provision of any kind.**

### **How the Agreement with the Admiralty has been Carried Out.**

It was in accordance with this arrangement that Sir Wilfrid Laurier introduced and the Canadian Parliament in May 1910 passed **the Act respecting a Canadian Naval Service**, under which while the Liberals were in power a beginning was made with the organization of a Canadian Service in accordance with the agreement reached.

**Australia carrying out her part of the agreement enacted on November 25th, 1910 an act relating to Naval defence, which is**

commonly cited as **the Naval Defence Act 1910**. One or two amendments were added on December 22nd, 1911. A comparison of this Act with the Canadian Naval Service Act shows that **the two measures follow almost identical lines in all essential particulars**. Provision is made in the Australian Act for the establishing of naval forces to be controlled in time of peace by the government of Australia, and available in time of war for co-operation with the other naval forces of the Empire. Provision is made for the establishing of a naval college and naval training, and other matters dealt with in the Canadian Act. It is natural that both measures should have followed similar lines as they were **prepared in accordance with the common plan approved by the British Admiralty**, and with the assistance of naval experts loaned to the governments of Australia and Canada respectively by the British government.

At a second conference held on June 28, 1911 an agreement was concluded between the British Admiralty and representatives of the Dominions of Canada and Australia, respecting the control of the Naval Service and forces of the Dominion of Canada and setting forth the limits of the Canadian and Australian naval stations respectively.

The limits of the Canadian stations were set forth as follows:

**"The Canadian Atlantic Station** will include the waters north of 30 degrees north latitude and west of the meridian of 40 degrees longitude."

**"The Canadian Pacific Station** will include the waters north of 30 degrees north latitude and east of the meridian of 180 degrees longitude." The limits of the Australian station were also set forth.

### **Steady progress made in organization of Royal Australian Navy.**

On November 12th, 1910, the government of Australia appropriated the sum of £2,590,000 for naval defence. The statute setting forth that this appropriation is **"toward the construction of a fleet for the naval defence of the Commonwealth."** Other appropriations were made in the years 1911 and 1912 under direction of the Australian government. Steady progress has been made in the organization of the Australian Naval Service. **On September, 19th 1911, His Majesty King George conferred upon this Service the title of "The Royal Australian Navy,"** and a further recognition has since been given in the Memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty at the request of Mr. Borden and presented by Mr. Borden to the Canadian Parliament on December 5th. Section 7 of the Admiralty Memorandum contains the following:

**"Further, at the present time and in the immediate future, Great Britain still has the power, by making special arrangements and mobilizing a portion of the reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand."**

Had the Borden administration continued the organization of a Canadian Naval Service upon the lines agreed to with Australia and the British Admiralty, there can be little doubt that His Majesty



King George would ere this have conferred upon the Canadian service the title of the Royal Canadian Navy, and that any references to the defence of Canada which British Admiralty reports might have contained would not have made this country dependent upon the Royal Australian Navy, but would have referred to the Royal Canadian Navy as a naval organization likely to be of service should the need ever arise in the defence of Australia and New Zealand.

## **The Present and Future Development of the Royal Australian Navy.**

What progress has been made by the Australian government in the creation of its navy and how this progress is viewed by Great Britain will be apparent from the following quotation from an article entitled **the Australian Naval Progress**, which appears in the **London Times of August 14th, 1912**:

"Beyond doubt the most striking sign today of the national development of the overseas Dominions is the establishment of the Australian navy. When all criticisms, favourable or otherwise, are summed up **there remains the unalterable fact that Australia is launching her own fleet because she wants it.** The overseas Dominions, **outgrown the stage of colonies,** are fast acquiring a responsibility abroad which Britain at home could not prohibit even if she would, yet **nothing could be more loyal than their spirit toward the Mother country** and the manner in which they offered to share the Mother country's burden. . . . It is about as useless to question here in England whether Australia should be allowed to own a navy as whether Germany should. It is a matter over which England herself has humanly no control. **The establishment of its own fleet by the younger British nation arises from popular demand, which is to say, popular instinct.**"

After setting out the names and sizes of the several ships constructed the article continues:

"These ships here described. . . . one Dreadnought cruiser, three smaller cruisers, six Destroyers and three submarines. . . . compose what is known as **the Australian fleet unit as arranged at the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909.**"

The article at this point goes on to describe the considerably **larger plans of naval construction and equipment** which have been adopted since the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 on the recommendation of Admiral Henderson and which contemplate **an expenditure of £22,500,000 spread over 22 years,** divided into four eras, the first of seven and the other three, of five years each, so that the fleet may grow in accordance with increase of personnel required.

## **How New Zealand has Carried out her Part of Agreement.**

New Zealand under the Naval Subsidy Act of 1908 undertook to contribute annually the sum of £100,000. Under the Naval Defence Act of 1909, the Minister of Finance of New Zealand was

empowered to contract on such terms as he saw fit with the Admiralty for the complete arming and equipment in the United Kingdom of a ship of war, the total cost of the ship and armament not to exceed £2,000,000 and the ship to form part of the Royal Navy. The New Zealand Statute sets forth that the ship when completed is to form part of the Royal Navy and serve under the control of the Lords of the Admiralty but not, as is Mr. Borden's proposal with reference to the Canadian ships "to range itself in the battle line of the Empire," its sphere of action is definitely limited to the **"defence of your Majesty's Dominions"**, the British Admiralty having arranged for other ships in connection with the China Pacific unit to be stationed in New Zealand waters. The New Zealand government has since permitted the original agreement to be temporarily waived as respects the Dreadnought contributed by New Zealand being kept as the flag ship of the China Pacific fleet the understanding being, however, that equivalent protection will be given by Britain at her expense to New Zealand coasts, and other ships kept in New Zealand waters.

### **Mr. Borden's Proposals Involve Breach of Arrangement with Australia and New Zealand.**

Canada alone of the three mentioned overseas Dominions appears to have failed to keep the arrangement reached with the British Admiralty on the basis of an understanding which included all three. A beginning in the carrying out of this agreement was made by the Laurier administration in the enactment of the Naval Service Act of 1910, and progress was made under this measure in the organization of a Canadian Naval Service. **Had the Borden Ministry on assuming office continued the work of its predecessor, Canada would in all probability be today in the same position as Australia,** and would have been saved the reproach contained in the Admiralty Memorandum which declares in paragraph 9 that "any action on the part of Canada" would be regarded as "most significant of the **renewed** resolve" of the overseas Dominions to take their part in maintaining the integrity of the Empire.

Nothing having been done since the Borden Ministry assumed office in October 1911 in the carrying out of the agreement reached at the London Conference in 1909, it is little wonder that the British Admiralty has drawn attention to the necessity of some evidence of a renewed resolve, and also that **exception is now being taken by Australia to Canada's neglect in carrying out her part of the agreement** which was to have been undertaken in common with other of the self-governing Dominions. The Canadian Associated Press, in a cable despatch London Feb. 26th 1913 which has been published in the leading Canadian papers of the day following says that the Commonwealth authorities in London issued on that morning the text of an important statement made recently by **Senator Pearce, the Australian Minister of Defence,** on the question of imperial naval defence in which Hon. Mr. Pearce explained that the Australian Government attaches no importance to its being represented on the Imperial Defence Committee, because it is of a purely advisory character while Australia is concerned in questions



of policy rather than administration, also that Mr. Pearce refers to the decisions arrived at at the conference of 1909 when Canada and Australia decided upon naval services of their own, and **says the Australian agreement is the only one that has been carried out.** That it therefore, becomes necessary for Canada to either carry out the scheme adopted by the 1909 Conference, or propose some other to take its place. The report despatch then says referring to Mr. Pearce's utterances:

"He could not say whether there was any truth in the report that the Admiralty authorities had been parties to **the suppression of the Canadian naval scheme and the substitution of contributed Dreadnoughts and an annual subsidy,** on the New Zealand plan, in preference to that of the creation of separate colonial naval units. We have not been given any hint either by the British government or the Admiralty that they have changed their minds. In regard to the wisdom of the agreement with Australia, that **agreement,** I may say, **originated with the Admiralty scheme for a fleet unit and did not originate with the Australian government** of the day or with the representatives at the Conference."

From this despatch it will be seen that the substitution by Mr. Borden of a contribution of \$35,000,000 for the 3 most powerful battleships in the world appears to Australia to be a **complete departure from the agreement reached with the British Admiralty** by Canada and herself at the Conference in June, 1909, and that **far from being acceptable to a sister Dominion this change has produced embarrassment of which Australia is disposed to complain.** It may well be asked if the unity and interests of the Empire are likely to be furthered when it is found necessary to call in question the faith of this Dominion, because of a change in policy born wholly of political expediency.

### **Mr. Borden Himself in Parliament Strongly Favours Australian and Canadian Naval Services.**

That **the change is due to political expediency** and not to Mr. Borden's own conviction or the convictions of the Hon. George E. Foster, the next most important member of his Cabinet, is amply proven by the strong endorsement given by each of these gentlemen to the Australian policy of a naval service in preference to the policy of a contribution either in ships or money to the Imperial Admiralty.

In the debate on the resolution of March 1909, Mr. Borden at that time Leader of the Opposition set forth his views upon the desirability of organizing a Canadian Naval Service and elaborated somewhat in detail the reasons why Canada should proceed with a service of her own and not adopt any policy of contribution. After carefully analyzing Canada's export trade and what was being spent by the Dominion on military defence, Mr. Borden stated that in his opinion "not less than half of the amount appropriated should be devoted to Naval instead of to Military defence."

Mr. Borden said "I would like to point out to the country and the House some considerations which lead me to this conclusion". Here are the considerations as given by Mr. Borden himself. "Where is the great market of the people of Canada today? We know that



it is across the Atlantic ocean, and we believe that in years to come it will also be across the Pacific ocean. **The great market of Canada** today is not the market which would be especially safeguarded and preserved to us by the expenditure of a large amount of money for military purposes, but it is a market which may be preserved to us by expenditure for naval purposes.

"I venture to submit to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the members of this House, that **the expenditure in defence of our seaports, in defence of our coasts and in defence of the waters of the ocean, which are immediately adjacent to our coasts, is of immensely greater importance and of immensely greater advantage than the expenditure which, year after year, we are disbursing in connection with the military forces of this country.**

"I do not desire to minimize them, but I do desire to emphasize, as far as may be in my power, the importance to Canada of some attempt at naval defence, of the defence of our seaports and the protection of our commerce.

"Let us look at the question from another aspect. How many cities and towns are there in Canada which would be open to the raids of a second or third class cruiser, as pointed out by my hon. friend from North Toronto? **I suppose there are not less than forty or fifty cities and towns in Canada of 2,000 population or upwards which would be open to the raid of an enemy coming against our coasts.** Let us not forget that the danger pointed out to the Commonwealth of Australia by the Admiralty itself was the imminence of a movement of that kind in Australian waters and against the Australian coasts in case the Empire should unfortunately become involved in any great Naval war. We are all aware today that the policy of the British Admiralty is a policy of concentration, and we are all aware that **the Australian naval programme which has recently been entered into with the full approval and consent of the mother country, is altogether designed to guard the coasts of Australia against a danger of that kind.**

"In so far as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) today outlined the lines of naval defence of this country I am entirely at one with him. **I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that. The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the mother country and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect.** In Great Britain the contribution has perhaps been regarded as rather unsatisfactory. In Australia it failed, in the end, to meet with the approval of the people for the reason that Great Britain felt constrained to ask Australia that the field of operations of the squadron should be extended to the China and Indian seas; and when the operation of that squadron was so extended, the Australians felt that the contribution which they had been making for some years past was not really being used to give that protection to Australia which her interests demanded. So that, the policy of Australia at the present time is to build up a flotilla of sub-marines and torpedo boats which, in case of war, would co-operate with the armed cruisers

and battleships of the British Navy. It was pointed out in discussing this question that **Australia in providing a force of that kind would provide a force which it would be very difficult, if not impossible for Great Britain to send across the seas, and that in thus protecting themselves they were providing the best possible force for the protection of the Empire.** So, I am at one with the Prime Minister as far as this is concerned. I am at one with him in this respect also that I think that **an expenditure of money designed for that purpose, ought, in the main at least, to be under the control of our own Parliament and that by making an appropriation of that kind and attending to the defence of our own coasts, by co-operation and co-ordination with the Imperial naval forces, we would be rendering a real service in the defence of the Empire and we would be doing our duty not only to Canada, but to the Empire as a whole."**

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, p. 3515-3518.)

**Hon. Geo. E. Foster also favours a Canadian Naval Service and opposes Contribution.**

In the same debate (March 1909) the **Hon. George E. Foster**, who introduced the resolution, **pointed out the many objections there were to a policy which involved contributions and dwelt not less strongly on the advantages of a Canadian Navy.**

After concluding his reference to the former, Mr. Foster said: "You will notice that while I have tried to discuss the pros and cons in connection with this method, while I have stated reasons in favour of and others against it, **my own mind tends rather towards the employment of another form than that of an out and out money contribution.**" (Hansard, March 20, 1909 page 3496). That other form Mr. Foster described in the sentence immediately following. "The second policy to which I would refer is **the assuming by ourselves of the defence of our ports and coasts, in constant and free co-operation with the imperial forces of the mother country."**

(Hansard, March 20, 1909, page 3496.)

Here are the two methods being considered at the present time. Mr. Borden's method—an out and out money contribution for ships—Sir Wilfrid's Laurier's method the defence of our own ports and coasts in constant and free co-operation with the imperial forces. **Mr. Foster's whole speech** should be read, it will be found in the House of Commons debate of March 29, 1909. (Hansard, page 3484 to 3503 inclusive). It is a **lengthy and able advocacy of the present Laurier policy and a not less strong denunciation of the present Borden plan.**

**Mr. Borden strongly endorses Plan of a Canadian Naval Service while in England.**

But Mr. Borden did not confine his advocacy of a Canadian Naval Service to his speech in the House of Commons. He spoke out strongly in favour of the present Liberal Policy in England, and more strongly upon his return in Halifax and Toronto.

The London Times of July 2nd, 1909, contains the following reference to the Canadian Naval Service in a **speech by Mr. Borden delivered at the Constitutional Club in London** on the previous day.

"With regard to the question of Imperial defence, he (Mr. Borden) was convinced that the people of Canada were prepared to take their full share when necessary in securing the safety and integrity of the Empire. He believed that the resolutions on Imperial defence which were passed by an unanimous vote in Canada had been misunderstood there, as well as in this country. The subject was undoubtedly one of great importance to the Empire and Canada. He was aware that some feeling was created in the British Isles owing to the fact that Canada did not by resolution or by speech from the Prime Minister vouchsafe the offer of one, two, or three Dreadnoughts. **He thought the resolution in the form in which it was passed, while its terms might not upon their surface seem as significant at the moment as the offer of one or two dreadnoughts would have been, laid down a permanent policy for the Dominion of Canada upon which both parties united and which would serve a more practical purpose than any such offer of dreadnoughts.** The effect of the resolutions which were passed was: (1) That they recognized the duty of Canada to take her share in Imperial defence as her wealth and importance increased; (2) that the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury was not, as far as Canada was concerned, the most satisfactory solution of the problem of Imperial defence; (3) that the House would approve of any expenditure necessary for the speedy establishment of a Canadian navy in close relation to and in co-operation with the Imperial navy and along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial conference; and (4) that the Canadian people would be prepared to make any sacrifices necessary for the purpose of co-operating with the Imperial Navy in maintaining the integrity of the Empire and its Naval supremacy."

### **Mr. Borden Strongly Endorses Plan of a Canadian Naval Service before Electors in Canada.**

In a public address delivered at Halifax on October 14th, 1909 Mr. Borden not only spoke on the advantages of a Canadian Navy, but anticipated and replied to most of the arguments which he and his followers are to-day urging against it. Here are some of the extracts from Mr. Borden's speech as reported in the leading Canadian papers on the day following. "Mr. Brodeur says, he has secured naval autonomy for Canada. **There is not and there never has been for the past forty years any constitutional or other difficulty about the establishment of a navy by Canada whenever its people thought fit to adopt that course.**

"Nationhood involves certain responsibilities from which we cannot escape. One of these responsibilities is **the duty of defending our borders and of taking effective steps to protect our commerce and our trade routes.**

"The House of Commons last session laid down a certain



policy touching naval defence in which **both political parties united.**

**"One governing principle at least should control, namely, that out of our own materials, by our own labor and by the instructed skill of our own people any necessary provision for our naval defence should be made so far as may be reasonably possible.**

**"To-day should be Nova Scotia's opportunity. Providence has endowed this province with the material, with the men and with the maritime situation which are essential not only for developing a scheme of naval defence and protection, but also for the re-suscitation of that shipbuilding industry which once made Nova Scotia famous throughout the world."**

**At Toronto on November 1st, 1909, Mr. Borden was no less explicit. The Ottawa Citizen and other Canadian papers on November 2, 1909 contained a full account of an address given by Mr. Borden at the Conservative Club rooms in that city, on that night.**

Here are a few extracts:

**"Mr. Borden spoke with great deliberation and evidently weighed his words carefully. He unhesitatingly reaffirmed his adherence to the national defence policy outlined in the House of Commons resolution passed last March. "**

**"The integrity of the Empire can best be preserved by co-operation in defence and in trade."**

**"Without adequate naval defence our ships would be liable to capture, our shores to raid, our cities to tribute."**

**"The will of the people, must prevail; but I believe it will affirm what Parliament with unanimous voice has declared."**

**"Public opinion must be considered and recognized."**

**"It is my own belief that a Canadian unit of the Imperial navy may be made powerful and effective. I also believe that in any such undertaking our own natural resources and raw material, and, above all, our laboring population, ought to be considered and employed as far as may be reasonably possible. That course is incident to the policy of protection."**

**"But the remedy is not to be found in any abnegation or abandonment of the functions of self-government. Otherwise we should hand over to Great Britain all our great spending departments for better administration."**

These quotations are sufficient to show that Mr. Borden clearly understands the difference between what is involved in a policy of contribution and a policy of a Canadian Naval service, and that notwithstanding his firm advocacy of the latter prior to becoming involved with the Nationalists of Quebec, and the jingoes in England, he has now for the sake of avoiding an appeal to the people as well possibly as for other reasons, deliberately abandoned the Naval service idea, for a policy of contribution.

**Mr. Borden's Proposed Contribution Enough to Construct and Equip Two Fleet Units as Outlined by the Admiralty.**

The change is more remarkable in virtue of the amount of money which Mr. Borden proposes to expend on the first contribu-

tion. Roughly speaking \$35,000,000 is almost sufficient to fully construct and equip two complete fleet units. At the Conference in London in June 1909, the Admiralty set forth a kind of fleet unit which it was prepared to advocate as the most suitable for coast defence and for co-operation with other units of the Royal Navy. The following is quoted from the Admiralty Memorandum presented to the Imperial Defence Conference 1909, and signed by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

"In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct Fleet unit; and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war.

"The Fleet unit to be aimed at should, therefore, in the opinion of the Admiralty, consist at least of the following:

1 Armoured cruiser (new "Indomitable" class, which is of the "Dreadnought" type),

3 Unarmoured cruisers ("Bristol" class),

6 Destroyers,

3 Submarines.

with the necessary auxiliaries, such as depot and store ships, &c., which are not here specified.

"Such a Fleet unit would be capable of action not only in the defence of coasts, but also of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile squadrons should such ever attempt to act in its waters.

"The estimated first cost of building and arming such a complete Fleet unit would be approximately £3,700,000 (\$18,019,000).

### **Mr. Borden's proposals intended to cause abandonment of Canadian Naval Service.**

In view of the circumstance that the amount which Mr. Borden proposes shall be given as a first contribution is an amount almost equivalent to what would be sufficient to construct and equip a fleet unit on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, is there not apart from everything else the strongest reason for believing that **his proposal is to discontinue the Canadian Naval Service altogether.** The circumstance that both Mr. Borden and his followers during the course of the debate in advocating the proposed expenditure of \$35,000,000, have endeavoured to minimize the value of a Canadian Service, and to suggest every conceivable obstacle in the way of its development, indicates pretty clearly that **the present amount is but the first of a series of contributions** which the Dominion of Canada will be called upon to make to the British Admiralty because of having no Service for its own Coast defence, or for co-operation with other naval forces of the British Empire in time of need.

### **The talk of having a voice in foreign policy a mere subterfuge and a feature of the Nationalist Conservative Alliance.**

Mr. Borden is saying that any Dominion undertaking to share upon a permanent basis in the sea defence of the Empire must have

some voice in the policy which shapes the issues of war and peace, and is giving as a reason for not bringing down a permanent policy, the fact that it will take some time to work out this partnership in foreign policy.

Without more than alluding to the fact that the British government has informed Mr. Borden that foreign policy is a matter that cannot and will not be shared, it is sufficient to point out that **expression was never given to any thought of the kind when in 1909 Mr. Borden was advocating the policy of a Canadian Naval Service**, also that in the speech delivered by Mr. Borden in Halifax on October 14th he expressly stated that if the permanent policy of Canada were to be a Canadian naval service, no constitutional difficulty of any kind could arise. He said:

“Mr. Brodeur says he has secured naval autonomy for Canada. **There is not and there never has been for the past forty years any constitutional or other difficulty about the establishment of a navy by Canada whenever its people thought fit to adopt that course.**”

**Neither Australia nor New Zealand have ever raised any question of the kind** and each of these dominions is at the present time carrying out a permanent policy of Naval defence. Australia, the policy of a Naval Service of her own, New Zealand the policy of contribution to the British Admiralty.

The truth is that Mr. Borden would never have thought of laying any stress on reasoning of this kind were it not that the Nationalists of Quebec with whom he is so closely allied have given as a reason for their opposition to any permanent policy of Imperial defence the absence of any voice by Canada in the Government of the Empire, and by raising this point Mr. Borden hopes to convince the Nationalists that he does not intend to have a permanent policy, and to appearances the blame for this will be upon England, because she will not give Canada a voice in peace and war.

**The Nationalists' attitude** is well set out in the following resolution:—

**After an address at St. Eustache at Quebec by Mr. Henri Bourassa on July 7th 1910, the following resolution was carried:—**

“But confident in the greatness and efficiency of the principles of centralization and of autonomy as solemnly proclaimed and recognized since more than a half century by the authorities of Great Britain and those of Canada, we are opposed to any new policy which would entangle us in distant wars, foreign to Canada, so long as the autonomous colonies of the Empire do not share with the Mother Country upon a footing of equality the Sovereign authority in matters relating to the Imperial army and navy, treaties of peace and of alliance, foreign relations, the Government of India and the possessions of the Crown.”

**After their victory on November 3rd 1910, in the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election** a Nationalist gathering to celebrate the victory was held at Montreal on the night of the 9th. At this meeting the following resolution was carried:

“This meeting considers as contrary to the principles of the autonomy of Canada and to the real unity of the Empire any policy



tending to impose upon Canada, which has no voice in the Government of the Empire, any part whatsoever of its exterior charges, or of its military defence outside of Canadian territories."

There are many who believe that this resolution was the inspiration of the following remarks made by Mr. Borden in the House of Commons 15 days later:

"If Canada and the other Dominions of the Empire are to take their part as nations of this Empire in the defence of the Empire as a whole, shall it be that we, contributing to that defence of the whole Empire, shall have absolutely, as citizens of this country, no voice whatever in the councils of the Empire touching the issues of peace or war throughout the Empire? I do not think that such would be a tolerable condition. I do not believe the people of Canada would for one moment submit to such a condition. Shall members of this House, representatives of more than 221 constituencies of this country, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, shall no one of them have the same voice with regard to these vast Imperial issues that the humblest tax payer in the British Isles has at this moment?"

Yet while saying this to please the Nationalists, Mr. Borden to please the jingoes now brings down a Bill to make provision for the "Naval forces of the Empire" without having obtained any voice in the councils of the Empire.

### **The Bearing of Australia's Example upon Canada.**

It is perhaps only necessary to point out that Mr. Borden is no more called upon, than is the Prime Minister of Australia or the Prime Minister of New Zealand to frame a naval policy which may serve to ensure the safety of the British Empire. As Prime Minister of Canada, the Canadian people, however, have a right to expect from him as the people of Australia and New Zealand had from their governments, a permanent policy for the protection of Canada's coasts and trade routes and a policy which will permit, should the need ever arise, of Canada doing her part through co-operation with other naval forces of the Empire, in the maintenance of its sea supremacy, just as during the South African war she was in a position, though without a voice in foreign policies to come, along with the other British Dominions to the assistance of the Mother country in time of need.

It remains only to add that in the fact, that Australia with a population of less than five millions, a dominion less extensive in territory, wealth, and resources than Canada, has been able to satisfactorily work out the conditions of the agreement entered into with the British Admiralty along with Canada, any argument to the effect that Canada is unable to do what Australia has already done falls to the ground.

The argument that Canada could not find men sufficient to train for a Naval Service of her own is answered by the example of Australia where labour is more scarce than it is in Canada. It is further answered by the first report of the Deputy Minister

of the Canadian Naval Service which suggests that recruiting for the training ships had been found easy, and that little difficulty in further recruiting was anticipated. The second report of the Deputy Minister of Naval Defence explains that the recruiting had fallen off owing to the uncertainty under the present administration of what the permanent Naval policy is to be.

**The insinuation that is sometimes heard that the Canadian Naval Service means independence and separation is also answered by the example of Australia.** No one so much as suggested that Australia in abandoning the policy of contribution and entering upon a policy of her own had in so doing any thought of separation from the British Empire. Why then should any suggestion of the kind be made with reference to Canada?

The Right Hon. James Bryce, British Ambassador to the United States, speaking before the Canadian Club in Ottawa on March 9, of this year said: "Both in Australia and New Zealand there has been of late years a very marked palpable growth of the sentiment of Imperial unity." This covers the very time that Australia has been engaged upon a Naval Service of her own.

Those who urge the argument of separation and independence forget that they **impeach the loyalty of Mr. Borden and every Conservative in the House of Commons during the last Parliament** inasmuch as the resolution to which Parliament unanimously agreed was the resolution for a Canadian Naval Service along lines identical to the Service established in Australia.

The kind of appeal which finds it necessary to call in question the loyalty of the people's representatives in Parliament is hardly deserving consideration of thinking men, and certainly is not worthy the name of patriotism.

### **Recent Declarations by Outlying Dominions in Favour of Naval Service as Opposed to Contribution.**

Since the debate on Mr. Borden's proposals commenced in the Canadian parliament, other parts of the Empire have come to see that the real question at issue is whether the outlying Dominions shall be permitted to have naval services under the control of their own parliaments, or be obliged to contribute towards the support of some scheme of centralization, and **the representatives of the several outlying Dominions have begun to speak out and make it quite clear that in their opinion centralization is not a desirable thing for the British Empire**, and that the right policy for Canada to follow at the present time is that of having a naval service of her own.

A Canadian Associated Press Cable of date London, March 12th, has the following in reference to a speech delivered by **Sir George Reid, the High Commissioner of Australia, at the Royal Colonial Institute** on the night previous:

"Sir George Reid, high commissioner of Australia, made an interesting reference to the question of Imperial Defence, expressing

the opinion that the time was not far distant when Canada would have to undertake the defence of the North Pacific and North Atlantic, New Zealand and Australia safeguarding the South Pacific, while India must eventually take a substantial share in the naval defence of the East.

"Such a scheme, he said, would leave England free to concentrate in the North Sea, and a large proportion of the trade routes.

**"Sir George thought that the Australian policy of having its own navy, operating in conjunction with the British fleet, was an example that must eventually be followed by all self-governing Dominions."**

The same despatch has the following in reference to **Sir Joseph Ward, former Premier of New Zealand**, "Sir Joseph Ward said he agreed with Sir George that it was **impossible that any self-governing Dominion would consent to return to the old system of government under central authority.**"

The Canadian Associated Press Cable dated London March 14th, has the following with reference to a speech made by the New Zealand Defence Minister in which the latter has made it plain that New Zealand would not long continue her present system of contribution. The speech is as follows:

"Speaking at a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association yesterday, **Hon. Col. Allen, New Zealand's Minister of Defence**, said that the payment of a naval subsidy would not, in the long run, appeal to the Dominion sentiment of patriotism. A permanent policy was needed, but this could hardly be said to exist under the Canadian (i.e. Borden) or New Zealand scheme. He, of course, valued to the fullest extent the steps taken by New Zealand and Canada, but they needed a permanent policy and one which would endure. What they wanted was a living thing in which the dominions would have a vital interest.

"It did not matter so much for the moment where Dreadnoughts were built; that could be arranged as conditions developed in the future. What did matter was that it should be realized that **the dominions would not be content with merely putting their hands in their pockets.** (Hear, hear.)

"The Imperial Navy must be a living reality to them to which they contributed, not merely money, but men. There was more value in the lives of their men than in the life of a ship. The dominions must have the opportunity of doing their duty towards the personnel of the fleet and manning the Empire's ships at sea. They must be prepared to help, not only the imperial fleet with material, but they must have an interest in the operations of the fleet itself."

### **The Real Question at Issue.**

The question then before the people of Canada at this time is **whether this country shall keep good faith in the matter of an**



agreement to which other of the self-governing Dominions of the Empire are also parties, and continue, as Australia is doing, the organization of a Canadian Naval Service along lines similar to that of the Royal Australian Navy, and in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons, or whether, for the sake of political expediency, Canada shall sacrifice her national honour and change to a policy of contribution similar to that abandoned by Australia, and one which New Zealand is finding to be unsatisfactory and unsuitable, not less on patriotic than on other grounds.

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## CANADA AND THE NAVY

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# **Reasons by the Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden, M.P. in Favour of a Canadian Naval Service and Against a Con- tribution.**

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**Which Policy Should Canada Adopt ?**

**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 on three dreadnoughts as part of a permanent policy of centralization and contribution.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1913.

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## **PREMIER BORDEN'S REASONS IN FAVOUR OF A CANADIAN NAVAL SERVICE AS OPPOSED TO CONTRIBUTION.**

On December 5th, 1912, in asking Parliament to vote \$35,000,000 as a contribution towards three dreadnoughts, the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden said: "There have been proposals, to which I shall no more than allude, that we should build up a great Naval organization in Canada. In my humble opinion, nothing of an efficient character could be built up in this country within a quarter or perhaps half a century. . . . Is there really any need that we should undertake the hazardous and costly experiment of building up a Naval organization especially restricted to this Dominion?" On February 27, 1913, Mr. Borden said, "We say that if we are to remain an Empire, we cannot have five foreign policies and five separate navies."

Many people who have heard these and other utterances of Premier Borden, all of which go to show that he favours a policy of centralization and contribution, are beginning to say that Mr. Borden was never in favour of a Canadian Naval Service, and are using his present arguments to show why a Naval Service of her own should not be permitted to Canada. **Let the reasons given by Mr. Borden why a Canadian Naval Service should be organized speak for themselves.**

### **Reasons Given in Parliament by Premier Borden why Canada Should Have A Naval Service of Her Own.**

Premier Borden gave his first set of reasons why a Canadian Naval Service should be organized in a **speech delivered in the House of Commons on March 29th, 1909**, and recorded in the Hansard Debates of that date on pages 3513-3523. Here they are in the order in which they were given.

**Reason No. 1. Because Canada is a nation and has national responsibilities.**

**Mr. Borden.** "Canada to-day is a nation and we are all proud to recognize and hail Canada as **one of the greatest nations in the greatest Empire that the earth beholds.** But, Mr. Speaker, let us not forget also that a national status implies national responsibility— **a primal responsibility is the defence of their territories and the protection of their commerce.**"

**Reason No. 2. Because Naval Defence is more important to Canada than land defence.**

**Mr. Borden.** "I would venture to submit that our expenditure has to some extent been appropriated to the wrong purpose. In my opinion not less than **one-half of the amount appropriated for defence should be devoted for Naval instead of military defence.**"

**Reason No. 3. Because Canada's markets are largely across seas.**

**Mr. Borden.** "The great market of Canada to-day is not the market which would be especially safe-guarded and preserved to us by the expenditure of a large amount of money for military purposes, but it is **the market which may be preserved to us by expenditure for naval purposes.**"

**Reason No. 4.** Because Canada's commerce is largely water-borne.  
**Mr. Borden.** "The expenditure in defence of our sea ports, in defence of our coasts, and in defence of the waters of the ocean which are immediately adjacent to our coast is of immensely greater advantage and of immensely greater importance than the expenditure each year after year, we are dispersing in connection with the military forces of this country. . . . I desire to emphasize as far as may be in my power the importance to Canada of some attempt at naval defence in the defence of our sea ports and the protection of our commerce."

**Reason No. 5.** Because Canada's cities and harbours are wholly exposed, and open to possibilities of being raided.

**Mr. Borden.** "How many cities and towns are there in Canada which would be open to the raids of a second or third class cruiser? I suppose there are not less than 40 or 50 cities and towns in Canada of 2,000 population or upwards which would be open to the raid of an enemy coming against our coast."

**Reason No. 6.** Because the British Admiralty has warned other Dominions that absence of local coast defence would expose them to great danger if England became involved in war.

**Mr. Borden.** "Let us not forget that the danger pointed out to the Commonwealth of Australia by the Admiralty itself was the imminence of a movement of that kind in Australian waters and against Australian coasts in case the Empire should unfortunately become involved in any great naval war."

**Reason No. 7.** Because Britain's policy of centralization of her fleets near home exposes the outlying Dominions to danger.

**Mr. Borden.** "The policy of the British Admiralty is a policy of centralization and we are all aware that the Australian naval programme which has recently been entered into with the full approval and consent of the Mother Country is altogether designed to guard the coasts of Australia against danger of that kind."

**Reason No. 8.** Because it is the proper line upon which to proceed.

**Mr. Borden.** "I am entirely of the opinion in the first place that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian Naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that."

**Reason No. 9.** Because the policy of contribution has been tried elsewhere and has proven a failure.

**Mr. Borden.** "The other extreme has been tried as between Australia and the Mother Country and it has not worked satisfactorily in every respect. In great Britain the contribution has, perhaps, been regarded as rather unsatisfactorily. In Australia it failed in the end to meet with the approval of the people."

**Reason No. 10.** Because a policy of contribution causes dis-satisfaction as to the extent to which it is being used for protection

**Mr. Borden.** "The Australians felt that the contribution which they had been making for some years past was **not really being used to give that protection** to Australia which her interests demanded."

**Reason No. 11.** Because Australia has adopted the policy of a Naval Service of her own.

**Mr. Borden.** "The policy of Australia at the present time is to build up a flotilla of submarines and torpedo boats which, in case of war would **co-operate** with the armed cruisers and battleships of the British Navy."

**Reason No. 12.** Because a local Naval Service affords protection which Great Britain could not give in time of need.

**Mr. Borden.** "It was pointed out in discussing this question that Australia in providing a force of that kind, would provide a force which it would be very difficult, if not impossible for Great Britain to send across the seas."

**Reason No. 13.** Because in protecting themselves the outlying Dominions afford the best protection for the Empire.

**Mr. Borden.** "It was pointed out that in thus protecting themselves they (the Australians) were providing the **best possible forces for the protection of the Empire.**"

**Reason No. 14.** Because Parliament ought to control the expenditures of money on naval defence.

**Mr. Borden.** "I think that the expenditure of money designed for that purpose ought in the main at least to be **under the control of our own Parliament.**"

**Reason No. 15.** Because by a Naval Service Canada would do her duty to herself and the Empire.

**Mr. Borden.** "By attending to the defence of our own coasts by **co-operation and co-ordination** with the Imperial Naval forces, we would be rendering a real service in the defence of the Empire and we would be doing **our duty not only to Canada, but to the Empire as a whole.**"

**Reason No. 16.** Because belonging to the British Empire, we should defend our own sea coasts.

**Mr. Borden.** "Being of the Empire and in the Empire we must take our fair share of the burden of the naval defence of that Empire and **particularly of our sea coasts.**"

**Reason No. 17.** Because the need for a Naval Service is urgent.

**Mr. Borden.** "I would be glad if my Rt. Hon. friend would accept the suggestion of inserting in that paragraph\* some word which would indicate an **intention to act promptly.** If

(Par. 4 of resolution of House of Commons of March 29th, 1909 'The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the organization of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference')



my Rt. Hon. friend would insert before the word organization **some such word as 'immediate' or even 'early'**, I think it would greatly improve the paragraph. If the resolution of my Rt. Hon. friend were so amended I think it would commend itself to the **unanimous approval** of the members of this House."

**Reason No. 18. Because a Canadian Naval Service has been in contemplation for many years.**

**Mr. Borden.** "Now I understand what the Hon. gentleman contemplated in 1902. **At that time he looked to the establishment of a Canadian Naval force.** On page 18 of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1902 **the First Lord of the Admiralty announced this:** 'Sir Wilfrid Laurier informed me that His Majesty's Government of **the Dominion of Canada are contemplating the establishment of a local Naval force in the waters of Canada.** . . . The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well.' . . . I am thoroughly aware that **the late Raymond Prefontaine intended to establish a Canadian Naval militia or naval force** of some kind. He told me so about a year before his death. Mr. Prefontaine was a man of large views and of great courage."

**Reason No. 19. Because self-respect demands protection of our own shores.**

**Mr. Borden.** "I believe that the defence of our shores and the protection of our own commerce is due to **the self-respect which should fill the heart of every man in this country.**"

**Reason No. 20. Because contribution implies that Canada has a status of a Crown colony, not of a self-governing Dominion.**

**Mr. Borden.** "You say that we may rest content to depend for our naval defence on Great Britain. Well, if we have assumed the status of a nation in one respect, **shall we adhere to the status of a crown colony** in other and still more important respects?"

**Reason No. 21. Because the Munroe Doctrine would not afford a sufficient defence of Canadian coasts and trade.**

**Mr. Borden.** "You speak of the Munroe doctrine, but that doctrine would not defend **our coasts, our cities, and our commerce** from the attacks of any foe. And it is idle to suggest that we could in the case of a great naval war obtain any measure of comfort from the Munroe doctrine."

**Reason No. 22. Because there should be unanimity between political parties as to naval policy.**

**Mr. Borden.** "This is too great a question for the introduction of party strategy. **It is a question in respect to which we should all rise superior to all party methods.** . . . We desire that this resolution should go out as the **unanimous resolution** of the Parliament of Canada to the whole world."

## **Reasons Given in England by Premier Borden, Why Canada Should Have a Naval Service of Her Own.**

At a luncheon given to him as Leader of the Conservative party in Canada, at the Constitutional Club in London, England, on Dominion Day, July 1st, 1909, Mr. Borden gave his reasons for preferring a Canadian Naval Service. Here they are:

**Reason No. 23. Because a Canadian Naval Service serves a more practical purpose than the offer of Dreadnoughts.**

**Mr. Borden.** (As reported in *London Times*, July 2nd, 1909.)

"He was aware that some feeling was created in the British Isles owing to the fact that Canada did not by resolution or by speech from the Prime Minister, vouch safe to offer one, two or three dreadnoughts. He thought the resolution in the form in which it was based, while its promises might not upon the surface seem to some as significant at the moment as the offer of one or two dreadnoughts would have been, laid down a permanent policy for the Dominion of Canada upon which both parties united and which would serve a more practical purpose than any such offer of dreadnoughts."

**Reason No. 24. That a Canadian Naval Service is in accordance with the purpose and terms of the unanimous resolution of March 1909.**

**Mr. Borden.** (As reported in *London Times*, July 2nd 1909.)

"The effect of the resolutions which were passed was—1. that they recognized the duty of Canada to take her share in Imperial defence as her wealth and importance increased; 2. that the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury was not, as far as Canada was concerned, the most satisfactory solution of the problem of Imperial defence; 3. that the House would approve any expenditure necessary for the speedy establishment of a Canadian navy in close relation to and in co-operation with the Imperial Navy; and 4. that the Canadian people would be prepared to make any sacrifices necessary for the purpose of co-operating with the Imperial Navy in maintaining the integrity of the Empire and its naval supremacy.

**Reasons given in his own constituency by Premier Borden why Canada should have a Naval Service of her own.**

The reasons given in Parliament were public reasons which would appeal to Canadians generally, irrespective of locality. The reasons given in England were those which it was thought might help to smooth the feelings of the jingo Imperialists who were displeased because the Canadian parliament had unanimously adopted the policy of a Naval Service of her own instead of a policy of centralization and contribution. Mr. Borden was not then Premier and therefore could promise nothing. Since becoming Premier he has yielded wholly to their wishes and demands. The speech at Halifax was delivered on October 14th, 1909, and was reported fully in the Canadian papers on the day following. It was intended to appeal specially to his own constituents. Here are reasons given on that occasion, in addition to reasons previously given.

**Reason No. 25.** There is no constitutional difficulty about establishment of a Canadian Naval Service.

**Mr. Borden.** "Mr. Brodeur says he has secured naval autonomy. There is not and there never has been for the past 40 years any constitutional or other difficulty about the establishment of a navy by Canada, whenever its people think fit of adopting that course."

**Reason No. 26.** Because it is the duty of Canadians to carry out a policy unanimously agreed to by both political parties.

**Mr. Borden.** "The House of Commons last session laid down a certain policy touching naval defence in which both political parties united. It may not have satisfied the aspirations of all Conservatives, but it seemed our bounden duty to place if possible above the limits of partisan strife, a question so vital and far-reaching and to attain the standard which has for many years governed both political parties in Great Britain with respect to foreign relations."

**Reason No. 27.** Because a Canadian Naval Service affords a demand for materials, labour and skill of Canada.

**Mr. Borden.** "One governing principle at least should control, namely, that out of our own materials, by our own labour, and by the instructed skill of our own people, any necessary provision for organizing naval defence should be made so far as may be reasonably possible".

**Reason No. 28.** Because a Canadian Naval Service will help to stimulate and encourage the shipbuilding industry of Canada.

**Mr. Borden.** "In this connection may we not hope that there shall be given a stimulus and encouragement to the shipbuilding industry of Canada which has long been lacking."

**Reason No. 29.** Because Providence has endowed Canada with great opportunities which the construction of a Canadian Naval Service would help to be realized.

**Mr. Borden.** "To-day should be Nova Scotia's opportunity. Providence has endowed this province with the material, with the men and with the maritime situation which are essential not only for developing a scheme of naval defence and protection, but, also, for the resuscitation of that shipbuilding industry, which once made Nova Scotia famous throughout the world."

**Reasons Given in Toronto by Premier Borden Why Canada Should Have A Naval Service of Her Own.**

Speaking to a crowded audience before the Centre and South Toronto Conservative Clubs on November 1st, 1909, Premier Borden repeated many of the reasons which he had given in his previous speeches as to why Canada should have a Naval Service of her own. The speech was fully reported in the Conservative papers on the day following. The press report contains the following: "Mr. Borden spoke with great deliberation and evidently weighed his words carefully. He unhesitatingly reaffirmed his adherence to the naval defence policy outlined in



the House of Commons resolution passed last March," also, "Mr Borden scouted the idea of Canada relying on the navy of the United States in time of danger, and characterised as absurd the plea that we are incapable of building a navy in this country." Being in a manufacturing centre, he laid special emphasis on labour and protection. His words in this connection were:

**Reason No. 30. Because a Canadian Naval Service will give employment to the labouring population.**

**Mr. Borden.** "I also believe that in any such undertaking, our own natural resources and raw material, and best of all, our labouring population ought to be considered and employed as far as may be reasonably possible."

**Reason No. 31. Because a Canadian Naval Service would mean the protection of Canadian industries.**

**Mr. Borden.** "Above all, our labouring population ought to be considered and employed as far as may be reasonably possible. That course is incident to the policy of protection."

### **Self-Government, Mr. Borden and the Will of the People.**

This account of Mr. Borden's reasons for the adoption of a Canadian Naval Service could not be more appropriately concluded than with three additional reasons contained in his Toronto speech. They are of special significance in view of the fact that Mr. Borden is prime minister of Canada to-day. One is expressive of Canada's right of self-government, one of Mr. Borden's own individual belief and one of the will of the people.

**Reason No. 32. A policy of contribution in preference to a Canadian Naval Service would mean the abandoning of self-government by Canada.**

**Mr. Borden.** (After referring to the insinuation that the construction of a Canadian Naval Service might lead to a reckless expenditure of public moneys), "The remedy is not to be found in any abnegation nor abandoning of the functions of self-government, otherwise we should hand over to Great Britain all our great spending Departments for better administration, that would be a counsel of despair and a shameful confession of our incapacity for decent self-government."

**Reason NO. 33. Because in Mr. Borden's own opinion a Canadian Naval Service would be effective and powerful.**

**Mr. Borden.** "It is my humble belief that the Canadian unit of the Imperial Navy may be powerfull and effective."

**Reason No. 34. Because it is the will of the people that Canada should have a Naval Service of her own.**

**Mr. Borden.** "The will of the people must prevail, but I believe it will affirm what Parliament with unanimous voice has declared."

The question is: Shall the will of the people prevail, and self-government be maintained?

# CANADA AND THE NAVY

## Answers to Important Questions

**On what grounds did Parliament decide upon a Canadian Naval Service?**

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**What were the views of Hon. Geo. E. Foster who introduced the resolution?**

**Which Policy Should Canada Adopt?**

**The Conservative Policy**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for three dreadnoughts as part of a permanent policy of centralization and contribution.

**The Liberal Policy**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons, of March, 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office  
of the  
Canadian Liberal Party  
Ottawa, Canada

1913

Pamphlet No. 11

**Question—On what grounds did Parliament decide on a Canadian Naval Service? What were the views of Hon. George E. Foster who introduced the resolution?**

**Answer—**

It was the Hon. George E. Foster who introduced the resolution of March 29th, 1909, which, as amended, was subsequently unanimously adopted by both political parties. In one of the ablest speeches he ever delivered, Mr. Foster summed up the arguments for and against a policy of contribution—the present Borden Policy—and a policy of a Canadian Naval Service—the Laurier Policy. The question at that time had not become one of party politics. Mr. Foster, therefore, spoke not as a party politician, but as a statesman. The following is a summary in Mr. Foster's own words:\*

**ONLY ONE OF TWO POLICIES POSSIBLE, CONTRIBUTION OR NAVAL SERVICE.**

MR. FOSTER.—“When you boil down all the propositions that are made, you get down to two propositions, one or the other of which must in the end be adopted, . . . the first is a policy of a fixed annual contribution, . . . the second policy is the assuming by ourselves of the defence of our own ports or coasts.”

“The policy of a fixed annual contribution divides itself, apparently, into two branches, but it is really the same thing. One man says send \$1,000,000 or \$2,000,000 a year; another man says send a dreadnought or two dreadnoughts, and so far as Canada is concerned, these two are absolutely one. When we translate our contribution into dreadnoughts it comes down in the end to money which would be sufficient to build and equip a dreadnought and, therefore, I say they are both parts of the one proposition.”

\*The speech in full will be found in the Hansard report of the debates in the House of Commons, on March 29th, 1909, pages 3484 to 3503 inclusive.



## **I.—OBJECTIONS TO A POLICY OF CONTRIBUTION.**

**OBJECTION No. 1.—It gives rise to difficulty in fixing the amount.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"The first difficulty is that as to fixing the amount of the contribution. . . . How long shall the sum which you have fixed to-day remain the proper sum, and will it not be subject to constant revision, constant negotiation, and maybe occasional disagreement, and consequent troubles?"

**OBJECTION No. 2.—It smacks too much of tribute.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"Another objection raised is that it smacks too much of tribute. That we are a free people and we do not want to be paying a contribution to the Old Country for this or for any other purpose."

**OBJECTION No. 3.—It is payment without control.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"But one says, we pay but we do not control."

**OBJECTION No. 4.—It impinges on autonomy.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"Another objection to be set forth is that it impinges on our autonomy."

**OBJECTION No. 5.—It may be used for purposes not approved of.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"Another objection that is made is that Britain may use our contribution in unjustifiable wars, and that we should guard ourselves carefully lest we make a contribution for the equipment and strengthening of a fleet which may be used in wars that we do not approve of."

With regard to Objections 2, 3, and 4, Mr. Foster says: "These objections have some force, though, as I think, not a force that is irresistible. There are some deeper reasons which appear to me to have deeper force with reference to that method of taking our part in defence." Here they are:

**OBJECTION No. 6.—It is hiring others to perform services which should be done by ourselves.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"The greatest objection which I have to a fixed money contribution is that it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ourselves ought to do. As though a man, the father of a family, in lusty health and strength, should pay his neighbor something per month for looking after the welfare and safety of his home, instead of doing that duty himself."

**OBJECTION NO. 7.—It puts the country no further on in the matter of defending itself.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"After 10, or 12, or 20, or 30 years you will have paid out an immense amount of money. You will have been protected in the meantime, but **in Canada itself there will be no roots struck.** There will be no residue left. **There will be no preparation of the soil or beginning of the growth of the production of defence.** Yet sometime or other, no one can doubt, that with resources and with a population constantly increasing, we must and will have in this country a naval force of our own, for our coast and home defence."

**OBJECTION NO. 8.—It does not inspire a national spirit.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"The interest that we take in a contribution made by another is not the interest that I desire for Canada. I want to see something grafted on the soil of Canada's nationhood, which takes root and grows and develops until it incites the spirit of defence in this country, leads to a participation in the defence, leads to that quick interest in it, its glories, its duties and its accomplished work, which is, after all, the one great thing that benefits all people for great expenditures, either on land or on sea, in the way of defence and of the maintenance of the rights of the country."

**OBJECTION NO. 9.—It does not properly protect commerce.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"Again it disjoins what has been joined together from the earliest days of the world's existence—commerce and the protection of commerce. After all a basic idea of a naval force is the protection of the commerce of a country. A commerce side by side with its protector, and its protector side by side with the growing commerce of a country flourish best together and are the surest helpers to each other."

**OBJECTION NO. 10.—It deprives Canada of benefits which she ought to derive from assisting in defence.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"When we make our contributions in the way of a fixed sum and it goes from us and we are not responsible for it, we have none of the inspiration arising from the growth and development of a system of future defence

**in our own country. We are deprived of the larger benefit ourselves, and in the future we do no greater service to the Empire of which we form a part in this matter of defence."**

**OBJECTION No. 11.—It ignores the necessities and aspirations and prospects of the Canadian people.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—"I think this method ignores the necessities and the aspirations and the prospects of a great people, such as the Canadian people are destined to become. We must have beginnings. This must at first be small, but sometime or other our country will have its naval force for the defence of this country, if for nothing else. The point with me is as to **whether it is not the greater wisdom to sow the seed at once and cultivate its growth as best we can in our circumstances and with our resources until at last we arrive at that stage of expansion which we have reached in other great lines of our country's progress.**"

Having set forth these objections to a policy of contribution Mr. Foster said: "My own mind tends rather towards the employment of another form than that of an out and out money contribution." That other form he then described as "the assuming by ourselves of the defence of our own ports and coasts in constant and free co-operation with the Imperial forces of the Mother Country." Mr. Foster then examined the possible objections that might be raised to a Canadian Naval Service, and concluded by giving his reasons in support of it.

## **II—ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS TO A CANADIAN NAVAL SERVICE**

**OBJECTION No. 1.—That a beginning has to be made without plant, expert skill, trained cadets or trained sailors.**

**MR. FOSTER** (in answer to objection).—"Under that system our first vessels would be British built, British equipped, British manned, British officered from stoker to captain . . . But the first Canadian-owned vessel built and equipped in Britain and sent out to defend our coasts would become **the nucleus and the training ground of Canadian stokers, Canadian sailors, and Canadian officers, and by and by, perhaps, of a Canadian admiral on the Canadian coast.** . . . The time must come when we have an Imperial adjunct to the British navy . . . in which Canada has some of her body, her bones, her blood and her mental power, her national pride. Then would come the dockyard, which would be of sufficient strength to enable us to repair the small vessels and in time build the smaller class of vessels that we need at first . . . and so in that progressive, gradual way we are working up to the fulfilment of this idea of defensive force in Canada, which would



be an auxiliary in the case of an outbreak of actual hostilities, which would be sufficient for the ordinary surveillance of our coasts and which would be, in time of war, sufficient to work in conjunction with the main portion of the fleet that would be sent to the part of our country that was menaced."

**OBJECTION NO. 2.—That the cost of naval service is greater than contribution.**

MR. FOSTER (in answer to objection).—"An objection to this method is found in its greater cost. **I doubt if the cost will be greater.**"

**OBJECTION NO. 3.—That a Canadian Naval Service would be ineffective.**

MR. FOSTER (in answer to objection).—"It is said it would be ineffective. **Ineffective how?** As the last line of defence certainly it would. If all the battleships of the Empire were swept from the sea, the torpedo and coast defence any of the colonies might have, would make no headway against the combined fleets of the conquerors, but we do not believe that that disaster will occur."

**OBJECTION NO. 4.—That there are physical and mechanical difficulties to be overcome.**

MR. FOSTER (in answer to objection).—"It is said also that there are physical and mechanical difficulties to be overcome. I have mentioned these—**they can be overcome. Time and application of a reasonable amount of resource will overcome these difficulties** and place us where we have had to place ourselves with reference to every other great line of development. **We must begin at the beginning and work up gradually until we gain the skill, the plant, the machinery and the power to make for ourselves what at first it was physically impossible for us to make.**"

### **III.—REASONS IN SUPPORT OF A CANADIAN NAVAL SERVICE**

**REASON NO. 1.—Canada will have an immense commerce by water.**

MR. FOSTER.—"Canada has on the line of water development as great a future as on the line of land development . . . **The imagination can scarcely grasp the commerce that waits**

for Canadian vessels, manned by Canadian crews, and a mighty instrument of expansion and wealth to be held almost completely in our own hands. . . .”

**REASON NO. 2.—The building of warships will encourage iron and steel commercial shipbuilding.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—“The building of warships is the strong encouragement of the steel and iron commercial shipbuilding in Great Britain to-day. The two are joined. The one works into and out of the other. I say that steel shipbuilding inaugurated in this country, developed to the capacity of turning out war vessels, would not only benefit Canada but Great Britain as well.”

**REASON NO. 3.—It may lead to Canada building ships for other parts of the Empire.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—“It is no stretch of the imagination to believe that an Empire with its component parts in full accord may have at some time immense dockyards in the Dominion of Canada on the Pacific coast and on the Atlantic coast, in which will be built, not only our own vessels, distinctively Canadian, but a part of the navy of Great Britain itself.”

**REASON NO. 4.—Because Australia has found the policy of contribution a failure and has adopted a Naval Service of her own.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—“In Australia the foundations of such a course are laid. That country to-day has taken that line of policy . . . After having tried the contributory method, Australia has adopted this policy with the best of concert between the Mother Country and herself. The coast defence in time of peace, the auxiliary body to the fleet in time of war, both carried on with the co-operation and good-will which perfect trust in each other engenders and keeps strong.”

**REASON NO. 3.—The duty of Canadians demands a proper coast protection.**

**MR. FOSTER.**—“Our circumstances, our manhood, our sense of gratitude, and our sense of right all demand that something should be done. Something adequate and something now. What boots it to drift from year to year? Are we proper stewards of this heritage if we allow it to go one moment longer without some proper care and provision for its defence?”

## **MR. FOSTER'S MOTION AND THE PRESENT POSITION**

**Mr. Foster's motion was as follows:**

"That in the opinion of this house, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and natural environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."

**The resolution on Mr. Foster's motion as finally adopted unanimously by both political parties** contained the following:

"The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference and in full sympathy of the view that the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire and the peace of the world."

**The question now before the people of Canada is, shall the unanimous resolution of Parliament of March, 1909, which was passed on Mr. Foster's motion be carried out? Or shall Canada abandon the beginnings already made in the construction of a Canadian Naval Service and enter upon a policy of contribution? Shall the country adopt the arguments of Mr. Foster as a statesman, or the evasions of Mr. Foster as a party politician?**

**Copies of this pamphlet may be had on applying to the  
Central Liberal Information Office, Ottawa, Canada.**



# CANADA AND THE NAVY

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## THE TWO POLICIES

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### 100 REASONS

# Why the Laurier is Better than the Borden Policy !

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## WHICH POLICY SHOULD CANADA ADOPT ?

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**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY** — An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 on three Dreadnoughts as part of a permanent policy of centralization and contribution.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY** — A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

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# CANADA AND THE NAVY

*(The following pamphlets and leaflets may be had on application to the Central Information Office of the Canadian Liberal Party, Ottawa, Canada.)*

## PAMPHLETS

Speech delivered by the Right Honourable Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Leader of the Opposition, in Moving Amendment to the Naval Aid Bill in the House of Commons on December 12th, 1912.

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The Memorandum prepared by the board of Admiralty on the General Naval Situation.—What it Discloses.

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Is there an Emergency?—Conflicting Opinions Examined in the Light of Facts.

---

Canada's position in Military and Naval Defence.—An Outline of Important Events.

---

The Real Emergency.—The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance and some of its Consequences.—How British Interests have been Sacrificed to Serve Party Ends.

---

Australia and New Zealand.—Methods of Naval Defence.—The Policies of other self-governing British Dominions and their bearing upon the Naval Controversy in Canada.

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Reasons by the Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden, M.P. in favor of a Canadian Naval Service and against a Contribution.

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On what grounds did Parliament Decide upon a Canadian Naval Service?—What were the views of Hon. George E. Foster who introduced the resolution?

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The Two Policies.—100 Reasons why the Laurier is Better than the Borden Policy.

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## LEAFLETS

Answers to Important Questions.—What have Australia and New Zealand done?

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Answers to Important Questions.—What are the views of the other self-governing Dominions of the British Empire?

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## IN PRINT

Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Leader of the Opposition, against the introduction of the Closure in the Canadian House of Commons, as proposed in a resolution moved by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden M.P., on April 9, 1913.

## **WHY THE LAURIER IS BETTER THAN THE BORDEN POLICY.**

1. The Borden policy is a policy of contribution.  
The Laurier policy is a policy of a Canadian Naval Service.
2. The Borden policy means centralization without control.  
The Laurier policy means co-operation with control.
3. The Borden policy, if carried, will be without 'moral effect,'  
being expressive only of coercion and a divided Canada.  
The Laurier policy, if carried, will have great moral effect  
being expressive of the will of the Canadian people  
as given unanimously by their representatives in  
Parliament and confirmed later at the polls.
4. The Borden policy means a departure from the unanimous  
resolution of the House of Commons of March 1909.  
The Laurier policy means the carrying out of that resolution.
5. The Borden policy means a departure from the plan approved by the British Admiralty at the Conference of June 1909.  
The Laurier policy means the carrying out of that plan.
6. The Borden policy means a failure to carry out the agreement reached with Australia and New Zealand at the Admiralty Conference of June 1909.  
The Laurier policy means the carrying out of that agreement.
7. The Borden policy means a failure to carry out the further plans approved by the Admiralty and the agreement reached with Australia at a Conference in London in June 1911.  
The Laurier policy means the carrying out of these plans and agreement.
8. The Borden policy means a failure to comply with the provisions of the Naval Service Act passed by the government of Canada May 1910 and now on the Statutes of Canada.  
The Laurier policy means the carrying out of the provisions of that Act.



9. The Borden policy is a hybrid policy, born of the Nationalist-Conservative alliance; a compromise policy to help unite the Nationalists and the imperial jingoes.

The Laurier policy is not the policy of any faction or group, but the policy unanimously adopted by both parties in Parliament.

10. The Borden policy is a reversal of the policy adopted since Confederation in the matter of defence, viz. the gradual assumption by Canada of a larger measure of self-defence.

The Laurier policy is in accordance with the policy all along pursued, and is merely an extension of the present policy of self defence from land to sea.

11. The Borden policy causes confusion as to what is to be the real policy in the future.

The Laurier policy leaves no room for future doubts.

12. The Borden policy makes it impossible for Canada to stop contributions and enter upon a naval service of her own, without appearing to be dissatisfied with the Mother country.

The Laurier policy creates no future embarrassments.

13. The Borden policy causes the placing by one government within the Empire of conditions upon another.

The Laurier policy avoids conditions.

14. The Borden policy is bound up with embarrassing and debatable schemes of representation on imperial councils, control of foreign policies, and the like.

The Laurier policy is free from entangling political complications.

15. The Borden policy precipitates Canada into a premature and ill-considered attempt to re-organize the Empire on some new system of Imperial federation.

The Laurier policy is the embodiment of every principle by which imperial unity and national autonomy have been built up.

16. The Borden policy is "the thin edge of the wedge".

The Laurier policy "leaves well enough alone".

17. The Borden policy makes for a divided Canada.  
The Laurier policy makes for a united Canada.
18. The Borden policy makes for a divided Empire.  
The Laurier policy makes for a united Empire.
19. The Borden policy will create dissensions within Canada and within the United Kingdom as to the allotment of funds and use made of ships.  
The Laurier policy avoids dissensions.
20. The Borden policy is a sensational departure from existing methods and as such is contrary to the Admiralty view as to what is best policy.  
The Laurier policy means steady development on a regular plan across a period of years, and as such is in accord with Admiralty view of what is best in naval policy.
21. The Borden policy will lead to strained relations between the Mother country and Canada should questions arise as to the use which Canadian contributions are being made to serve.  
The Laurier policy removes all possibility of friction by reserving to each part of the Empire the keeping of its own accounts and the management of its own affairs.
22. The Borden policy ignores the people.  
The Laurier policy recognizes the right of the electorate to be consulted.
23. The Borden policy is opposed to the wishes of the other self-governing Dominions.  
The Laurier policy is in accord with the views of the other Dominions as to what is best for the British Empire.
24. The Borden policy is an emergency policy.  
The Laurier policy is a permanent policy.
25. The Borden policy is an abandoned policy.  
The Laurier policy is an accepted policy.

26. The Borden policy is contrary to what experience has taught to be best,—Australia abandoned contribution for a Naval Service of her own. New Zealand is thinking of doing the same.

The Laurier policy is the same as the present Australian and the proposed New Zealand policies.

27. The Borden policy is contrary to the teachings of history, which shows that all Empires based on centralization have failed to endure.

The Laurier policy recognizes what history has taught, and affords a basis for the permanent development of the British Empire.

28. The Borden policy has divided public opinion in the United Kingdom, Canada and in all the self-governing Dominions.

The Laurier policy is founded on unanimous agreement.

29. The Borden policy is based on political expediency.

The Laurier policy is based on Canadian honour and patriotism.

30. The Borden policy breaks faith with Australia.

The Laurier policy keeps faith with everyone

31. The Borden policy necessitates a reversal by Mr. Borden and his followers of their former position.

The Laurier policy avoids all political contortions.

32. The Borden policy is an attempt to assist the "re-organizers" of the British Empire, and the "imperial fussers" to change the present constitution of the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions.

The Laurier policy is a recognition of the wisdom of allowing a natural evolution in the affairs of the British Empire.

33. The Borden policy condemns by implication Australians for assisting the Empire by building a navy of their own.

The Laurier policy casts no such invidious reflections upon a sister Dominion.



34. The Borden policy places Canada on a par with the Malay States.  
The Laurier policy retains for Canada her position as the premier self-governing Dominion.
35. The Borden policy must be abandoned sooner or later.  
The Laurier policy necessitates no change.
36. The Borden policy is the beginning of a series of contributions.  
The Laurier policy avoids tribute.
37. The Borden policy is based on false alarms.  
The Laurier policy is based on common sense.
38. The Borden policy is a policy which looks only to the Admiralty point of view.  
The Laurier policy considers first and foremost, how the ultimate strength and unity of the Empire can best be assured.
39. The Borden policy threatens British connection by the reimposition of control from across the sea.  
The Laurier policy cements British connection by furthering self-government.
40. The Borden policy is anti-Canadian and the methods taken to compel its adoption anti-British.  
The Laurier policy is in all respects in accord with Canadian sentiment and British practice.
41. The Borden policy looks to strengthening the Empire by ignoring Canadian needs.  
The Laurier policy by being true to Canada promotes the welfare of the Empire.
42. The Borden policy contemplates Canada becoming a province of the Empire.  
The Laurier policy means Canada remaining a self-governing Dominion.
43. The Borden policy is based on lack of faith in Canadians.  
The Laurier policy is founded on a belief in the country and its people.

44. The Borden policy typifies fear and incapacity.  
The Laurier policy typifies Canada.
45. The Borden policy is based on what Canada cannot do.  
The Laurier policy is based on what Canada can do.
46. The Borden policy means interference of Downing Street  
and British departmental officials in Canadian affairs.  
The Laurier policy avoids interference.
47. The Borden policy is contradictory throughout. A gift  
with ownership reserved to the giver. Relief to  
British tax-payers involving additional burdens upon  
them through manning and maintenance. Assistance  
coupled with the right of withdrawal of assistance.  
The Laurier policy is not contradictory in any respect.
48. The Borden policy renders Canada liable to unknown and  
indefinite future obligations. Every panic will be used  
to increase her contributions.  
The Laurier policy controls expenditure in accordance with  
the will of the people of Canada.
49. The Borden policy amounts to a world confession of want  
of confidence in Britain's Navy on the part of Canada.  
The Laurier policy is a declaration to the world of Canada's  
ability to cooperate with Britain in maintaining Naval  
supremacy.
50. The Borden policy is calculated to involve the New World  
in the racial animosities, prejudices and antipathies  
of the old.  
The Laurier policy avoids mixing up new world affairs  
with old world quarrels and prejudices.
51. The Borden policy means Canada's participation in Eu-  
ropean wars, without a voice in foreign policy.  
The Laurier policy means Canada's right to co-operate  
in defence of the Empire in accordance with the will  
of the Canadian Parliament.
52. The Borden policy is a challenge to Germany.  
The Laurier policy is a challenge to no one.

53. The Borden policy helps to provoke the kind of evil which nations should seek to avoid. By adding to European war equipment, it will tend to accelerate among European nations the insane race of battleship building. The Laurier policy causes no kind of competition, but enables Canada to effectively defend herself and aid in the defence of the Empire.
54. The Borden policy means the concentration of all power in the hands of a few and at one place. The Laurier policy means the establishing of new centres of strength.
55. The Borden policy means monopoly in all that pertains to naval defence. The Laurier policy means a distribution of the duty of defence.
56. The Borden policy tends to make Canada a dependent colony. The Laurier policy continues Canada as a self-respecting self-governing Dominion.
57. The Borden policy is the abnegation and abandonment of the functions of self-government with respect to naval defence. The Laurier policy is an assertion of the rights and duties of self-government.
58. The Borden policy ignores the immediate needs of Canada. The Laurier policy begins to meet these needs.
59. The Borden policy does nothing for the coast defence of Canada on the Atlantic or the Pacific. The Laurier policy establishes coast defence, and naval forces available to the Admiralty when required.
60. The Borden policy leaves the harbours, shipping ports, coast cities and terminals of transcontinental railway systems open to the attack of a third class cruiser. The Laurier policy provides protection for Canadian harbours, shipping ports, coast and railway terminal cities.



61. The Borden policy provides no special protection to Canadian trade routes or commerce.  
The Laurier policy provides special protection, and the necessary convoy to safeguard ships carrying provisions from Canada to Britain in time of need.
62. The Borden policy makes Canada dependent for her entire defence on the Mother Country, at such time as the Mother Country may be least able to render assistance.  
The Laurier policy relieves the Mother Country of anxiety for her greatest Dominion in time of stress.
63. The Borden policy makes Canada look always to the Mother Country for assistance.  
The Laurier policy enables the Mother Country to look to Canada for assistance.
64. The Borden policy means the acceptance in advance of what British diplomacy may do without any voice in shaping of policy.  
The Laurier policy means the right of the Parliament of Canada to be consulted on matters affecting the Dominion.
65. The Borden policy is a hiring of others to aid in defence.  
The Laurier policy is self-defence.
66. The Borden policy is a contribution of money only.  
The Laurier policy is a contribution of men and brains.
67. The Borden policy ignores service.  
The Laurier policy is service.
68. The Borden policy avoids duties as Canadians, whilst claiming rights as British subjects.  
The Laurier policy recognizes rights as Canadians with duties as British subjects.
69. The Borden policy takes no root in Canadian soil.  
The Laurier policy is a Canadian growth.

70. The Borden policy gives no expression to Canadian sentiment.  
The Laurier policy is the truest kind of Canadian expression.
71. The Borden policy leaves Canada no farther ahead as the years go by.  
The Laurier policy gives added strength and security to the Dominion year by year.
72. The Borden policy is the handing over to Great Britain of an important branch of Canadian administration.  
The Laurier policy means further development in administration by Canada.
73. The Borden policy destroys responsibility and self-reliance.  
The Laurier policy fosters the truest patriotism.
74. The Borden policy protects nothing.  
The Laurier policy protects both Canadian coasts and Canadian industry.
75. The Borden policy leads to nothing but further contributions.  
The Laurier policy may lead to Canada building ships for other parts of the Empire.
76. The Borden policy ignores Canadian opportunities and industries.  
The Laurier policy helps to establish in Canada a great ship-building industry and to develop the industries dependent on it.
77. The Borden policy does nothing for Canadian trade and commerce, but sends millions of dollars out of the country.  
The Laurier policy seeks to retain for circulation in Canada as much as possible of the money that may be needed for expenditure on Naval defence.

78. The Borden policy does nothing for Canadian capital, aids no industry, creates no demand for Canadian resources, or manufactures, but deprives the country of \$35,000,000 of its capital immediately, and additional sums later on.

The Laurier policy seeks to utilize Canadian resources, manufactures and material.

79. The Borden policy fosters the industries of the United Kingdom at the expense of those of Canada.

The Laurier policy builds up the industries of the Empire by establishing industries in Canada.

80. The Borden policy says what Australia, Argentina and Brazil have done, Canada cannot attempt.

The Laurier policy says whatever Canadians undertake they can successfully carry out.

81. The Borden policy does nothing for Canadian labour, but gives to the shipyards of the United Kingdom \$35,000,000 part at least of which might create a demand for Canadian labour, and add to the wages of workingmen. While it is \$35,000,000 to begin with, it may be \$350,000,000 before many years.

The Laurier policy is designed to help Canadian labour by furnishing an additional demand for labour, and an absolutely reliable source of payment of wages.

82. The Borden policy discourages immigration by placing orders for work abroad.

The Laurier policy induces immigration by affording new opportunities of employment in Canada.

83. The Borden policy affords no new career to Canadians.

The Laurier policy opens a new career to young Canadians, and a new occupation to those who like the sea.

84. The Borden policy deprives Canada of benefits which she ought to derive from assisting in defence.

The Laurier policy has regard for the necessities, aspirations and prospects of the Canadian people.



85. The Borden policy means irresponsible control.  
The Laurier policy means responsible control.
86. The Borden policy means expenditure without representation.  
The Laurier policy recognizes that expenditure and representation should go together.
87. The Borden policy means a parting with control over expenditure on Naval defence by the Parliament of Canada.  
The Laurier policy means retaining control by Parliament over Naval expenditure.
88. The Borden policy contemplates the use of Canada's property by those who are not responsible to, and cannot be called to account by, the representatives of the Canadian people.  
The Laurier policy recognizes the cardinal principle of responsible government, that the representatives of those who pay the taxes, must look to their proper expenditure.
89. The Borden policy is contrary to responsible self-government, and helps to destroy Canadian autonomy.  
The Laurier policy is based on the fundamental right of self-government, and responsibility of a ministry to the people for control of expenditure of funds raised from the taxes of the people.
90. The Borden policy in the minds of many is unconstitutional, going beyond the powers of the British North America Act.  
The Laurier policy permits of no doubt as to constitutionality.
91. The Borden policy places a wrong ideal before the Nation in that it aims at Canada outrivalling all the Nations of the world in the size of the battleships she owns; they are to be "the three most powerful battleships in the world".  
The Laurier policy is not a policy of international rivalry in battleship construction, but of Canadian co-operation in defence.

92. The Borden policy involves a moral wrong in that it compels the Canadian people to grant to persons not responsible to them, the right to use great engines of destruction as they see fit.

The Laurier policy retains a control by Canadians of their own property and responsibility for its uses.

93. The Borden policy contemplates Canadian ships visiting South America and parts of the world in no way connected with the British Empire without the sanction of the Canadian Government.

The Laurier policy retains to Canada a say as to the disposition of her property.

94. The Borden policy is for the purpose of "showing the flag" in all parts of the world.

The Laurier policy is to keep the flag flying continuously along Canadian coasts.

95. The Borden policy does not replace the ships which have been withdrawn from Canadian coast protection.

The Laurier policy fills up the gaps.

96. The Borden policy places no ships in Canadian waters except as visitors.

The Laurier policy definitely and directly secures the presence of Canadian ships in Canadian waters for the defence of Canadian coasts.

97. The Borden policy affords no protection against the Asiatic menace.

The Laurier policy affords adequate protection to British Columbia and Western Canada and enables Canada to assist in the maintenance of the British Naval power in the Pacific.

98. The Borden Policy makes Canada dependent on the Royal Australian Navy.

The Laurier policy will permit of co-operation between Australia and Canada in the defence of the Pacific.

99. The Borden policy draws Canada into the vortex of European militarism.

The Laurier policy avoids European entanglements.

100. The Borden policy is not based on any mandate from the people.

The Laurier policy is in accordance with the will of the people.—“The will of the people must prevail, but I believe it will affirm what Parliament with unanimous voice has declared.” (Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden, M.P. in an address on the naval question before the Centre and South Toronto Conservative Clubs, November 1, 1910.)

Copies of this pamphlet may be had on applying to the  
Central Liberal Information Office, Ottawa, Canada.





# CANADA AND THE NAVY

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## ANSWERS TO IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

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### WHAT HAVE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND DONE ?

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#### Which Policy Should Canada Adopt ?

**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for three dreadnoughts as part of a permanent policy of centralization and contribution.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons, of March 1909.

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1913

Leaflet No. 1.

## **Question—**

### **What have Australia and New Zealand done?**

## **Answer—**

Australia has established a naval service of her own. New Zealand pays for her defence by contributions to the British Admiralty.

Australia's present policy is the policy advocated by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberals for Canada and is the same as the policy outlined in the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 1909, as the one Canada should adopt.

New Zealand's present policy is similar to the policy advocated by Mr. Borden and the Conservatives, but New Zealand's policy is better designed for the protection of coasts and trade routes than is Mr. Borden's.

Australia at one time paid for her defence by contributions but found this unsatisfactory, and decided to abandon the policy of contribution for a policy of a Naval service of her own.

Both Australia and New Zealand were paying by their contributions for ships to be used in the defence of Australia and New Zealand, and stationed in or near their waters, but these payments were only part of the expense of protecting their coasts. England had to pay out large sums in addition on ships and sailors to be kept stationed in the waters of Australia and New Zealand, and is still helping Australia and New Zealand in the defence of their own coasts. In addition, they share in common with Canada and the rest of the British Dominions, the general protection afforded by the British Navy wherever it may be.

There are no British ships in Canadian waters or near Canadian coasts, and England is not today paying out money for the defence of Canadian coasts. She did some years ago, but withdrew her ships from the Halifax Atlantic station in 1906 and the Esquimaux Pacific station in 1910, just as years before she withdrew the garrisons from Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg and Esquimaux. Canada replaced these garrisons by troops of her own, the Liberal policy is to do the same with the ships, the Conservative policy is to pay contributions to the British Admiralty beginning with \$35,000,000.

Contributions began in 1887 when Australia and New Zealand agreed to pay £126,000 per annum for five cruisers and two torpedo boats to be added by the British Government to the ships already in Australian waters. These ships were to be placed "within the limits of the Australian stations" and not to be removed except "with the consent of the Colonial government". In 1903 the amount of the contribution was raised to £240,000 per annum. It was an agreement for defence, so many ships for so much money.



In 1907 at the Colonial Conference in England **Mr. Deaken** the **Prime Minister of Australia** told the British government that the policy of contribution had proven a failure, and had given satisfaction neither to the Admiralty nor the Commonwealth.

In 1909, Australia decided to stop contributing and to enter on the organization of a Naval service of her own.

Australia undertook to begin a Naval service of her own at an Imperial Defence Conference held in London in 1909. At this Conference **Canada** also undertook, carrying out the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 29th of that year, to begin a Naval service of her own. The British Admiralty and government approved of this plan, and saw no difficulties in the way of it being carried out.

Australia has pretty well completed her Naval service as originally undertaken, and has since made plans extending over twenty-three years for the enlargement of it.

On September 19th, 1911 His Majesty King George V, conferred on the Australian service the title of "Royal" and it is now known as "The Royal Australian Navy".

Canada made a good beginning with her service, having established a government department of Naval Service, purchased training ships, opened a Naval college, and called for tenders for the construction of the necessary ships. But for the elections of September 1911, contracts would have been nearly completed by now. The tenders submitted were from several of the best firms in the world, and all were for the building of the ships in Canada.

The Australian Act was passed November 25th, 1910, and is known as the **Naval Defence Act 1910**.

The Canadian Act was passed March 4th, 1910 and is known as the **Naval Service Act 1910**.

New Zealand undertook the construction of a dreadnought in 1909, this ship to be part of the Royal Navy, but the Act which provided for this, contained the stipulation that it was for "the defence of your Majesty's Dominions," and it was understood it was to belong to squadrons composed of other ships owned by England but stationed in or near New Zealand waters. New Zealand has since agreed that this Dreadnought may remain in the North Sea, but care has been taken to see that Britain at her expense maintains a much larger equivalent in the way of ships for defence of New Zealand in and about New Zealand waters.

Australia and New Zealand have never raised any question about having a voice in the issues that shape peace or war in the Empire. They have been content to look after the defence of their own part of the Empire. Australia began by paying for her defence by contribution, now she has a Naval service of her own. New Zealand pays for her defence by contribution.

**Australia and New Zealand have seen no need of an "emergency policy" each has adopted a permanent policy for its own defence, Australia a permanent policy of Naval service, New Zealand a permanent policy of contribution.**

**Australia has not been regarded as disloyal or wanting independence or separation from England in starting a Naval service of her own. Why should any such motive be attributed to Canada?**

**Australia has been able to organize a Naval service and is progressing with the manning and maintaining of it. Why should not Canada be able to do the same. Australia, at the last census, had a population of 4,918,707, Canada, a population of 7,204,838. Canada is larger in extent of territory, resources, money, men, and experience. Will it be said that what Australia can do successfully, Canada cannot do?**

**Australia entered upon her Naval service on the understanding Canada would do the same, does not Canada owe something in the way of keeping faith with a sister Dominion?**

**Mr. Borden in 1910 strongly endorsed the Australian policy of a Naval service, and condemned the policy of contribution which he rightly said had proven a failure in Australia. Why does he change? The Nationalists and the Jingo Imperialists are the explanation.**

**The Admiralty Memorandum of November 1912 says Great Britain could without courting disaster at home send ships "to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand."**

**Is it not about time Canadians should commence a "Royal Canadian Navy" when the British Admiralty tell them that they are dependent on "The Royal Australian Navy" for the defence of one of their Provinces?**

**What has become of Canada as the first of the Dominions, when she has to look to a sister Dominion for her defence?**

**If a Naval service of her own has proven better to Australia, than a policy of contribution is the same not likely to be true of Canada as well?**

**Will Canadians say that what Australia has been able to do in less than four years, Canada is unable to undertake?**

**For a detailed account of what Australia and New Zealand have done the reader is referred to pamphlet No. 9, entitled "Australia and New Zealand, methods of Defence."**

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**Copies of this leaflet and pamphlet No. 9 may be had on applying to the Central Liberal Information Office, Ottawa, Canada.**

# CANADA AND THE NAVY

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## ANSWERS TO IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

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# What are the Views of the Other Self-Governing Dominions of the British Empire?

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### WHICH POLICY SHOULD CANADA ADOPT?

**THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY**—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 on three dreadnoughts as part of a permanent policy of centralization and contribution.

**THE LIBERAL POLICY**—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office  
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(Leaflet No. 2)



## **QUESTION—What are the views of the other self-governing Dominions of the British Empire?**

### **ANSWER—**

The debate in the Canadian House of Commons on Mr. Borden's proposed contribution of an expenditure of \$35,000,000 for 3 battleships to be at the disposition of the British Admiralty, has caused other outlying Dominions of the British Empire to ask whether a deliberate attempt at centralization is not being made and whether behind Mr. Borden's proposals the real object is not to deprive the self-governing Dominions of the right of establishing naval services of their own in co-operation with the other naval forces of the Empire.

Mr. Borden's words in the House of Commons on Feby. 27th have occasioned alarm to all the self-governing Dominions and the impression is becoming general that Mr. Borden is really acting on behalf of a group of Empire reorganizers, and that the Liberal party in Canada, in fighting to have a Canadian Naval Service established instead of the adoption of a policy of contribution, is championing the cause of all the self-governing Dominions. One phrase in particular in Mr. Borden's speech has given rise to serious misgivings. "We say that if we are to remain an Empire, we cannot have five foreign policies and five separate navies". This each one of the self-governing Dominions has taken as an attack upon autonomy and self-government.

Nothing could be clearer and more fearless than the utterances of the leading Statesmen of the outlying Dominions in protest against a scheme of centralization which affects all alike.

### **AUSTRALIA PROTESTS AGAINST BORDEN'S PLAN OF CENTRALIZATION AND CONTRIBUTION**

Sir George Reid, High Commissioner of Australia, in the course of a speech before a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute in London on March 11th expressed the opinion that the Australian policy of having its own naval service, operating in conjunction with the British fleet, was an example that must be eventually followed by all self-governing Dominions.

On March 2nd Lord Denman, the Governor General of Australia, opened a naval college at Geelong, Australia. In declaring the Institute opened, the Governor General stated that the occasion afforded a further proof that the Australian people intend to own and man their own war ships in an effort to carry out the programme laid down for them by the British Admiralty at a recent Conference.

Senator Pearce, the Australian Minister of Defence, on the same occasion said that the Australian government had its mind made up that while building its navy it would not confine its efforts to building ships alone, it was fully realized that the country should also undertake to man as well as build them. He declared that Australia was doing her utmost to add a new centre of strength to the British Empire.

On Feb. 26 the Australian Commonwealth authorities in London issued the text of an important statement made by Senator Pearce, the Australian Minister of Defence, in which the Minister refers to the decisions arrived at during the Conference of 1909 when **Canada and Australia each agreed to organize naval services of their own, and points out that the Australian agreement is the only one that has been carried out.** He says that **the Australian scheme for a fleet unit did not originate with the Australian government of the day, but with the British Admiralty.** The Minister of defence concludes, "our policy is known and has the approval of the admiralty. We are **hopeful the three countries may yet fall into line** for the purpose of promoting unity of action."

### **NEW ZEALAND PROTESTS AGAINST BORDEN'S PLAN OF CENTRALIZATION AND CONTRIBUTION**

**Hon. Col. Allen, Minister of Defence for New Zealand, gave expression to the New Zealand point of view, at a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association in London, March 13th, at which he said that the payment of a naval subsidy would not, in the long run, appeal to the Dominion sentiment of patriotism.** A permanent policy was needed, but this could hardly be said to exist under the Canadian (i.e. Borden) or New Zealand Schemes. They needed a permanent policy and one which would endure. **What they wanted was a living thing in which the Dominions would have a vital interest.** It did not matter so much for the moment where Dreadnoughts were built; that could be arranged as conditions developed in the future. What did matter was that it should be realized that **the Dominions would not be content with merely putting their hands into their pockets.**

**The Dominions must have the opportunity of doing their duty towards the personnel of the fleet and manning the Empire's ships at sea.** They must be prepared to help, not only the Imperial fleet with material, but **they must have an interest in the operations of the fleet itself.**

Views similar to those of the Australian Minister of Defence were given expression to by **Sir Joseph Ward, the former Prime Minister of New Zealand.** In an address before the meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute at which Sir George Reid spoke, Sir Joseph Ward said he agreed with Sir George that **"It was impossible that any self-governing dominion would consent to return to the old system of government under central authority."**

### **SOUTH AFRICA PROTESTS AGAINST BORDEN'S PLAN OF CENTRALIZATION AND CONTRIBUTION**

**The views of South Africa were clearly set forth in the House of Assembly at Cape Town on March 4th** when Major Silburn moved that the government should consider the advisability of submitting without delay proposals to the House for a contribution annually by the Union of South Africa to the British Navy. **General Botha the Prime Minister objected to this resolution and stated that it was impossible to bind South Africa to an annual contribution, which**

would not be the best form of assistance to the Imperial Government. He thought that possibly South Africa might wish to have a small navy in its own waters, and if they went on those lines they would see good effects.

Mr. Merriman, a leading member of the Assembly, in the course of the same debate stated that he thought Canada had embarked on a dangerous course in having a Minister residing in London who was to be a sort of partner to be dragged into the policy of Great Britain and its warlike enterprises. He could not imagine a more mad and insensate policy for a young country.

### **IMPERIAL UNITY AND LOCAL AUTONOMY MUST GO TOGETHER.**

While the self-governing Dominions have given expression in this frank and open manner to their opposition to any policy of contribution based upon an idea of centralization in naval affairs, they have not deemed it necessary to assert that their loyalty to the British Empire could not be challenged. As a matter of fact, with the growth of self-government, the self-governing Dominions have become more strongly attached to the British Crown. Imperial unity and local autonomy have gone together.

The Rt. Hon. James Bryce, British Ambassador at Washington, made this very plain in a speech before the Canadian Club at Ottawa on March 9th in which referring to his recent visits to New Zealand and Australia, he said, "Both in Australia and New Zealand there has been of late years a very marked, palpable growth of the sentiment of Imperial unity. The spirit of Imperial unity which prevails in Australia and New Zealand has taken shape there, as it has here, in the desire to make arrangements for common defence with the United Kingdom, and there also they are considering what they will do for co-operation with the Imperial navy."

The real question at issue in Canada today is whether the British Empire is to be strengthened by Canada's adhering to the policy of self-government by the adoption of a naval service of her own, or whether Canada by entering upon a policy of contribution is to adopt a course opposed to that which all the other self-governing Dominions regard as best, and which is certain to lead to strained relations between this Dominion and the mother country,

British subjects who love Canada and the British Empire will do their utmost to see that the policy which Canada adopts is the one unanimously agreed to by both political parties in the Canadian parliament in March, 1909; a policy which is endorsed by the other self-governing Dominions; a policy which demands the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service."

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# **Freedom of Debate and Liberty of Public Discussion**

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## **S P E E C H**

BY

**The Rt. Honourable Sir Wilfrid Laurier**

**P.C., G.C.M.G., M.P.**

**(Leader of the Opposition)**

### **Against the Introduction of The Closure in the House of Commons of Canada**

As proposed in a Resolution moved by the Prime Minister,  
the Rt. Honourable R. L. Borden, M.P., on April 9th, 1913;  
together with a brief account of the manner in which this  
obnoxious measure was introduced.

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## **The Introduction of the Closure in the Canadian House of Commons.**

On April 9th, the Rt. Hon. R. L. Borden, M. P., introduced in the House of Commons amendments to the rules of the House for the purpose of limiting the freedom of debate and public discussion by a process commonly referred to as "the closure," "the gag" and "the guillotine". Drastic and objectionable as were the proposed amendments, the method by which it was sought to have these measures forced upon the Opposition surpassed for arbitrary and hypocritical procedure, any incident known to the Canadian Parliament. In a speech glittering with professions of fair play, the Prime Minister assured the members of the House that in his mind, and in the purpose of the government, there was no desire to curtail the liberty of speech and the freedom of debate, no intention "to take away from any honourable gentleman on the other side of the House any legitimate right he now possesses".

### **The Rt. Hon. Mr. Borden's Professions and Practice Compared.**

"No one is more ready than I to acknowledge that liberty of speech and freedom of debate must be preserved" was the way in which Mr. Borden began his speech in support of the amendments he was proposing; and "my honourable friends are very suspicious; I think they should be prepared to accept my word in the matter" was the manner in which he sought to remove all doubts as he proceeded. Replying to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's observation on behalf of the Opposition that the amendments meant the "holding a terror" above their heads, Mr. Borden spoke words so fair that it is almost inconceivable they could have been uttered by one who had in his breast at the time the guilty knowledge of the betrayal of these professions which was so quickly to follow. Speaking as the Prime Minister from his seat in Parliament, "Not at all", he said to Sir Wilfrid, "that is not the way in which I would desire to exercise a power of this kind. I would think that if this rule passes, things might go on in future just as they have in the past. I would always ask my right honourable friend what length of time he desired to conclude any particular debate, and I would hope that in future we would be able, as we have been in the past, to come to some conclusion without invoking these rules. I would hope that would be the case. I am not disposed, as I think even my honourable friends on the other side of the House will admit, to use unfairly any power that I might possess. I would think that any reasonable doubt as to the time within which a debate should be concluded ought to be resolved in favour of the minority. I will go so far as to say that the object of bringing these rules into force is not for the purpose of repressing the minority or taking away the right of liberty of speech, but purely for the one overmastering reason, namely, that the Parliament of Canada may not become a byword and a reproach, and that it may be able to transact public business".

This not sufficient, Mr. Borden added, "The rules that are put in force must of course, be exercised prudently and fairly. It would not be to the interest of any government to exercise them unfairly.

. . . . . I can only say that I commend the rules to the consideration and approval of honourable gentlemen on both sides of the House in the full conviction that they have been drawn up in such a way, and with such provisos and safeguards, that honourable gentlemen on the other side of the House will be absolutely secured of their full rights of speech with regard to any public measure that may be presented for the consideration of this Parliament. . . . . All that we desire—and I speak in the most absolute sincerity to honourable gentlemen opposite—is to bring about such conditions as will permit to each and every one of them all reasonable freedom of debate, and at the same time permit the government and the majority in this House to go on in a reasonable way with the public business of the country."

The echo of these words was still to be heard in the chamber of the House of Commons when Sir Wilfrid Laurier, rising as Leader of the Opposition to speak in reply to Mr. Borden, was denied the constitutional right, the time honoured and most universally conceded privilege of answering the Prime Minister and of conveying to Parliament the views of the Opposition with respect to a public measure of first importance and of grave national concern. In this particular instance it so happened that the measure was one more important and far reaching in its possible effects than any introduced in the House since Confederation. The first vote to deny this right to Sir Wilfrid Laurier was cast by Mr. Borden himself, and the method taken was such as to make it impossible to believe that there was not intended by it, with the knowledge, consent and active participation of the Prime Minister, a studied insult to the veteran Statesman who today is the oldest member of the Canadian House of Commons, and who for over 25 years as the leader of the Liberal party in Canada has been the most chivalrous of opponents, and for fifteen years as Prime Minister of the Dominion, the most distinguished figure in Canadian public life.

### **How Sir Wilfrid Laurier was Prevented from Replying to Mr. Borden.**

The pre-arranged plan as carried out was as follows: Mr. Borden having concluded his speech, Sir Wilfrid immediately rose to reply; Mr. Hazen, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries rose at the same time. The Speaker, following the custom of Parliament, recognized Sir Wilfrid, who was proceeding with his speech, when members of parliament on the Conservative side of the House began pounding their desks with a view of making it impossible for Sir Wilfrid to be heard and of attracting the Speaker's attention to the circumstance that Mr. Hazen was also standing. The Speaker, whose duty it is to preserve order, was obliged to rise and inform the House as to who, according to his judgment, had the floor and the right to speak; this he did in the following words: "The Honourable member for East Quebec, (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) is accorded the floor." No sooner was this said than Mr. W. B. Northrup, Conservative



member for West Hastings, rose from his seat and drew from his pocket a resolution prepared in advance. This produced a storm of protest from the Liberals. As soon as quiet could be restored, Mr. Northrup proceeded to read aloud. The resolution was for the purpose of enabling the House to take a vote to prevent Sir Wilfrid Laurier, notwithstanding that the Speaker had accorded him the right, from speaking. Never before in the history of the Canadian Parliament has a resolution under the rule cited been presented. The proceedings as recorded in *Hansard* are as follows:—

“Mr. W. B. NORTHRUP (Hastings East): I rise under rule 17, Mr. Speaker, which rule, if I may be allowed to read it to the House, is as follows:(\*)

“When two or more members rise to speak, Mr. Speaker calls upon the member who first rose in his place; but a motion may be made that any member who has risen ‘be now heard’ or ‘do now speak’, which motion shall be forthwith put without debate.

“Under that rule of the House, I beg to move, seconded by Mr. Blain, member for Peel:

“That the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, being the member for the city and county of St. John, be now heard.

“SOME HON. MEMBERS: Shame.

“SIR WILFRID LAURIER: When you have got a majority in this House, that is what we have to expect from you—shame.”

A moment later Sir Wilfrid rose to a point of order, stating that the motion as presented was not correct, that it should state that he as well as the Minister of Marine and Fisheries had risen. Mr. Borden at once intervened to prevent this fact being recorded saying “The motion is precisely in the form provided by rule 17.” The Speaker following the wish of the Prime Minister refused to consider any amending of Mr. Northrup’s motion, and the members

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\*A persistent effort has been made by the Conservative press to have it appear that Sir Wilfrid Laurier while Prime Minister was responsible for the introduction of Rule 17 which gives to any member of the House the right to demand that in the event of two members rising at the same time, a vote shall be taken to ascertain which of the two shall be heard. This allegation is wholly without foundation and an absolute misrepresentation of the facts. The rule has been one of the rules of the House ever since Confederation, but has never been made use of. The Speaker’s ruling has always been regarded as sufficient. Moreover, it is impossible to conceive that it was ever contemplated by those who framed this rule that it would be used as a means of destroying the universally conceded custom of affording to the Leader of the Opposition the right of reply to the Leader of the Government in regard to any measure of public importance. Sir John Bourinot who is the leading authority on procedure in the Canadian Parliament says: “It is usual to allow priority to members of the Administration who wish to speak, and in all important debates it is customary for the Speaker to endeavour to give the preference alternately to the known supporters and opponents of a measure or question; AND IT IS IRREGULAR TO INTERFERE WITH THE SPEAKER’S CALL IN FAVOUR OF ANY OTHER MEMBER.”

When in 1906, the rules of the House of Commons were revised, there was added to rule 17 the words, “which motion shall be forthwith put without debate”. This is the only change for which Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s government was responsible. It will be seen that this amendment relates to the method by which a motion shall be decided, but has nothing whatever to do with the motion itself. What the Liberals in Parliament objected to was not that the motion to give the floor to Mr. Hazen was put without debate, but that it was presented at all. In other words, that a rule which was intended as a means of enabling the House to decide as to which of two members should be heard where the House objected to the Speaker’s ruling, should have been made an instrument to destroy the accepted usage of Parliament of the Leader of the Opposition being accorded the right of following the Leader of the government.

were called upon to vote as to whether or not Mr. Hazen should be allowed to speak instead of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and this, as already mentioned, notwithstanding the fact that the Speaker under the rule of the House that "when two or more members rise to speak, Mr. Speaker calls upon the member who first rose in his place" had already accorded the right to Sir Wilfrid. Mr. Borden was the first to vote, and his vote was in favour of giving the floor to Mr. Hazen and of denying the right of speaking to Sir Wilfrid. Mr. Borden's example was followed by every Conservative member present and every Nationalist with the exception of one..

### **How Amendments to the Government's Drastic Proposals were Arbitrarily prevented.**

Having by the brute force of their majority made it impossible for Sir Wilfrid Laurier to speak, Mr. Hazen, then, on behalf of Mr. Borden and his followers in the House presented a motion which has only been made on three occasions since Confederation. This motion was intended to make it impossible for any one, Sir Wilfrid or even Mr. Borden himself, to amend in any particular, the drastic changes proposed and of limiting all discussion upon them. This purpose was carried out by Mr. Hazen moving, seconded by Mr. Cochrane, the Minister of Railways and Canals what is technically called "the previous question", namely, that "this question be now put", the effect of which is to make all amendments impossible.

As the rules of the House can be amended simply by the adoption of a resolution, without any second or third reading, or discussion in Committee as is the case in the passage of a Bill through the House, and further, as the Senate has no rights or powers in the matter, one way or the other, it will be seen that no more arbitrary or brutal course could have been taken by a government to prevent discussion on a measure which involves the whole question of the liberties of Parliament as respects freedom in debate and the right of free speech. Yet all this, as is now quite plain, was carefully worked out by Mr. Borden and his colleagues in advance. Mr. Borden was to talk "fair play", Mr. Hazen was to rise when Sir Wilfrid rose, so that the Speaker would have to choose between them, Mr. Northrup was to have a written motion in his pocket, and his authorities lying open on his desk before him, Mr. Borden was to give the lead in favour of gagging Sir Wilfrid by being the first to rise and cast his vote against Sir Wilfrid being heard, the other Ministers of the Cabinet were to do likewise, and every member of the party, under pressure of what would happen if he dared to do other than follow the leaders, was to do the same, and the Nationalist allies were to be duly brought into line. By the sheer circumstance of brute majority secured in this way, Sir Wilfrid was to be prevented from speaking, until the motion was carried, precluding the possibility of any amendment. Mr. Hazen, with the privilege to speak secured, was to move that 'the question be now put' so that all right of moving amendments shut off, the party by its force of numbers might jam the closure through, denying thereby to the people of Canada the dearest of their liberties as British subjects, the right of free discussion through their representatives in Parliament on matters pertaining to the public weal.

The plan was carried out to the letter, rules devised to secure the freedom of Parliament were forged into weapons to prevent debate, the most sacred precedents were set at nought, the high office of Speaker was made the pivot of a political machine, and this desecration of dignity and right and honour, was carried out by the Prime Minister in the name of "fair play", the security of "the full rights of speech" and "the reasonable freedom of debate". Little wonder that Sir Wilfrid Laurier, speaking later in the day after the motion preventing him from moving an amendment had been adopted should have been led to exclaim, "We are in the minority; we can be gagged; we can be prevented from expressing our opinions: they can trample upon our rights. But, Sir, the day of reckoning will come, and it will come as soon as we have a dissolution of the present Parliament".

The full text of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's speech on this occasion is as follows:—

## **SIR WILFRID LAURIER'S SPEECH.**

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: The spectacle of which we were witnesses when the right hon. Prime Minister concluded his remarks and placed in your hands, Mr. Speaker, the motion now before the House, was a very apposite commentary upon the speech of my right hon. friend. All through that speech the right hon. gentleman stated and reiterated that the object of the Government in proposing this new resolution was not to impede in any way the freedom of debate or to prevent free discussion, but simply to avoid the abuse of it. My right hon. friend was profuse of declarations that the minority, when these rules have been adopted, can always rely upon fair play; but the words were scarcely out of his lips when we were brought to realize how much fair play we may expect at the hands of hon. gentlemen opposite.

### **Constitutional Rights and Privileges Ignored.**

By the unwritten law of Parliament, not to speak of the courtesy which generally prevails between the two sides of the House, it is expected that when the Prime Minister brings an important measure to the consideration of the House, the Opposition, by its leader, shall be allowed to present the views which are entertained on the other side. Firmly entertaining that impression, I rose to my feet; but great was my surprise when I saw the Minister of Marine and Fisheries (Mr. Hazen) had risen at the same time. You saw him, Mr. Speaker, and you saw me, and, in the exercise of that authority which belongs to your office, in the exercise of that fair play which had been promised us not five minutes before, you called on me, as Leader of the Opposition to take the floor. And, I presume, still exercising that fair play which we were promised by the leader of the Government in introducing these rules, the hon. member for East Hastings (Mr. Northrup) asked the House to take from me the privilege which was mine by constitutional



right, and to give it to a member of the Government. And, Sir, every member of the House on that side, including the right hon. gentleman who had only a few moments before promised fair play, rose to impose a gag upon me, and to prevent me from expressing the views of the Opposition with regard to this very important question. When I saw my hon. friend the Minister of Marine and Fisheries rising and insisting upon his right to speak, I concluded that he had some great announcement or some important deliverance to make upon this question. But no; he had not a word to say, but to apply closure in anticipation by moving the previous question. What does this mean? What is the conclusion?

Some hon. MEMBERS. Oh, oh.

Other hon. MEMBERS. Laugh, laugh.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Sir, it means this: closure in anticipation. I had a motion ready to move in amendment; I cannot move it now—

Some hon. MEMBERS. Oh, oh.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER:—And, by the cheers of the gentlemen who know that I am precluded from moving that motion, I see what measure of fair play we have henceforth to expect.

### **The Rules of Parliament Destroyed.**

Sir, my right hon. friend when he rose to speak, was tumultuously cheered by his friends. These plaudits I thought a tribute of the loyalty of his followers to their leader, and so I thought they were quite in order; but, I reflected that, considering the motion which he had to make and the mission which he had imposed upon himself, perhaps it would have been better taste if he had been allowed to proceed in silence. I understand those plaudits better now after beholding the spectacle which closed his speech. There is some reason to believe that my right hon. friend had no particular relish for the task which he had set for himself, the task of gagging free speech. But my right hon. friend must proceed, whether he relishes it or not. He is like the person in the French novel who said: 'I must follow them, since I am their leader'! I understand now that the plaudits and cheers were meant to urge him upon a most uncongenial task. Because the task which my right hon. friend imposed upon himself this day was not to improve the rules of the Polish Diet. The task which he set himself to accomplish, and which the majority will accomplish, I have no doubt, was simply to put a gag upon the rules which we in this House have looked upon almost as sacred, and which have come to us from the Mother of Parliaments. These rules were not made in a day; they are the embodiment of the wisdom of many generations of statesmen and the result of the experience of men whose whole life was devoted to the public welfare, and who brought British institutions to the degree of excellency which they had reached at the time Confederation was established.

We have heard it stated that these rules are antiquated. I do not admit that at all. These rules are not antiquated. They were not made for a day or for a period; they were made for the ages.

It can be said of them, as has been said of the maxims of civil law which have come to us from the Roman jurists, and which are the basis of the civil law of most of the nations of Europe, that they are reason crystallized into writing. The maxims of the civil law have been applied to the relations of the people in daily life, and the maxims of our parliamentary procedure have been accepted as the duties of the transaction of business in all deliberative assemblies.

Sir, these rules are to be swept away, they are to be ridden over rough shod; they are to be put aside, and we are to have the gag substituted for them. And what is the pretence? The pretence is that there has been obstruction in the House. Sir, if obstruction be a fault, if obstruction be an offence, I call upon the man on that side of the House who is without guilt to cast the first stone. I read in some Conservative newspapers that obstruction was the murderer of parliamentary government. I do not here now challenge the statement; but if obstruction be the murderer of parliamentary government, the murderers are on that side of the House, and not on this. My right hon. friend has experience, and he will experience still more, that as you sow, so shall you reap; and Sir, it does not lie in his mouth or in the mouth of his followers to say that there has been obstruction in this House by the parliamentary minority.

### **The Effect of Closure.**

My right hon. friend, as usual, has attempted to justify his course by opinions of Liberal newspapers and Liberal members of Parliament. True it is that in the party to which I belong there are men who were in favour of closure, just as in the party of my right hon. friend there are men who were opposed to closure. My right hon. friend has quoted with great relish the opinions of the Toronto Globe and the Manitoba Free Press. I do not observe that he has quoted the opinion of the Ottawa Citizen. If he had prolonged his investigations and pursued them in the press of his own friends, he would have found something which perhaps would have induced him to act differently, because in the Citizen of to-day I find in the course of an article of one column in length directed against closure, these words:

‘The closure will not better matters in the least, it will pass the Bill, but a Bill which will represent \$35,000,000 plus bitterness, plus protest, plus division’.

It is true that in these matters there may be divided opinions. My right hon. friend has quoted the opinions of some friends of myself. But, Sir, I also have the honour to belong to the great Liberal party of Canada. I have occupied a position of some importance in it; nay, I may say that for twenty years and more I have been entrusted with its chief command. During the fifteen years I was in office it sometimes happened that friends came to me and told me that I was not doing justice to myself or to the party, but that I should impose closure, as had been done in many other parliaments. Sir, I am a Liberal of the old school; I have been brought up in the school of Fox and of the old leaders of the Liberal party; and I could not bring myself to the point of depriving a

minority in Parliament of such a valuable weapon as it would be deprived of by the introduction of closure. Perhaps I was wrong; perhaps I was too generous. Nay, I was not; I would rather stand here to-day, having refused, after the fifteen years of my administration, to impose closure, and having decided to abide by the old rules. The rules of the House are intended to apply to the discharge of the duties which the House owes to the country, and to the Sovereign. The first business of the Government, the first business of Parliament, the first business of every member of this House, whether he sits on this side of the Speaker's chair, or on the other side, is to carry on the King's Government.

### **The Government and not the Opposition Responsible for Delay in Business of Parliament.**

It has been charged against us that we have delayed the business of the House, that we have prevented it from going on. Sir, I deny the charge altogether; there is not a word of foundation for it. If the business of the House is not more advanced than it is, the fault cannot be laid at our door, but at the door of the other side. It is quite true that when we came to the first of April, Supply had not been voted, and the financial year was at an end; but if Supply had not been voted before that, whose fault was it? Was it that Supply was demanded and was refused?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Everybody knows that each time Supply was demanded, we granted it without hesitation. Everybody knows that when my right hon. friend came to me and asked for a vote on account, I agreed without any hesitation and with unstinted hand, perhaps too unstinted indeed. Everybody knows that whenever a measure of public importance was brought to our attention we gave it our best consideration, and it was passed. When the Bill for the renewal of the bank charters was brought to our attention, there was not a word said on our side to oppose it. We discussed it fairly; we discussed it completely, but we offered no obstruction to it. When the Bill to ratify the Japanese treaty was introduced, there was not a word on our side which went to oppose the passage of that Bill. And so it has been with every measure. It is true, Sir, that we oppose a certain measure. It is true that we opposed their Bill for naval aid. We did that with all the might at our command; we did it with all the means at our command under the rules of the House. Am I to be told that in exercise of this power of strenuous opposition we did anything which is not in accordance with the best traditions of parliamentary government? Sir, at all times in this House, at all times in the Mother of Parliaments, there have been questions upon which the minority thought it owed it to themselves to offer the most vigorous opposition possible. Under the rules of the House it is expected that the two sides of the House shall carry on the business, as was stated by my right hon. friend to-day, and so it is generally; but there are occasions, I repeat, when an opposition or a minority owes it to itself, on account of the strong views it holds upon some public measure, to oppose that measure with all the force at its command.



## When Obstruction is and is not Justifiable.

This is not a modern doctrine. This doctrine has been in force at all times in the British House of Commons. It goes back to the days of Charles I; the books are full of references to it. The leaders of the House in the time of Charles I, in the struggle against the King to uphold the constitutional rights of the people of England, presented to the King what they called the Grand Remonstrance, and the presentation of the Grand Remonstrance was opposed all night by some members until, it is stated in the books, the House looked like a starved jury. That was an occasion when obstruction failed of its purpose. On another occasion, in 1771, the majority of the House did not want to allow the publication of the debates. That strange position was opposed by a majority headed by no less a man than Edmund Burke, and Burke by whole days of obstruction succeeded in defeating the object of the majority, and as he himself said afterwards, 'posterity will bless the pertinacity of that day'. On that occasion the obstruction was successful. Later on, in 1831, at the time of the passage of the first Reform Bill, the Tories of that day, the strong and unbending Tories of that day, opposed the Bill with all the vigor that they could command, but they had to succumb. On that occasion obstruction did not succeed. Later on, in 1833, Daniel O'Connell availed himself

'On the very day of the introduction of the Bill—'

That was, Earl Grey's Irish Coercion Bill—

'—of the antiquated expedient of a call of the House, with the intention of delaying the proceedings. The first reading of the Bill occupied several sittings, the Irish members having threatened to take refuge in repeated formal motions for adjournment if any attempt was made to close the discussion prematurely'.

This was repeated in 1843. Then, we come to the year 1881, when, as we know, the Irish members resorted to obstruction under the direction of Parnell, in order to obtain long-sought satisfaction for Ireland. Sir, there is no man in this House, I am sure—nay, the man who is most devoted to British interests, the greatest admirer of England, must admit that if there is a page in British history which he would like to have erased, it would be the dealing of England with Ireland. That has been the only black page in modern British history. But it is to the credit of the Liberals of the present day and of the last generation that at last they have staked their political existence upon the task of giving some redress for the grievances of Ireland.

In 1881, as was stated by my right hon. friend, Mr. Gladstone, after the deliberate obstruction of the Irish members, introduced the closure. But, Sir, Mr. Gladstone was too great a man to be satisfied with such a method of dealing with the woes of Ireland. On the contrary, he was induced afterwards to study the case of Ireland; he did study it, and he came to the conclusion that the best and only manner of redressing the long-endured woes of Ireland was at least to try to give to Ireland self-government according to the will and constitutional character of the Irish people. There are two pages in the life of Mr. Gladstone. There is a page in which he

introduced the closure, and there is the page in which he sought by conciliation to give justice to Ireland. Our friends opposite select the first page; we select the last.

### **An Appeal to the People, Not Closure, the Proper Method.**

As I have said, there are some occasions on which there is a cleavage between the majority and the minority, and then there is an easy remedy, an easy solution. The remedy is not closure; it is not the application of brute force. The remedy is an appeal to the people. The people, after all, are the judge and the jury. The people, after all, are the parties to pass judgment as between the Government and the Opposition, as between the majority and the minority; and, Sir, the least I would have expected on such an occasion as this was that the Government of the day would have adopted that remedy, and not have resorted to closure. I am sure it was not a pleasant task that my right hon. friend performed to-day; and, for my part, when I compare my conduct with his conduct, I am proud that I resisted all applications for closure, and that when the time came I appealed to the people, as I did on reciprocity. My right hon. friend stated, not to-day but the last time when he spoke upon that question, that the remedy which I suggested was absurd, because, he said, if upon every occasion on which there was obstruction the Government were obliged to go to the country, we might every year have a general election. Let me tell my right hon. friend that there is no sense in such an objection, because obstruction cannot be of any avail unless it is backed up by a strong expression of public opinion, and unless it be on some most important question. If there were at any time in this House a political party so oblivious to the respect it owes to itself and to the country as to obstruct upon a trivial question, that party would lose all the confidence it might have in the country and any chance of ever again creating an impression upon the people. But, Sir, there is a better reason than that. When we come to discuss these constitutional questions, these questions of public policy, the best authority after all is the authority of history. Confederation will have been in existence forty-six years next July, and how many times has there been obstruction during these past forty-five years? Just four times before this year. Let me recall them. There was obstruction in 1885, in 1896, in 1908, and in 1911, and after I have mentioned the causes for the obstruction on these several occasions, I shall have furnished the most complete justification for the attitude we have taken upon the present occasion.

### **Instances of Obstruction in the Canadian Parliament.**

There was obstruction in 1885. In that year the Government of Sir John A. MacDonald introduced a uniform franchise bill for the Dominion. Up to that date the franchise had been under the control of the several provinces, each province having its own franchise. While in two or three provinces there was manhood suffrage, in the others there was a diverse franchise, and we of the

Liberal party thought this system was the best. After all the franchise is a question of education; it is a question which interests the people themselves directly, and we thought it better to leave it directly in the hands of the people through their provincial legislatures. We fought the Dominion Franchise Bill night and day True, we did not defeat the Bill; but our tactics resulted in the embodiment of important amendments which otherwise we could not have obtained. We compelled Sir John MacDonald to accept many of our proposals. While the list is too long to name them all, let me say that by our attitude we obtained the right to appeal from the decisions of the revising officers, and that alone was worth all the fight we made for it.

There was obstruction in 1896, and what was the occasion of that? The Government of that day undertook to deal with the Manitoba school question, which had been for six long years before them, and had been debated and debated again. The Government did not dare to give a decision on the question until at last in 1896, in the dying days of a moribund parliament, it introduced a measure for the purpose of giving satisfaction to the minority; in which there was not enough to give justice to the minority, but in which there was enough and more than enough to irritate the majority and to make them feel that a grievous wrong had been perpetrated on them. We fought that measure and we obtained what we were asking for. We were asking that that measure should be referred to the people. It was in the dying days of a moribund parliament, and justice demanded that the people should pronounce upon it. If the resolution which my right hon. friend the Prime Minister has to-day introduced had been in existence then, Parliament would have been gagged, and that great wrong would have been inflicted not only on the people of one province but upon the whole people of the Dominion, with consequences which it would be impossible to estimate. These are some of the reasons which make me say that the position taken by the Prime Minister to-day, and which he says he is taking on behalf of parliamentary government, is opposed to the very essence of a fair system of parliamentary government.

There was obstruction again in 1908, and what was the occasion? The Government of which I was the head had introduced an election measure providing for voters' lists for British Columbia, Manitoba, and the unorganized portions of Ontario; and the minority, the Conservative party, took issue with us. I am bound to say that the appeal they made to us impressed me. I thought there was fairness in some of the points taken by the Opposition of the day, and the consequence was that, having consulted my colleagues, we offered a compromise, which was accepted. The obstruction on that occasion, as we know, came from the Conservative party. I found no fault with it; I never whined. I thought it consistent with my dignity as a man and as the head of the Government, feeling we might be to some extent in the wrong, to hold out the olive branch to the other side and to end the difficulty by compromise. After all, is not that better than closure?



The other occasion on which there was obstruction<sup>7</sup> was in 1911.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I see that some hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House remember that; so do I. We introduced the reciprocity measure on the 26th of January, and on the 28th of July we had not yet been able to obtain even a preliminary vote upon it. We had been met at every step by obstruction from the Conservatives, then in opposition; dilatory motions of every kind were made, speech after speech was delivered day in and day out, even in the dog days of summer. I did not complain; I did not whine. Two courses were open to me. I could have done as is done to-day by the Prime Minister; I could have introduced the closure and said that we must carry on the business of the Government and that, consistently with our dignity, we could not allow obstruction. But there was another course open to me, and that was an appeal to the people; and I advised my colleagues to give the hon. gentlemen of the Opposition the opportunity of appealing to the people. We appealed to the people and we were defeated. Heaven is my witness that I would rather stand here to-day, defeated and in opposition by that appeal to the people, than stand over there in office by the power of the gag.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Here is the position—

Mr. SPEAKER: Order. I would appeal to the House to keep some semblance of order, and to allow the business of the House to go on.

### **Liberal and Conservative Methods Contrasted.**

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Here is the position of the two parties. For my part I desire nothing more than that the people shall pronounce once more. I do not envy the position which my right hon. friend takes to-day. This is the first introduction in Canada of machine politics. My hon. friend the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Rogers) told us recently that he knows how to win elections. He did not tell us the methods, however.

Some hon. MEMBERS: We know them.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: We know some of these methods. If an election takes place in British Columbia, or in Nova Scotia, lavish promises for public works are made. It may not be a federal election; it may be a provincial election. But my hon. friend has tried his hand in provincial elections also, not always with complete success. If there is an election in Antigonish a letter is sent by the Minister with abundant promises of public works. If there is an election in Richelieu, it is not a letter which is sent there, but an emissary with his hands full of promises. If it is an election in Macdonald, there is a warning sent out that all those who stand for freedom shall be put in jail. We have not yet come to that in this House, I admit. We are not threatened with durance vile. It is not alleged that we shall be sent to jail. I do not know but

that we may not be thankful for so much. After all, what is proposed is that we shall be treated just as men in Macdonald were treated, we shall be gagged and shall speak no more, or, if allowed to speak, we shall be allowed to speak twenty minutes. My right hon. friend did not know whether he had not been too generous in giving us twenty minutes. He thought we should do better in five minutes than in twenty. I do not know but we should be thankful to him for that much; but we know what we are to expect from these new rules. I had proposed to move this amendment, if the action of my hon. friend the Minister of Marine and Fisheries had not cut the ground from under my feet:

'That the House do not proceed with the consideration of the resolution, but that it be referred to a special committee to assist Mr. Speaker in the examination of the same, and to report upon it, according to the established and binding rules of this House.'

In 1867, when Parliament was first organized after Confederation, the first thing it had to do was to establish rules for its guidance. How was that done? By resolution moved in the House? No. The rules were prepared by a special committee. After this committee had reported, they were referred to the Committee of the Whole, and again discussed. You will find the record in the Journals of the House of the 20th of December, 1867:

'Resolved that this House will immediately resolve itself into a committee on the report of the Select Committee appointed to assist Mr. Speaker in framing rules and regulations for the Government of this House. The House accordingly resolved itself into the said committee; and after some time spent therein, Mr. Speaker resumed the Chair; and Mr. McDonald (Glengarry) reported that the committee had gone through the rules and regulations and made amendments thereunto.'

### **The Proper Procedure in Amending Rules of the House.**

This procedure has always been followed afterwards when the rules have been amended. This would have been the proper method to follow; but my right hon. friend to-day had resolved to gag the House and not to allow free discussion in Committee of the Whole or in a special committee. There are many reasons why the rules which we are now discussing should be discussed in the Committee of the Whole. Nobody can contend that they are complete. Indeed it is not possible to pass them as they are, because in some points they do not convey the meaning of those who framed them. That point has been taken up by my hon. friend who sits by my side (Mr. Pugsley). For instance, what is the meaning of this rule:

'Every motion heretofore debatable made upon routine proceedings, except adjournment motions and every motion standing on the order of the proceedings for the day, or for the concurrence in a report of a standing or a special committee, or for the previous question, or for the third reading of a bill, or for the adjournment of the House when made for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, or for the adoption, in Committee of the Whole, or of Supply, or of Ways and Means of the resolution clause, section, preamble or title under consideration shall be debatable; but all other motions shall be decided without debate or amendment.'

My right hon. friend tells us that a motion for a committee of investigation upon the conduct of a member, such as was moved recently by my hon. friend from St. Hyacinthe (Mr. Gauthier), would come under routine proceedings. Is any man serious in telling me that a motion of that character, impeaching the conduct of a member of the House, is a routine motion? What an absurdity that is. Routine motions are motions which are made every day for the conduct of the business of the House. To tell us that a motion which is made perhaps once in twenty years, or once in five or ten years is a routine motion is too much for the intelligence or the common sense of any man. The only comment which we heard upon this point by my right hon. friend the Prime Minister was this, that so long as he is in the place which he now occupies we have nothing to fear—that such a motion will always be treated as a routine motion. My right hon. friend is not immortal, unfortunately. There is always a possibility of accidents. What would happen, for instance, if his place were to be taken by his neighbour (Mr. Rogers)? If we are to trust to the good will of my hon. friend, Heaven help us! We want the rules framed so as to convey the true meaning of the gentlemen who framed them. In this case the proposed rules should be referred to the Committee of the Whole, there to be thoroughly discussed and canvassed.

### **The Real Purpose of the Closure and Amendments Proposed.**

Clause (4) of the Resolution reads in this way:—

‘On Thursdays and Fridays when the Order of the Day is called for the House to go into Committee of Supply, or of Ways and Means, Mr Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question, provided that except by the consent of the House, the estimates of each department shall be first taken up on a day other than Thursday or Friday.’

My hon. friend beside me took the point that this rule will put it in the power of the majority to have the Committee of Supply sit only on Thursdays and Fridays. The Prime Minister took at once a different interpretation. He said it meant unanimous consent, and to make it sure he offered to put in **the** word ‘unanimous.’ I was a little surprised, I must say, at that; but **it is** not hard to understand what he was after. He knew that the Minister of Marine and Fisheries was to move immediately thereafter the previous question, and that therefore this could not be amended. But I am too old a bird to be caught by that snuff. I thought something might be coming. I would not accept it because I had another amendment to move to that proposed rule. I wanted to move the excision of the whole of this clause 4. I ask it of the fair play of gentlemen on the other side, if their fair play is not all a mockery. Why should this clause be here at all? It has been said that this motion of closure is necessary in order to pass the Naval Bill. But this clause has nothing to do with the naval question at all; it is simply intended to deprive the minority of the most valued weapon that a British subject has had from the days when



parliamentary government began, that is to say, to demand the redress of grievances before Supply is voted. Here it is in plain words:

‘On Thursdays and Fridays when the Order of the Day is called for the House to go into Committee of Supply or Ways and Means, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question.’

Why should Mr. Speaker on Thursday and Friday leave the Chair without putting a question? To prevent the Opposition from moving motions concerning the conduct of the Government of the day. Parliamentary government in England goes back many ages. England, up to the time of the French revolution, was the only country in the world in which the people were taxed only with their own consent, and in which the people, when giving their consent to be taxed, presented their grievances to the King. In every other country of Europe, even the most civilized, the people were taxed by the Sovereign without reference to their means to pay taxes. They had not the power to declare that they would not be taxed by their own consent. But in England the subject would not pay a penny of taxation except by his own free will; and when he was asked to tax himself, then he had his opportunity to present grievances to the King. That most valuable right of the British subject has been in existence for six hundred years; and it is proposed to-day to deprive us of it. This is applying the gag with a vengeance.

### **The Consequences of Injustice.**

Let me repeat to my right hon. friend: As you sow, so shall you reap; as you are fair so shall you meet with fairness; as you are unjust, so shall you meet with injustice. My right hon. friend two years ago took a certain attitude on the Reciprocity Bill; he has no right to complain if the same method that he made use of is applied to him in the present case. My right hon. friend has not forgotten the words of Shakespeare:

*“—this even handed justice*

*Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice*

*To our own lips.”*

The poison that he offers to us to-day will come to his own lips at some future day. We are in the minority; we can be gagged; we can be prevented from expressing our opinions; they can trample upon our rights. But, Sir, the day of reckoning will come, and it will come as soon as we have a dissolution of the present Parliament.

# Canada and the Navy

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## A SPEECH

DELIVERED BY

The Honourable  
**Sir George Ross**

Kt., LL.D.

(LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE SENATE)

*In Moving Amendment to the Naval Aid Bill  
in the Senate of Canada on  
May 27th, 1913.*

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Speech  
delivered by  
**Sir George Ross**  
in the  
**Senate of Canada**  
on the  
**Naval Policy of the Borden  
Government**

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Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex): Allow me to offer my congratulations to the hon. leader of the government on the calm, lucid and comprehensive statement he made to us yesterday on the Bill under consideration. My hon. friend felt, no doubt, the responsibility of the position he occupied. Allow me to join with him in expressing a similar sense of responsibility, and I can only now, at the outset, assure the hon. members of the Senate that I approach the discussion of the Bill before the House with a deep sense of my responsibility to the Senate and to the country. I realize that what I say may be read and considered far beyond the limits of this Chamber, that in the mother country, as well as in His Majesty's dominions beyond the seas, all eyes are turned towards Canada at this moment.

Unfortunately the voice in which we speak on this question is, by circumstances for which I am not responsible, construed to be the voice of party rather than the voice of the country. It is not for me to question the loyalty of those who disagree with my views. May I hope for similar generosity in return, or perhaps still better, may I hope that those who read our speeches may believe that we are equally anxious, though by different means, to maintain the solidarity of the British empire, and to strengthen the bonds of defence and attachment which for over one hundred and fifty years have so happily bound Canada to the mother land. In the lines of welcome addressed by Tennyson, England's greatest poet laureate, to the Queen mother, when, as the bride and wife of the Prince of Wales, she turned her face toward England, her new, home, let me say:

For Saxon, or Dane, or Norman are we,  
Teuton or Celt or whatever we be;  
We are all Danes in our welcome to thee, Alexandra.

May I adapt these lines to the present occasion and say:

For Saxon or Dane, or Norman are we,  
Teuton or Celt or whatever we be;  
We are Britons all, in our love for thee, Britannia.

**Defence a Duty.**

The promotion of defence is a duty we owe to ourselves and to the empire. We are all agreed that from centre to circumference Canada is the home of patriotic citizens. We are feeling our way in a large sense, for the first time, how we can best express that patriotism. The line of cleavage between the two sides of the House appears to be, whether the contribution, as the Bill says, to increase



the naval defence of the empire is a better expression of our loyalty than a permanent policy which combines the defence of Canada and her commercial routes to Great Britain with such an extension of a Canadian fleet as would render it serviceable at the same time for the defence of the empire, wherever its integrity was assailed. Let me briefly and somewhat on the lines of my hon. friend's speech state the origin of this great question of naval defence and its development during the last few years as I understand it. The first movement in the House of Commons for naval defence was made by the Hon. Mr. Foster. In November 1909 he introduced a resolution, which I do not propose to read at length, but in which he stated "that Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of responsibility and financial burden incidental to the protection of her exposed coast-line, and great sea-ports." In a speech of great power Mr. Foster enforced the purpose of his resolution. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the leader of the government of that day, moved an amendment thereto, in which he agreed with Mr. Foster as to the desirability of Canada doing her full share in the defence of the empire. Mr. Borden, then leader of the opposition, concurred in the general purpose of both resolutions, but suggested some changes in the amendment moved by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Let me present a few of the points in that resolution, which consisted of four clauses, in which both sides of the House concurred as amended by Mr. Borden. The first clause is expressed in these terms:

"This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in large measure the responsibilities of national defence."

I am sure every senator will concur, that it would be intolerable if, with our wealth and great resources and our abundant prosperity, we should look idly on as the mother land is preparing to fight the battles of the empire, and to fight our battles, also. May I speak for hon. gentlemen when I say that we concur in the proposition to which unanimous assent was given in the other Chamber.

The second clause is still more striking;

The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations—

May I emphasize the words "constitutional relations."

—between the mother country and the self-governing dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

Hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex): To that proposition we adhere on this side, on both grounds—first because of our present constitutional relations, and, on the other, because of the entangling character, which I shall expose later on, of possible contributions to the mother country for defence. Clause 3 says:

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization—  
and let me say the word "speedy" was interpolated at Mr. Borden's request—

—of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial conference and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world.

## **A Patriotic Policy.**

That clause was drafted by the hand of—a statesman. Look what it contains—the speedy organization of Canadian naval defence; no delay if the empire is in danger; in close relation to the Imperial navy, no separation of the daughter from the mother; no dispersion of the forces of the empire over seven seas; but Canada, as she ought—and shall I say as I hope she always will be—prepared to co-operate in full sympathy with the British navy in the security of commerce, the safety of the empire, and the peace of the world. The latter phrase of that resolution is to me as important as any. We agree, I think, on both sides of the House, that the naval supremacy of England is not sought for the glory of the British Empire alone; that she does not seek to maintain the sovereignty of the seas that her history may be perpetuated and that her people may rejoice in her supremacy; but that she has a higher and a nobler ambition, grander than any conceived except in the vision of the prophets of old—that her supremacy should promote our common christianity and maintain the peace of the world. And then, lastly—

The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready—

aye, ready—

—and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the empire.

### **Cordial Reception of Policy.**

These resolutions were read from ocean to ocean, and the response to them was as cordial throughout the Dominion as it was in the House of Commons. They thrilled Canada with the thought that she had entered upon a new epoch in her history as on the day when she was initiated into the family of nations some forty years before; that she was about to take her place beside her royal mother to defend the constitution which gave England liberty, civil and religious, and in which we share so generously and so freely. And may I note here the chronological fact, that this resolution was adopted on the 29th day of March, 1909—the 42nd anniversary of the day on which Her Majesty the Queen signed the charter of Canadian liberty, the British North America Act. We join with all those who believe in the value of that Act in declaring that Her Majesty did nothing more for Canada of greater importance to the empire than the House of Commons did on the 29th of March when both parties united in a common purpose for the common defence of the empire. Now let me ask, who stood sponsors for that resolution? Particularly three men—Laurier, Borden, Foster. (I may be pardoned, as being guilty of no breach of courtesy, for not mentioning those names in connection with the titles usually attached to them.)

### **Laurier, Borden and Foster.**

They are all leaders of public opinion, one for forty years a prominent figure in the House of Commons, the other two for a shorter period, but each in his own place maintaining the dignity of the Chamber, and commanding the confidence and respect of his friends. These three men stood sponsors, and in their views the whole Commons concurred. Let me read a word or two from the

speeches of two of them. I will first read from the speech of Mr. Borden, who is now leader of the government. On that day he said:

In so far as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister to-day outlined the lines of naval defence, I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a naval force of our own.

I like that Canadian pride.

The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the Mother Country, and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect. In Great Britain the contribution has perhaps been regarded as rather unsatisfactory, in Australia, it failed in the end, to meet with the approval of the people.

So I am at one with the Prime Minister in so far as this is concerned. I am at one with him in this respect also that I think an expenditure of money designed for that purpose ought, in the main at least, to be under the control of our own parliament; and that by making an appropriation of that kind, and attending to the defence, and to co-ordination with the Imperial navy forces, we would be rendering a real service to the defence of the empire, and we would be doing our duty not only to Canada, but to the empire as a whole.

What suggestions I have to make I make with the sincere desire that we may shape a resolution of which we can all approve and which shall go forth to the world as a ringing declaration that if the mother of nations has to fight the battle of her life, the people of Canada without distinction of party or of creed will stand beside her in that fight. This is too great a question for the introduction of party strategy. It is a question in respect to which we should all rise superior to party motives, and so I propose making to my right hon. friend one or two suggestions which I know he will receive in the spirit in which I make them.

That is a noble speech. It dates four years ago. I have no doubt the hon. gentleman shares these views still, although not expressed quite in that form. Another quotation a year later nearly, January 12, 1910, he said:

It has been suggested that instead of the organization of a Canadian naval force there should be a system of annual contributions from this country to the mother country; and I am free to admit that, from the strategical point of view I would be inclined to agree with the view of the admiralty that this would be the best way for the great self-governing dominions of the empire to make their contributions. But, Sir, from a constitutional and political standpoint I am opposed to it, for many reasons. In the first place I do not believe that it would endure. In the second place it would be a source of friction. It would become a bone of partisan contention.

I am afraid it has got there now.

It would be subject to criticism as to the character and the amount of the contributions in both parliaments. It would not be permanent or continuous. It would conduce, if anything, to severing the present connection between Canada and the empire.

These are terrible consequences associated a little more than three years ago with annual contribution.

Permanent co-operation in defence, in my opinion, can only be accomplished by the use of our own material, the employment of our own people, the development and utilization of our own skill and resourcefulness, and above all by impressing upon the people a sense of responsibility for their share in international affairs.

### Mr. Foster's Views.

Now for the third of these noble Romans, speaking of a contribution he said:

The first and greatest objection which I have to a fixed money contribution is that it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ourselves ought to do; as though a man, the father of a family, in lusty health and strength, should pay his neighbour something per month for looking after the welfare and



safety of his home instead of doing that duty himself. That seems to me when you work it out, to be a basic objection to this form of aid. It goes still further than that. Suppose you contribute this year your sum, and next year your equal sum, and thereafter year for year, after ten or twelve or twenty or thirty years you will have paid out an immense amount of money.

In Canada itself there will be no roots struck, there will be no residue left, there will be no preparation of the soil or beginning of the growth of the product.

It disjoins what has been joined together from the earliest days of the world's existence—commerce and the protection of commerce.

That method ignores the necessities and the aspirations, and prospects of a great people, such as the Canadian people are destined to become.

However humble the beginning we must have something in which Canada has some of her body, her bones, her blood, her mental powers and her national pride.

### **A Canadian Navy—Ideal in Character.**

That ideal of a policy for naval defence suits me exactly. It has history to recommend it. It grapples with the great question of national defence. It appeals to our national pride. It begins as great things have often begun, probably in small beginnings. I know of no better way in which that policy could be expressed, than it was by these gentlemen on that occasion, and let me say, as I said before, that the fact that both sides of the House concurred in it stamps it with additional value. 'Behold how good and pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.' On few occasions in the history of Canada have both parties agreed upon what you might call a national policy. When the air was discoloured with inflammatory speeches and the whole public mind disturbed by the political agitation of 1862, 1863, 1864 and 1865, thirty-three leaders of public opinion now known as the Fathers of Confederation from the four provinces of Canada met in the old city of Quebec. They laid down their arms, they shook hands over their differences. For eighteen days they studied, meditated and planned, and out of these meditations grew that magnificent fabric which we call the Dominion of Canada. On this second coronation day, four years ago, the two parties met, they had their differences, and always will have, and perhaps always ought to have in some respects, for we cannot agree on the details, but on the great question which would give to Canada her place in the family of nations and which would give to the British empire an additional source of strength, there was no difference of opinion, no confusion of thought; all were agreed that something should be done. In that unity of purpose there originated in the following year, 1910, the Naval Service Act, to which I shall refer a little later on. I shall not ask questions as to where the Bill before us originated. I do not know. Lord John Russell said, in regard to a small body of schismatics that troubled him in his early political career, that their policy was but the whisper of a faction, a whisper to which I fear, Mr. Borden has paid too much attention.

### **An Emergency Bill.**

The hon. gentleman who opened this debate declared that this was an emergency Bill; declared that the peace of Europe was threatened; declared that for many years the various kingdoms of Europe were plotting in some diabolical and unknown way the ruin of the British Empire, that alarm prevailed throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and that there was occasion for alarm, and he declared that the only way to meet that emergency was

by this Naval Bill. May I be pardoned if I tell my hon. friend that, in my simplicity and without the responsibility of office, if there be an emergency I know a better way of meeting it than by the Naval Bill. It is now on the statute book of this country. It is known as the Naval Service Act of 1910. It is an Act for which hon. gentlemen opposite are as much responsible as we are. So long as it remains on the statute book unrepealed, it is the Act of the party clothed with the responsibility of government, just as much as it was originally the obligation of the party that initiated it. May I be pardoned if I refer to a conservation I had in 1902, with Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain. I had the honour of being a guest of Sir Gilbert Parker. Many distinguished noblemen, and statesmen were also guests at his hospitable table. After dinner we retired to the drawing-room and it occurred that Mr. Chamberlain sought me out. I suppose he knew I was Premier of the Province of Ontario, and entitled to a little attention. One of the questions he asked me was, 'I understand the Liberal party has been a long while in power in your province. How long?' I said, 'Not very long, we are just in our thirty-first year, that is all.' He said, 'That is too long, you should have been in and out two or three times in that period.' I said, 'That may be, Mr. Chamberlain, but if you happened to be the Premier you would not like your reign cut short just when, for some constitutional reasons, it might be desirable.' He said, 'That is not the point. The point is this: unless there is a change of party, every Act passed in your term of office will be charged against you as the policy of the government in legislation on party grounds. If you retire, the succeeding government will either repeal your legislation or adopt it. If they adopt it, then it is as much theirs as yours. They are responsible for it as you were when you were in power, and instead of being political legislation it becomes national 'legislation.' A very important constitutional point, and, disclosed to me for the first time. The Act of 1910 is now national legislation. It does not belong to the Liberal party now because we handed it over to the hon. gentlemen when we handed over the seals of office. They have assumed its responsibility because they have not repealed or amended it.

### Objections Considered.

1. Now that leads me to consider my first objection to this Bill, namely that it is unnecessary as under the Laurier Act of 1910, all that is proposed to be done under the Bill before us and much more can be done for the defence of the empire. In the first place the Naval Bill provides for a contribution of only thirty-five millions (\$35,000,000), a very generous contribution which we would cheerfully vote if no other consideration were involved. Under the Laurier Act of 1910, now in force, any number of millions could be contributed by parliament if so disposed. Why then harass parliament with a Bill which is not required for emergency purposes and which is not as effective as the Act of 1910. If the hon. gentlemen are sincere in their efforts to meet an emergency, let them withdraw the Bill now before us, and submit to the House a supplementary estimate for ten or fifteen millions for the speedy construction of battle-ships, wherever they can be built and then, from year to year, ask parliament for such additional sums as may be necessary for their com-

pletion, according to the practice of parliament in regard to all larger appropriations. We built the Canadian Pacific Railway, put \$100,000,000 into it, but we did not vote one hundred millions when we entered into the contract for its construction. We voted the money from year to year as it was required. That is the constitutional way. That is the principle involved in the resolution in which the House concurred in 1909. We stand now where the House of Commons stood then, and we consider ourselves bound by that resolution. I do not know that a single senator would object if it was proposed, in the regular and parliamentary way, to do that. May I say more, the Bill provides that this money shall be applied in the construction of a certain number of ships. That could be done under the Act of 1910. I am informed that it is the intention to construct three battleships under this Bill. If hon. gentlemen or the government of the day wanted four or five, they could build them wherever they pleased under the Act of 1910.

### **No Emergency.**

If there be an emergency hon. gentlemen can meet it without this Bill just as well as with it. If this Bill should be rejected by the Senate, next day they can bring down a supply Bill appropriating every dollar which this emergency Bill provides, and much more; and we who supported the Act of 1910 and believe in it, would be bound to support any reasonable grant so provided. I do not say any extravagant grant. All that is necessary is the permission of His Royal Highness, concurrence in Committee of Supply, and presentation of the Bill to the Senate. What does the admiralty say on that question?

Hon. gentleman seem to claim that this Bill is introduced at the request of the admiralty. I am not sure whether my hon. friend said so yesterday or not, so I am not attaching that statement to his name. I have read that report from A to Z, and will quote the last clause, which is as follows:

10. The Prime Minister of the Dominion having inquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances, that it is desirable that such aid should include—the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply.

I want to emphasize the word “include.”

The word ‘include’ presupposes something else. Now I am playing the part of mind-reader—there was a certain Act for establishing a navy; the admiralty did not think it quite adequate, and they said—‘We will supplement it; that is, we will include in that permanent navy the construction of a certain number of battleships, the strongest which science can build or money supply.’ I do not think that inference is far fetched; but let it be ever so far fetched the fact still remains, if hon. gentlemen are leaning upon the report of the admiralty, that what they propose to do could be done without their Bill. Let me read from the report of the Admiralty the spirit of the empire, the spirit of the mother country in dealing with this question.

9. Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present juncture, Great Britain will never in any circumstances fail in her duty to the over-sea dominions

Noble words from the mother of parliaments, from the promoter



of the peace of the world, from the mistress of the seas. The story is told of William Pitt that no one who entered his presence ever retired without being a braver man. I am braver because I have read this report. I ask hon. gentlemen who are not as brave as I am—for my standard is very high—to read on—

“She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations.”

You feel the pulse of patriotism and power in every line of this clause. I think it was Ralph Waldo Emerson who said the pulse of England beats like a trip-hammer. You feel it there, you hear it. I will read on:

She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and she has not lost her capacity by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire.

Our little mother isle, God bless her for her courage and her determination. And here is another sentence:

The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. Any action on the part of Canada to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial navy, and thus widen the margin of our common safety, would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire, and to the renewed resolve of the overseas dominions to take their part in maintaining its integrity.

There is a word there I want to repeat:

The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require.

No dis-union; the Admiralty and House of Commons all one in the defence of the empire; that is the position in which we should be to-day. The Senate, the House of Commons, all the physical and financial forces of Canada, one in the defence of Canada and the defence of the Empire. And from what I have read you will see that there is no demand upon Canada for this aid. Britain unaided, alone, can cope with her enemies or with any combination of them. Now let me point out some objections to the present Navy Bill which appear on the surface.

### Second Objection.

2. My second objection to the Bill is that the control of the ships when constructed is removed from the Government of Canada and placed at the disposal of His Majesty under such “terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon by the Governor-in-Council and His Majesty's Government.” Now I cannot understand why ships built at the expense of Canada should be subject to an agreement of this kind. More than eighty years ago we escaped from the control of Downing Street and since then have enjoyed responsible Government and all the privileges included in that comprehensive term. Now we are returning to a condition of things in which the full control of our Navy, or at least so much of it as pertains to the battleships to be constructed under the Bill, is lost.

Suppose that these ships were placed at the disposal of His Majesty and either the Admiralty or the Canadian Government desired a rearrangement of those terms and conditions, is there not the

greatest danger of friction between Canada and the British Government? I think that is self-evident. Further, may I ask my hon. friend if he has thought out this constitutional difficulty? Under the British North America Act, clause 91, Canada is given exclusive power over militia and naval defence. Clause 91 of that act says:

The exclusive legislative authority of the parliament of Canada extends to all matters coming within the classes of subjects next herein before enumerated, that is to say—(7) militia military, and naval service and defence.

We have under that Act, exclusive jurisdiction. I ask my hon. friend is he going to take the responsibility of surrendering part of the authority conferred upon the parliament of Canada by the British North America Act? We are giving over part of that authority when we agree to make conditions with His Majesty's government as to how this money shall be paid, used and applied. Has my hon. friend any authority to surrender part of that power? I do not think he has. It could only be surrendered by an amendment to the British North America Act. What we have we hold. What we have we cannot part with. It is ours to use, not to dispose of. Why should we delegate the power exclusively conferred on us. Let me take the converse of that—has the British Government the power to take over, by order in council, any of the powers conferred upon the parliament of Canada by the British North America Act? I do not think they have. In my judgment they could only constitutionally take over this power by an amendment to that Act. So I say we have two constitutional anomalies or defects in the Navy Bill—That Canada, beyond her right to do so, is surrendering part of her power, and the other, that the British government is getting power which she has no right to. Now, I am not afraid of the British government; for that matter I am not afraid of any government, if we only keep upon the watch-tower. But if you allow these innovations and concessions, where will they land you?

I am not going to set up very high standards of autonomy for anybody, nor am I going to be fastidious in regard to the exact claims of responsible government. There may be emergencies when we have to yield a little here and there. Indeed if there were no other way of meeting the present difficulties of defence, I would perhaps forego, if there were a real emergency, some of my convictions upon both points, because in danger everything must give way. There is no emergency in this case, so that we are required to give away or surrender any of our constitutional rights.

### **No Permanent Navy.**

The Bill before us does not provide for a permanent Naval force. To use the words of Mr. Foster "there are no bones in it, at least no Canadian bones, or flesh, or blood, or mental attitude. It is so many empty shells, a painted ship on a painted ocean so far as Canada is concerned." To quote Mr. Borden again in his speech on January 12th, 1910:

"I do not believe that it could endure. It would not be permanent or continuous."

3. The Bill makes no provision for training men for the Naval Service. One of the difficulties of the British Admiralty is to man the ships already built. Mr. Borden proposes to build a certain number

of the most powerful battleships known in the British service, apparently without considering that such ships, no matter how powerful, would be of no use unless fully manned. Under the Laurier Act of 1910 provision was made for the training of men on board training ships, and in Naval schools and colleges, so that the ships, as soon as constructed, would be prepared to go to sea and fill their place in the naval defence of Canada and the Empire as the case might be. Moreover, provision was also made for the establishment of a Naval service, the establishment of naval forces, dockyards, naval yards, factories, rifle and gun ranges, that is, as fully an equipment for a Canadian Navy on a smaller scale of course, as the Admiralty provides for the British Navy. Was there ever a policy conceived so short-sighted and so ineffective as that contained in the Borden Naval Bill?

### **Nothing to Offer.**

In a case of an emergency, the Borden Bill has nothing to offer for the defence of the Empire except the empty shells which may be constructed in British Navy yards. In the Act of 1910 Canada could offer the full fighting force of her navy. Section 23 provides as follows:

"In case of emergency the Governor-in-Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy, the naval service or any part thereof, any ship or vessel of the naval service and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels or any officer or ship belonging to the naval service."

In the one case you place ships only and in the other case what do you place? You place at the general service of the Royal Navy the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the naval service. In the one case you send three empty shells, clad in steel for the defence of the empire. What would they accomplish? In the other case you send your battleships, manned with the best blood, and muscle, and courage and seamanship that Canada can produce? That is what you do. There is the great difference. What would these empty shells accomplish floating like the froth of the sea—a prey to the enemy, useless for all practical purposes, unless the ship by some instinct of its own, without a man on deck, could rush to the firing line and discharge its guns, and I do not think it will do that.

It has been said that under the Laurier Act of 1910 it would be necessary to call parliament together to place the Canadian navy at the disposal of the Admiralty, and that even in an emergency, the Laurier navy had a string to it by which its use for the common defence of the empire could be restrained. This is a palpable misrepresentation of the Laurier Act. Under the clause I have read, the Governor-in-Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty the whole Canadian navy in a case of an emergency. That could be done in 24 hours, but by the next section of the Laurier Act if the Canadian navy was placed at the disposal of His Majesty, parliament was to be called within fifteen days. For what purpose? To provide the necessary supplies, of course. Before parliament was called the navy could be two weeks in active service, but its maintenance in active service would be dependent upon the later action of parliament.

Section 24 reads:



Whenever the Governor-in-Council places the naval service or any part thereof on active service, as provided in the two preceding sections, if Parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall issue for a meeting of Parliament within fifteen days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue to sit in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.

### Constitutional Practice.

Now, this is the practice of the British parliament when war is declared. The King may declare war and has the right to do so under the British constitution. Should this be done, parliament is immediately called to furnish the necessary supplies. Why should we depart in this case from a well established constitutional practice? If the parliament of Great Britain sees fit by controlling supplies to restrain a passionate King, or an impulsive government, from rushing heedlessly into war, why should not the parliament of Canada exercise a similar control over the government?

4. The Borden Bill proposes to take a vote of thirty-five millions in one lump sum for the construction of the proposed battleships, while the practice of Parliament is to vote from year to year as much money as may be required for one year's service.

What is the constitutional law? The constitutional law is that parliament cannot take any appropriation for more than one year. The law as to appropriation is the same as the law as to mutiny. Soldiers are enlisted for one year, and that Act has to be renewed from time to time, to keep them in the service. Parliament can give an appropriation for one year. I ask my hon. friend to inquire if he can find a precedent in the history of England in which parliament gave three years' supplies on any subject to the government of the day. I will put it to him in another form. I may be wrong, but I do not think I am. Can he find a precedent in the history of Canada where parliament placed three years' supply on any subject, or for any purpose, at the disposal of the government in advance? There is no necessity for it. Let me revert to our action in building the Canadian Pacific Railway. In the contract for the construction of that railway, parliament was asked to appropriate twenty-five millions (25,000,000) acres of land and twenty-five millions (\$25,000,000) in money. Did the Minister of Railways ask parliament to vote the whole appropriation at one time? Certainly not, but following the parliamentary rule he took from year to year as much money as was necessary for the service of that year in the annual estimates. It has been the same with the National Transcontinental Railway and the Welland Canal, and the same with any public work which hon. gentlemen are now engaged in building. The constitutional principle of placing money at the disposal of the government many years in advance is wrong.

Now let me briefly enquire what has been done under the Laurier Act of 1910, which Mr. Borden has so blindly overlooked. The royal assent was given to that Act on the 4th of May 1910. In the meantime a vote of Three million (\$3,000,000.) dollars was taken for the purchase of training ships, and for their maintenance during the fiscal year 1910-11. By that vote two ships were purchased and put into commission and about 500 seamen enrolled for training. Tenders were called for additional ships, but as they

were not received until after Parliament was dissolved, Mr. Laurier decided to delay action till the result of the election fixed for September 1911, was ascertained.

When Mr. Borden took office in October 1911, he found the tenders waiting for consideration, but declined to carry out the Laurier policy which was, that one or more ships should be built in Canada, according to the tenders submitted. Considering that Mr. Laurier was only in office about a year after the Act of 1910 was passed, it may be fairly said that he showed reasonable activity in carrying out the Act. Mr. Borden has been in office now for nearly twenty (20) months and the only result of his efforts to provide for the defence of the Empire was this emergency Bill, which we are now considering, and Closure to force it through the House of Commons. Had he proceeded under the Act of 1910 we might now have, at least, the nucleus of a promising Canadian Navy.

In his speech on January 12th, 1910, he said:

"I say to my Right Honourable friend, the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him: do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend this empire asunder before the proposed service is worthy the name. In the face of such a situation, immediate, vigorous, earnest action is necessary."

Notice this was in January 1910. In September 1911, his party triumphed at the polls, and for nearly two years his hands have hung listlessly by his side and the Empire which was to be rent in twain unless something was done is as much exposed to danger as ever. Is that the way to deal with an emergency?

5. The Borden Bill does not provide for the maintenance of the ships which it proposes to build. Under the Laurier policy the Canadian Navy, whether in the service of Canada or Great Britain, in a case of an emergency, is to be maintained at the expense of the Canadian treasury.

What a policy for the administration of Canada. Empty shells, nothing in them, not even the powder and shot, to be maintained by the British Government. Poor impoverished, empty, pureless Canada sends to Great Britain three empty shells and asks Britain to man them and maintain them at the expense of the British taxpayers, while Canada sits back and keeps out of the way of all harm, ties up her purse strings and says to the British taxpayer. 'Here, are these beautiful ships, made in the best shipyards in the country. If you want them to fight, man them yourselves. These guns will not go off of their own accord. We have no money to spend for maintenance, and if we have, we wont give it to you.'

6. There is no provision in the Borden Bill for defending the commerce of Canada on the high seas or defending its coasts against hostile invasion.

What would be the consequences if three German fast cruisers came to our coast? One would bottle up the St. Lawrence as tight as any brewer man ever bottled up his ale, and not a Canadian ship could get in or out. Another would bottle up the entrance to the Bay of Fundy which is only fifteen miles wide. Another would bottle up the entrance to Sydney, and that is all the entrances we have open and we would have to go through Portland, New York, or Boston to reach the mother country. More than that, we have a trade of four hundred million of money between Canada and European and British

nations, and that trade could be hunted by German cruisers, and there is not a Canadian cruiser to fire a shot to prevent them. The Alabama in 1862 played havoc with United States commerce, from which it has not yet recovered. Two ships at that time did it all. It would not require more than two ships to destroy our commerce, yet we have no defence, and that is a difficulty in the Bill which I hope hon. gentlemen will consider.

### Defence on Land.

We are providing this year in the Militia Department for an expenditure of \$10,000,000, for the land of defence Canada. So far as Naval defence either of commerce or the coast is concerned there is to this hour not a single dollar promised in the Supply Bill. If it is important to be protected on land, it is equally important to be protected at sea? How can we support a Bill that overlooks entirely such protection? We could at least begin the construction of dockyards and shipyards and such other establishments as might be required for a Canadian Navy as was proposed under the Laurier Act with a view to the final construction of a Canadian Navy, but all this is overlooked as if Canadian home defence was a matter of no consequence. What would you think if an engineer who in constructing a bridge over a river would build a strong abutment at one end and allow the other end of the bridge to rest on the sand? Figuratively we are building a bridge for the defence of the Empire. The British end is strong now and I do not object to increasing its strength, but the Canadian end of the bridge is weak. It has no foundation. Such bridge building could not be defended for one moment, as a sample of good engineering. It is equally indefensible as a sample of Naval defence.

Let me give another illustration. Would it be wise in building an armoured ship to place all the armour on one side? That is practically what we are doing under the Borden Naval policy. The British side of this armoured ship is well plated now and we are adding to its strength, while the Canadian side has not an armour plate to protect its ribs from the first broadside of the enemy. Is that good naval engineering? I think it is not.

My hon. friend said yesterday 'If Canada is to be of assistance to the Empire in naval defence, to deliberately talk of building a navy in Canada is an insult to Great Britain.' It is the only observation he made during the whole speech to which I would take very strong exception. I am bound to say that, to my mind, the language is very objectionable—I will not use a stronger word. Can it be possible that it is an insult to Great Britain for us to build a permanent navy? Is it possible that we cannot get the skilled men to do it? Are we less advanced in engineering skill than Japan that only issued fifty years ago from eastern barbarism, or than Australia, or old decrepit Spain, who long ago reached her zenith, or Italy, or Austria-Hungary. Surely my hon. friend does not entertain the idea that to build a Canadian navy would be an insult to Great Britain or anybody else. I have confidence that a country that has the administration of one-third of the extent of the British empire, is able to do anything it chooses to do. As Tennyson says:

We sailed wherever ships can sail,  
We found many a mighty state,  
Pray heaven our greatness may not fail,  
Through craven fear of being great.



Emerson said, 'Hitch your wagon to a star if you are going to rise.' To what does my hon. friend hitch his wagon? Or does he hitch it at all? He stands passively by and says it will be an insult to Great Britain if we attempt to build a Canadian navy. Britain did not say that with regard to the Act of 1910. It was approved of by His Majesty's government. If it had been an insult to Great Britain the British Government would not have assented to it, they would have thrown it in the waste paper basket. Let us not depreciate ourselves. No good can come to a man who sits in sack-cloth and ashes in self-abandonment and humiliation, crying out against the fates that made his position severe. The man who takes his marching orders from some prophet or seer, or great leader, is the man who keeps up with the procession. I hope no member of the Senate will entertain the idea that we cannot build ships. Mr. Borden, the leader of the government had no such idea at one time. Listen to what he said in Halifax on the 14th day of November, 1909:

One governing principle, at least, should control, namely, that out of our own material, by our own labour, and by the instructed skill of our own people any necessary provision for our naval defence should be made so far as may be reasonably possible. In this connection may we not hope that there shall be given a stimulus and encouragement to the shipbuilding industry of Canada which has long been lacking. To-day should be Nova Scotia's opportunity in that regard. Providence has endowed this province with the material, with the men, and with the maritime situation, which are essential not only for developing a scheme of naval defence and protection, but also for the resuscitation of that shipbuilding industry which once made Nova Scotia famous throughout the world.

Did he say it would be an insult to Great Britain, if Canada built a navy? Who stands on the highest plane? The man who leads the government in the other House or my hon. friend who is ill-advised in using such a term. I know it is not his conviction. He rose himself to a high position of wealth and influence just because he had the courage to seize opportunities as they rose, and he is worthy of the honour he has gained, but let him not tell the Senate that to place a Canadian navy at the disposal of Great Britain would be an insult.

### Fundamental Principles.

Let me lay down two or three fundamental principles in connection with this matter. The first fundamental principle is that nothing will live or thrive in the life or institutions of Canada, or of any country, that does not appeal to national sentiment. That is fundamental. You cannot build up a country, no matter what it is, except on that foundation. It is true of China to-day, it is true of Japan, it has been true of England for one thousand years. Britannia rules the waves, why? Because she has the sentiment that that is her business, and that nobody else has a right to interfere with that prerogative. And the sentiment of the British empire is that she is to be defended at all hazards, no matter where she is assailed. She will fight her Waterloo in the face of a combined Europe if necessary. She will fight her battles in the Soudan against sixty thousand of the Mahdi's followers. She will keep in hand two hundred and forty millions in India, because nobody dare question her authority now, as they did sometime ago. Why? It is the national sentiment that she was born to rule, not only to rule the waves, but to dominate the whole

world by her Christian spirit, by her toleration. And there is more British flesh and blood governing the chancellories of Europe, governing the modern kingdoms of this world to-day, than there is of the flesh and blood of any other people born upon this rounded globe.

### **National Sentiment.**

The constitution of the United States is founded on the Magna Charta. I think ten of its clauses included almost verbatim et literatim, and that great republic thinks it founded itself. It got its fundamental principles of liberty and its constitution from where? It got them from England—could not get them from anywhere else, although liberty was on trial itself at that time. We must have a national sentiment. It was that which made confederation. My hon. friend knows that we entered upon our career four little provinces, three million of hope and an area of 800 thousand square miles, forty-six years ago, just a day shall I say in the life of a nation, and where are we? We are administering one-third of the British empire. Was ever such a trust committed to a people? Is there any kingdom of Europe that handed over exclusive jurisdiction to its subjects upon which the King himself cannot encroach. Our constitution gives more power in this parliament in some respects to the people of Canada than the constitution gives to Great Britain, because the King can veto the legislation of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, but the King cannot veto the legislation of our parliament. He gives us exclusive power in a contract, signed by the sign manuel of Her Majesty the Queen. That is extraordinary power; we have it. Let us, in promoting the naval defence of the empire, do it in such a way as to promote the national sentiment. We have to begin in a small way. The British navy is said to be founded in the days of Cromwell, 300 years ago, one of the many good things Cromwell did for the British Empire, and he taught that Kings could not trample on the rights of their subjects. He taught the British empire, after Von Tromp had nailed a broom to the mast and declared that he would sweep British commerce from the sea, that there was a time for beginning, and he began and all along the line from that day to the battle of Trafalgar, the British navy has asserted itself. Let us begin. Mr. Borden in one of his speeches in the House of Commons advised Sir Wilfrid Laurier to proceed slowly and cautiously. Let us begin, first the blade, then the ear, then the full grown corn in the ear. There is not a blade to be seen in this measure. It has the barrenness of Sahara.

### **A Hireling Policy.**

I do not believe in a hireling policy.

I do not believe we should ask people to fight our battles for us. What did we do in the case of the war in South Africa? The case is in point. Did we send a contribution to buy horses, mules, rifles and uniforms in order that Great Britain might hold her position and establish herself in South Africa? We sent nearly 6,000 men to South Africa. Was there any sentiment in that? What sentiment would there be in rifles or uniforms, or horses and mules? When the war was over they would be consigned to the scrap heap. But in that war in South Africa there was a sentiment and some one has said, 'In South Africa Canada found herself.' We found that we had the

power and the enthusiasm, and courage to fight the battles of the empire, and we went and fought them hand to hand, and knee to knee with those who pulled down the flag from Johannesburg, and who would have pulled it down from Ladysmith and Pretoria. We left on the veldt of Africa 225 Canadians, who sleep in their little green tents, whose curtain will never be drawn aside. The son of one of our most beloved Governor-Generals sleeps with them, another son of our own ministers of militia and a son of the commander-in-chief, the noblest Roman of them all, left his only son as a sacrifice to the solidarity of the British Empire. We share in its glory, we share in its honour and we share in the results. We now celebrate the victory. We have a Paardeburg celebration every year, and they sit, these returned soliders, around the camp fires, and tell what they did and the results achieved. We took three Victoria Crosses to Canada from South Africa. How many Victoria Crosses are you going to get from these empty shells? How many stories will be told of how Horatius kept the bridge in the brave days of old, if we do nothing more vital or more British in defending the empire than to send them these powerful—notice the term—‘the most powerful’—powerless, I would say—‘the most powerful armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.’ Dead, inanimate armour-plate? Dead and as inanimate as the dry bones that Ezekiel saw, in which no breath of life existed.

### Unity of Purpose.

The second fundamental principle I would lay down is that no great career is possible for a nation without unity of purpose. Confederation is a unit. The thirteen colonies arranged their constitution finally in 1787 and bound themselves by solemn contract to stand together. What was the cause of its extension from Maine to California. The sentiment of the people of the United States to found a great republic, to make them as puissant on this continent as Great Britain was on the other continent, and that sentiment so pervaded them that under no circumstances would they allow that union to be broken up. In the civil war they spent three billions of money, and one million of men died upon the plains of Shiloh and at Gettysburg, and elsewhere, and what for? They laid down their lives that the climax of Webster's speech in reply to Heine might be realized. What did he say? ‘Liberty and union, one and inseparable, now and forever,’ and that cry rang through the United States as they mustered forces for the civil war. The union must not be broken up, the slave must be free and on the 1st of January, 1863, the shackles fell off four million slaves. It was the language of Daniel Webster that accomplished that end—it was liberty and union. It made a united republic and freed the slaves. Mr. Borden, in Toronto, said that I was a good imperialist, and would probably support the Navy Bill; it is because I am a good imperialist that I do not support his Navy Bill. Mr. Borden is a separatist. He says himself that this Bill is going to cause friction between Canada and the empire. I want no friction. He says it may lead to the separation of Canada from the empire: I want no separation. I want to see Canada and the empire one and inseparable, now and forever, and that is my wish for the future of the empire. I am no separatist, I may be an imperialist. Where do I get my imperialism? In that charter to which I referred



a little while ago, the British North America Act; we find it. Do we realize what it contains? It may be studied in the light of one hundred years of British history, and every page will furnish a lesson. What does the preamble say?

Whereas the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

### **An Imperialist.**

There is where I am. I belong to the Province of Ontario, federally united with the other provinces of Canada under the Crown. How can I be anything else but an imperialist? If I were not an imperialist I would be in favour of independence, but never in favour of annexation. As long as we are federally united under the Crown, so long I cannot help being an imperialist, if I am true to my obligation. The preamble proceeds:

With a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.

The constitution of England has kept together her colonies for two hundred years or more. It has led to the union of England and Scotland and Ireland; it has kept the British empire together in the bonds of civil and religious liberty. Nowhere is the atmosphere so pure, nowhere is a man's home so much his castle, nowhere can a man walk so erect, and lift his forehead to the stars as in the British empire. That is why I am an imperialist. I could point to a dozen paragraphs in that Act to show where the principle prevails, that we are united federally, not separated, under the Crown of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and if, as Mr. Borden says, it is possible that a contribution would lead to friction. I do not want a contribution. If it is possible it may lead to separation, I do not want it; I want union. I want to carry out the principles of the British North America Act. I want to see Canada do her share in her own defence and in defence of the empire. Now at the risk of some repetition I am going to state why I am opposed to the present Bill. First, because it is unnecessary and of no possible use. It is absolutely of no use. My second objection is that it establishes a line of cleavage in defence between the two parties. Get rid of it and there is but one policy. Third, because it does not provide for the defence of Canada directly. Fourth, because if passed it might lead to friction with Britain. Fifth, because we have no evidence that it meets with public approval. Sixth, because it introduces a new practice in legislation not sanctioned by the usages of this constitution. Seventh, because it removes from the free control of Canada one of its effective elements of national defence, the three battleships proposed.

### **Where the Senate Stands.**

That is why I am opposed to the Bill. Where does the Senate of Canada stand?

It stands for the defence of the Empire, from Australia to the Pole. Not on the North sea alone, but on every sea where the British flag floats in time of danger. I hope we are all agreed on that.

Secondly, we stand for as many battleships of the most modern type as are required; at any rate to the limit of our resources. The Bill does not do that.

Thirdly, we stand for a permanent Canadian navy to guard our coast and trade routes and commerce with Great Britain, and all other nations at peace with the empire.

Fourthly, we stand for the construction of a navy and shipyards, using for that purpose the product of Canadian industry and building it by the industry of our people.

Fifthly, we stand for the training of our own seamen in naval schools and colleges, and on board training ships, so that when our ships go out to sea they will represent Canadian blood and bone and flesh and sentiment. The bill does not provide for that.

Sixthly, we stand for placing our ships at the disposal of the King in case of emergency, or at any time, at the expense of Canada, and not at the expense of the British tax-payer; our hearts, hopes and money to go with the ships wherever they are called to fight for the integrity of the empire.

Seventhly, we stand for co-operation with His Majesty's dominions beyond the sea in forming one solid phalanx if need be, with all the powers they represent, in the defence of Britain for the peace of the world.

Eighthly, we stand for unity and defence if the emergency arises, and we do not propose to question the wisdom of the admiralty as to how or where that emergency has arisen, or with whom or why we are called upon to fight for the empire. If you can get any better foundation I will go with you, and I will stand on a stronger platform than my own if you build me one. We want to be in the strongest position and we want to do that in perfect independence. I regret that the premier in his address at Toronto made some remarks regarding the Senate, which I do not think were called for. He said:

### **Borden on the Senate.**

For the present, however, I deprecate the assertion made in many Liberal quarters, that the majority of the Canadian Senate is merely an echo of a discredited minority in the House of Commons.

I do not believe it.

Whenever Sir Wilfrid Laurier pulls the strings the Liberal senators will dance as he desires.

I am sorry to say there is one Liberal senator who cannot dance.

There are many men of high character and intelligence among the Liberal senators, and I entirely decline to believe that their action will be thus unworthily controlled.

Otherwise I would be prepared to declare that the Canadian Senate as at present constituted, had thoroughly outlived its usefulness, and that an immediate remedy must be sought and found. The Senate is an important part of our constitutional machinery and is entitled to every respect, but it is not, never was, and never will be above the Canadian people.

Who said it was? We do not assume to be above the Canadian people. The House of Commons is not above the Canadian people. I have seen in my short time four Houses of Commons put out of doors and it may happen again. And it is a good thing for the House of Commons on certain occasions. And why? Because the people were above them. The sovereignty of the people is above the House of Commons. When he talks about reconstituting the Senate, what does he propose to do? We will live as long as we can. The hand that fills the Senate empties it; does he want an elective Senate? He has not proposed one. Let him not shoot his darts in the air. We were

not here to suit any premier or any leader of the opposition or anybody else. We are to do our own sweet will according to our judgment and good conscience. To say that we are an echo, is an offensive term.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

### Is the Senate an Echo?

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex): A very offensive term. Was my hon. friend opposite an echo before 1896—I think he was in the House about that time, was he an echo? I think probably some hon. gentlemen who sit around me were in the House before 1896, before the Liberal government came into power. Were they echoes? I do not think they were, and I would be ashamed of my colleagues if I thought they were an echo of any voice except that of justice and propriety. Perhaps it might be interesting now to know what is the final decision of this House in regard to this Bill. I think it is probable that I shall move a resolution before I sit down, that the consideration of this Bill be deferred for sometime in the future. I do not think it will be any good at any time. I do not think it is any good at all just now. It may be revamped. It may be recast; it may be rehabilitated. If it turns up in some other form that is reasonably acceptable, we shall take it and be glad to help it. It is not an uncommon thing for Bills to be deferred. The terms of my resolution are well known to this House. When I was here in 1910, I remember the hon. leader of the House moving a resolution in these terms:

That all the words after the first word “that” be struck out and the following inserted: This House is not justified in giving its assent to this Bill until it is submitted to the judgment of the people.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex): In 1910 he wanted to get the judgment of the people. Perhaps he knows what is the judgment of the people. He wanted to get the judgment of the people on a Bill founded on strictly parliamentary principles. Would it be unreasonable that we should ask the judgment of the people upon a Bill that has not a sound parliamentary principle in it from clause 1 to clause 6?—and it contains six clauses, all bad. Are we to blame? I think the Hon. Mr. Borden moved in 1910 that the Naval Bill be submitted also to the judgment of the people. Was he at fault in regard to the Naval Bill of 1910? If we take the Naval Bill of 1913 and submit it to the people, or propose that we should get the judgment of the people—are we to blame? I do not think so. I think Mr. Borden said in his speech at Montreal—I have not had time to look it up—that he would submit his Bill to parliament and if parliament rejected it he would appeal to the people. I have no concern whether he does or not. I have no concern with the political side of the question; but I have this concern, that I do sincerely hope that any legislation we may approve of in this House is in harmony with public opinion, whether that public opinion is represented in the other House by a Liberal or Conservative government.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

### Public Opinion.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex): The moment a Bill comes before us in regard to which public opinion is uncertain, or in regard



to which there has been no expression of it, then I think we are justified in trying to find what that public opinion is.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS. (Middlesex) Now, will any harm come? And there is the point where I had some difficulty in reconciling myself to this position. Would any harm come? Suppose there is an emergency and this Bill is rejected to-day; to-morrow morning hon. gentlemen can provide for that emergency just as easily as they could if we passed the Bill and the Governor General signed it.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

Hon. Mr. CLORAN: And better.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex). The Bill does not help the emergency one iota. It is utterly useless for that purpose. The old Act of 1910 is fully capable of meeting an emergency or any other condition of things—war, insurrection, invasion or anything. So when we ask the Bill to stand over we are hurting nobody. Let me say, too, if there was no other way of helping the empire—if there was an emergency—I am afraid I would have to vote for this Bill, for we cannot allow the empire to fall, no matter what happens.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS. I do not think it is in danger, but if parliament had no other authority than the present Naval Bill to help it, then I would have to consider seriously whether I should reject such a Bill. To reject it means nothing to the empire, but to reject it means a great deal to Canada. Sentiment, construction of a navy at home, employment of our skilled workmen, the inspiration of doing something for ourselves instead of hiring somebody else to do it. So I propose to follow the course pursued by my hon. friend in 1910. I am just going to do as he did. I am going to follow the course pursued by Mr. Borden in 1910. I am going to do as Mr. Borden said in his speech in Montreal he would do if there was any necessity for it. I am going to take the advice that Mr. Borden gave to Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1910—if parliament did not approve of the Bill, to appeal to the people. That is the position I propose to take. How I shall be supported remains to be seen. There is another point. The hon. member claimed that he had a mandate for this Bill. I do not know on that point. I am a little short of information. As far as I can recall the election of 1911—for I was out of the country very shortly after it took place—I think this was the situation: The Naval Bill was not discussed except in the Province of Quebec. I think I am right in that.

Hon. MEMBERS: Yes. No.

### **No Mandate.**

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS. One member outside of the Province of Quebec admitted that the naval question was an issue in the last election. Thirty-eight members supported the Laurier policy from the Province of Quebec, so that province did not give any mandate for a change of policy. Will hon. gentlemen bear that in mind? And if they did not get the mandate from the Province of Quebec they got it from nobody, because the matter was not discussed in any other province. As I understand it, there is no mandate for this Bill; and if you will allow me to say it, there are times when we do not care whether there is a mandate or not. In an emergency we would not

want a mandate. There was no mandate for sending volunteers to South Africa. It was confirmed later, but there was no mandate in advance. Necessity, as I said before, has no law. There is no mandate; there is no emergency; or if there is an emergency we can do without the Bill. Let us wait, and let the people of Canada say whether they believe in a permanent navy or in a contribution.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex). If they want this contribution they shall have it, so far as I am concerned, should I have a seat in the Senate.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex). There is nothing to stop the chariot wheels of the sovereign people. This senate will not stop them so far as I am concerned. They must go on from stage to stage, and parliaments must give way for them, and houses of lords must give way for the people, and kings must lay down their heads upon the block that the sovereignty of the people might be supreme. What should we do? Find out what that is, and obey that mandate. If the twentieth century is to see the full fruition of the labour of those who laid the foundation of our Dominion and planned the superstructure which should be the glory of the nations, every measure which affects its dignity or which represents its purpose should be proportioned to the ideals of its founders. I have a great respect for the fathers of Confederation; we do not think enough about them. We are no longer infants in the night crying for the light. The day of things is past and gone. We are no longer walking timorously the path of destiny; our pulse beats stronger and our step is firmer, for the strength of young manhood is in our loins.

Hon. GENTLEMEN: Hear, hear.

### **Duty of Canada.**

Hon. Sir GEORGE ROSS (Middlesex). Not by shrinking from the responsibility of man's estate, not by listening to the feeble voice of mediocrity, not by cloudbursts of patriotic emotion will Canada be admitted into the family of nations. It is for the statesmen of today to set the pace for the next generation as well as for the present and to give the national character an impulse which will fire it with a new born enthusiasm for higher national ideals. Is there anything, I ask, in this Bill to produce that effect? Shall our children of twenty years hence read the history of our naval defence and cover their faces when they discover that it was proposed in the Senate of Canada to place at the disposal of the British admiralty a certain number of modern ships, the best that science could devise or money pay for, but not a single Canadian to man them? When we joined with the other dominions to fight for the empire in South Africa we did not send empty uniforms. Uniforms were sent, to be sure, but there were 5,847 courageous Canadians inside of them. It was not Nelson's ships that won the battle at Trafalgar. Nelson did not say, "England expects this day that every ship will do its duty." Nelson said, "England expects that every man will do his duty." This Bill calls for money, not for men; for models of steel and iron; not for models of courage and daring; it appeals to no man's flesh and blood; it offers no Victoria crosses for lives rescued on the battlefield from the sabres of the enemy. Empty as an exploded cartridge, and soulless as its



plated sides, it arouses no sympathy, no sentiment, no emotion of joy or glory. Should a Bill like this be submitted for the assent of a royal scion whose ancestors for many generations honoured the British constitution as a palladium of liberty and self-government. Our feelings, our judgement, our sense of duty to our country, all combine to ask for further delay in the hope that even at this late hour we may show to the whole world that the disrupting forces of party warfare have been submerged by the loyalty of a united nation in the naval defence of Canada and the empire.

I beg to move, seconded by Hon. Mr. Bostock, in amendment to the motion of the second reading of this Bill:

That all the words after the first word "that" be struck out and the following substituted:—"This House is not justified in giving its assent to this Bill until it is submitted to the judgment of the country.

## MR. BORDEN'S NAVY BILL.

### BILL 21.

AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 15TH MAY, 1913.

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE MEASURES FOR INCREASING THE EFFECTIVE  
NAVAL FORCES OF THE EMPIRE.

HIS MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. This Act may be cited as <i>The Naval Aid Act</i> .   | Short title   |
| 2. From and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.   | \$35,000,000 authorized to increase the naval forces of the Empire. |
| 3. The said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor-in-Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.   | To be used to construct battle ships or cruisers.                   |
| 4. The said ships when constructed and equipped shall be placed by the Governor-in-Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire.  | Ships to be for the common defence of the Empire.                   |
| 5. The said sum shall be paid, used and applied and the said ships shall be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the Governor-in-Council and His Majesty's Government. | Terms to be arranged with Imperial Government.                      |
| 6. A detailed statement of the sums expended under the authority of this Act for the then last preceding fiscal year shall be laid before the House of Commons during the first fifteen days of each session of Parliament.  | Statement of expenditure to be laid before House of Commons.        |

## APPENDIX

### *Sections of Act of 1910 referred to in Speech of Sir George Ross.*

9-10 EDWARD VII.

### CHAP. 43.

And Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada.

[Assented to 4th May, 1910.]

HIS Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows.

#### SHORT TITLE.

1. This Act may be cited as *The Naval Service Act*.

#### INTERPRETATION.

2. In this Act, and in any regulations made hereunder, unless the context otherwise requires,—

Over



(d) "emergency" means war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended  
(g) "naval establishment" includes officers' quarters, barracks, dockyards, victualling yards, naval yards, factories, rifle and gun ranges, naval colleges, and all other buildings, works and premises under the control of the Minister, constructed or set apart for the Naval Service;

(h) "Naval Forces" means those naval forces organized for the defence and protection of the Canadian coasts and trade, or engaged as the Governor-in-Council may from time to time direct;

(i) "Naval Service" includes His Majesty's service in respect of all naval affairs of which by this Act the Minister is given the control and management, and also the Fisheries' Protection Service, Hydrographic Survey, tidal observations of the coasts of Canada, and wireless telegraph service;

4. The Command in Chief of the Naval Forces is declared to continue and be vested in the King, and shall be exercised and administered by His Majesty, or by the Governor-General as His representative.

7. The Minister shall have the control and management of all naval affairs, including the purchase, maintenance and repair of the ordnance, ammunition, arms, armouries, stores, munitions, and habiliments of war intended for the use of the Naval Service.

8. The Minister shall have the control and management, including the construction, purchase, maintenance and repair, of naval establishments and of ships and other vessels for the Naval Service.

11. Governor-in-Council may organize and maintain a permanent naval force.

19. The Naval Reserve Force shall consist of such persons as join the said reserve after naval service or after undergoing such training as may be prescribed. All members of the said reserve shall be liable to active service upon an emergency.

22. The Governor-in-Council may place the Naval Forces or any part thereof, on active service at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of an emergency.

23. In case of an emergency the Governor-in-Council may place to the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

24. Whenever the Governor-in-Council places the Naval Service or any part thereof on active service, as provided in the two preceding sections, if Parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall issue for a meeting of Parliament within fifteen days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue to sit in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.

25. When the Governor-in-Council declares that an emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public service that His Majesty should have control of any dock, shipyard, pier, wharf, machine shop, repairing or salvage plant, factory, warehouse, store or other building the Minister may, by warrant under his hand, empower any person named in such warrant to take possession thereof in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, and to use it for the service of His Majesty in such manner as the Minister directs, and all persons, officers, servants and employees employed thereon shall obey the directions of the Minister in connection with the management or operation thereof.

26. The Governor-in-Council may organize and maintain a force to be called the Naval Volunteer Force.

27. The Naval Volunteer Force shall consist of officers and seamen raised by voluntary engagement from among seafaring men and others who may be deemed suitable for the service in which such volunteers are to be employed.

31. In an emergency the Governor-in-Council may order and direct that the Naval Volunteer Force, or such part thereof as may be deemed necessary, shall be called into active service, and the naval volunteers so called out shall be liable to serve under such regulations as may be prescribed.

32. There shall be an institution for the purpose of imparting a complete education in all branches of naval science, tactics and strategy.

2. Such institution shall be known as the Naval College of Canada, and shall be located at such place as the Governor-in-Council may determine.

37. The Minister may lay down targets, buoys and other appliances for target practice by the vessels in the Naval Service, and may also provide rifle ranges suitably equipped for the use of the Naval Service at or near any port or any naval establishment.





